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Shrestha, Ananda. 1979. "Error Analysis." *Contributions to Nepalese Studies*, 6:2, pp. 1-9.

Shrestha, Ramesh. 1977. "Adult Literacy in Nepal: a Report." Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Tribhuvan University. Mimeographed.

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MEDIEVAL BUDDHIST ART IN NEPAL: PENETRATION OF PAL INFLUENCES IN THE HIMALAYAS¹

Prem Upreti
Central Department of History, TU

Introduction

The expression "Nepal" throughout the paper is used in the traditionally limited sense to include the Kathmandu valley only, which embraces the three ancient cities of Kantipur, Bhaktapur, and Lalitpur. The spatial dimension of the Kathmandu valley is a little oval, elongated in shape, covering an area of 200 square miles.² Nepal's contribution to the evolution and development of Buddhist art in Asia is of monumental significance relatively out of all proportion to her small size and limited human and physical resources.

All the schools of religious and artistic movements in South Asia registered their impact on Nepal. By the seventh century A.D., Buddhism was on its decline and in the process of largely disappearing from India. The description of the Chinese pilgrim Hiuen-Tsang indicates that Buddhism by the time of Harsha of Kanauj Buddhism was already in neglect, and there were few believers.³ Nepal thus became the home of Buddhist art in South Asia from seventh century onwards. Hundreds of well finished Lichchavi *chaityas* of pristine Hemispherical form are found scattered all over the Kathmandu valley bearing testimony to this fact. At present, there are 314 *bahas* and *bahis* (Buddhist monasteries) in the Kathmandu valley alone.⁴

Evolution of Buddhist Art in Medieval Nepal

Three factors helped significantly in enriching Buddhist art in medieval Nepal. First, the sweep of Bhakti cult in Nepal led to a greater urge for creative vision and artistic expression. The Bhakti cult was primarily responsible for the evolution of the cult of Adhi Buddha (akin to the Hindu Brahma), who, according to the *Swayambhu Purana* and the popular Nepali tradition, was manifested in the form of a flame in Nepal. He then decided to take the form of five celestial Buddhas. Subsequently the five Dhyani Buddhas were associated with their families (*kulas*). The result being that the

female deities like Tara and Vrikuti assume towering significance. All these elements entered quickly into the cosmogony of Nepali Stupa art. Thus, even Adhi Buddha also receives his iconographic forms of either Vajradhara or Vajrasattava, who is also represented by his *sakti yab-yum*.⁵ Second, the Pal influence in Nepal helped in the final evolution of Buddhist art in the Valley, not only in its conceptualization but also in its medium of expression and the final style of execution, and finally, after the fall of Nalanda as a centre of Buddhist learning due to the invasion of the white Hunas, Nepal became the home for the Tibetan Buddhists, and the Nepali artists had to cater to their needs.⁶ As Buddhist deities in Nepal multiplied with the entry of Hindu-styled local gods and goddesses and spirits, they also formed a distinct part of the Buddhist cosmogony of the Nepali stupa. Thus, the Vajrayanic art that attained its final evolution and perfection in Nepal is, in fact, the completion of the evolutionary process that was set in motion from the time of Sakyamuni onwards.

Nepali *bahas* and *bahis* of the Kathmandu valley are the finest treasures of the Pal-styled art in South Asia. The Pal-styled Buddhist art of medieval Nepal is superb in its plasticity and in the style of execution. There is a balance in composition, rhythm and vigour. Nepali art from this period breathes with life and is pleasing to the eye. Though predominantly religious, the art is secular enough to embody the metaphysical concepts of art. Here the artist is moved by the spirit of syncreticism rather than parochial or sectarian outlook.⁷

Pal influence in Nepal is so wide-spread that it is seen in every nook and corner of the cities of the Kathmandu valley, like the Dhvakha Baha, Nag Baha, Vinche Baha and other *bahis* of the Valley.⁸ However, this was not a one-way traffic. Nepal influenced the Nalanda school of Buddhist art also. As Ulrich Von Schroeder points out:

Among the hundreds of cast images excavated at Nalanda two copper images of Nepalese origin representing Vajrapani in the standing and seated positions shows that at one time Nepalese artists were commissioned to work there.⁹

Buddhist gods and deities are depicted as *yogis* with matted hair, wearing few garments. But they are profusely ornamented, including necklaces, bracelets, and earrings. A way of further beautifying the Buddhist deities is the painting of the palm in red. Under the Pal influence the Buddhist male and female figures became as numerous as their Hindu counterparts; and they are richly associated with animals. The Pal-styled seated as well as the standing Buddha figures representing the Master in the *varad*, *vyakhyan*, and *bhumisparsa*

mudras and wearing the Sarnath type of wet drapery was very popular in Nepal in the early medieval period; this tradition continues even today. Today they can be seen in the Buddhist Chaityas of Swyambhunath and Mahaboudh temple of Patan. It is easier to recognize the Buddha figures when they are standing; but it is often difficult to differentiate the seated Buddha images from the Dhyani Buddhas, which are more popular and more plentiful in Nepal.

Specific Examples of Pal-styled Buddhist Deities in Nepal

a. **Padmapani Avalokesvara** (13th. or 14th. century A.D.): This beautiful Buddhist deity is one of the proud possessions of the Nepal Museum, Kathmandu. The bronze cast and gilded figure is seated in a double petaled lotus flower. The figure is inlaid with precious and semi-precious stones especially in the crown and ornaments. The face reveals the characteristically gentle smile that is typical of Padmapani (the bearer of lotus). The slender figure is expressive of beauty and mildness. His lower right hand is making the gesture of giving (*varada*); and his left hand is holding a lotus stem which rises behind him to the level of his shoulder and there blossoms into a flower. The upper half of the body is unclothed, while the lower half has an attractive *dhoti*, supported by waist-band with many hanging pendants. In one hand he is supporting the *dhoti*, the other is in a blessing posture. The earrings of the deity are very remarkable. He also wears a necklace of seven pendants, thus making it a perfect example of symmetrical order. The central pendant, being big and attractive, was taken by the artist as the central point. He wears a double tier crown, and the head is little bent with half closed eyes of compassion. This sculpture is indicative of the Pal style in its ornamentation, drapery, crown and facial expression.

b. **Vasundhara** (13th – 14th. century A.D.): This is another possession of Nepal national museum, Kathmandu. Vasundhara, the second wife of Lord Vishnu, enters into the tantric Buddhist pantheon of Nepal. She is a very popular Buddhist deity in Nepal. Being a treasure-giver, out of her six arms she is shown holding in four of her hands. In the left hands from top to bottom she holds a book, ears of grain, and a pot containing jewels. A shining gem sticks out of the pot. In her middle hand there is another gem with a string of brooch jewels suspending from it. The top and bottom right hands make significant gestures. She wears a five spoked crown behind which is shown another crown. She is profusely ornamented in the manner all Pal-styled Buddhist deities of Nepal. Her right leg is bent hanging casually down, with the foot resting on the lotus. Her waist is slender, and her breasts are

well executed with prominent nipples. Her body is further beautified by a garland of pearls reaching to her waist and a necklace that is made of two-tier beads with a hanging pendant. The stones inlaid in this figure are uncut star-ruby, garnet and other semi-precious stones.

c. Water Spout Icon of Tara (12th. Century): This stone icon is found inside the water spout of Nala. Her left hand is holding a stem of lotus. The hair is tied in a knob without a headdress. A very distinctive waist-band decorates her waist which is similar to the river Jamuna of the Pashupati area. The figure shows the same kind of dress used in Nepali and Indian figures during the Mathura and Gupta schools of art. The hollow stela is very much indicative of the Nepali school of art in the medieval period. This is not found in the Pal art of India. The double *prabhavali* (nimbus) depicted in the figure indicates the first of its kind in the figures of the Kathmandu valley. This certainly is the impact of Pal art in Nepal. Afterwards, this style is copied meticulously by the artists of medieval Nepal. The double *prabhavali* is still an important feature of contemporary Nepali sculptures.

d. Sculptures with life-scenes of Buddha: The sculptural representation of the life-scenes of Buddha are relatively fewer in Nepal. Two sculptures of circa ninth century representing life-scenes are remarkable for their elegant plasticity and narrative presentation. One from Yangal-Hiti (now in the National Museum, Kathmandu), depicts a fragment of a scene from Mara's temptation. Two daughters of Mara are depicted in standing seductive posture, trying to tempt the Master. Besides a large number of Mara's associates, especially goblins and demons, including a skeletal figure resembling Chamunda (a buffalo-headed demon) and Ganesh wielding axe, are shown launching further attacks on Sakyamuni. The other figure comes from Deo-Patan (now in National Museum, Kathmandu). The sculpture depicts the scene of nativity and shows Mayadevi standing in graceful *tribhanga*, holding a branch of tree. The infant Buddha is standing on a lotus against an oval *prabhavarli* represented on her right flank. The newly born Buddha is being bathed by a pair of flying celestial devotees with water mixed with lotus blossoms from upturned vases.

e. Buddhist Deities from Nepali Paintings: The manuscript illuminations and illustrations constitute the earliest expression of Nepali paintings. One of the earliest Nepali paintings is now in Los Angeles County Museum. It shows a very rich Pal influence in composition of the theme, for example the depiction of the eight principal events in the life of Buddha, as well as the use of colours and the stylistic representation. The above painting depicts the

birth of the Master. Here we see a fully grown Buddha with no pretension of being an infant. He emerges from the left hip instead of the right of the Indian tradition. He then stands on pyramid of lotus flowers and is attended by Indra and the multi-headed Brahma. While Indra carries the fish, Brahma holds a basket. Here we see a strange combination of a supernatural birth combined with a realistic social ceremony the artist may have witnessed at home. The Nepali artist did not follow the dictates of rigorous tradition; frequently he is inspired by his own imagination and personal experience. So far from being carried away by the traditional norm, he gives a touch of newness and elegance.¹⁰

More important illuminations come from a Buddhist manuscript text in the National Archives, Nepal, containing minatures of Dhyani Buddhas and the minature deities. These are four leaves with minatures from palm-leaf manuscript. First, is the protective goddess (Maha) *pratisara* in white, with eight hands and four heads. Four right hands hold from top to bottom; sword, arrow, thunderbolt, and jewel; while the four left hands hold the axe, bow, trident and sling. Second, the Dhyani Buddha, *Vairochana* is in white, and his hands reveal the gesture of preaching (*dharmachakra mudra*). Third, the protective goddess (Maha) *sitavati* is in green. She possesses three heads and six hands. Three right hands from top to bottom possess: arrow, thunderbolt, gesture of protection (*abhaya mudra*). Three left hands bear the ensigh (*ratnadhvaja*) and sling. Fourth, the Dhyani Buddha *Amoghasiddhi* is in green with his right hand in the gesture of protection. All the four figures are seated on lotus blooms above a rectangular plinth and are enclosed within a nimbus.¹¹

Nepali paintings are richest in the Buddhist cosmogony. They reflect the Buddhist deities like the Dhyani Buddhas and Manjushri. It is true that Nepali paintings reflect Pal influences, yet they also reflect stylistic differences such as in the setting of the background of painted rocks, the figure in the backdrop of red and blue, and the overall use of pigment and colours. While talking about the paintings in Nepal, the *pauva* Art or the *thankas*, the culmination of Nepali painting tradition, occupies the central place. Though the Nepali *pauvas* can be dated only to the beginning of the nineteenth century the school of Nepal art is much older and is the finest expression of Nepali use of colours.

The *thanka* paintings of Nepal can be taken as the most representatives of Nepali art, where tradition reigns supreme. The *thanka* painting in Nepal, unlike modern art, eschews the process of experimentation and innovation. It consists of imitations of methods, which are already valued beautiful as opposed to attempts to discover new forms of beauty. There is no room for a free hand in the *thanka* paintings, for they represent subjects and images

from the Buddhist religion in a meticulously worked out methods as handed down from generation to generation. All the figures are laid in geometric fashion and conform with the perfect proportion of the ideal divine body. The drawing always begins with the central figures. The Buddha figure alone has thirty-two major and minor characteristics, each of which is faithfully reproduced even in the fingernails of Buddha.

Once the drawing is finished, colours are applied to the canvas with the traditional hair brush. First, the two colours of the landscape blue and green are applied in basic blocks. As the iconography of the *thanka* painting is dictated by formal unchanging rules, so are the colours, which are specific and individual to each deity. A true *thanka* painter will even today prefer natural colours bound with glue from animal skin. The minerals and herbs traditionally used were: lapis lazuli for indigo or blue, arsenic for yellow, and cinnabar or conchineal for red. After the basic colours are fixed, many months are spent in details. The serene posture of Buddha, the depiction of his hands and fingers is done with all profusion and fineness. It is because of the rigorous method that the *thanka* paintings appear to be repetitive; but up on a close scrutiny, one always sees the ingenuity and the skill of the artist in the execution of the details. Thus, a talented *thanka* artist can give a two-dimensional *thanka* a touch of life and make the central figure "step off the canvas and speak to you."

The *thanka* painting is an act of faith dedicated to the Lord -- The Master. The final proof of the dedication is the gold work. Goldingots or gold leaf and mercury are ground together with crushed calcite and sometimes mixed with sugar and honey to make a smooth paste, which is delicately applied to bring the finest details. It is the patron of the *thanka* who supplies as much gold as he can offer to the god.

The final touch is when the three letters "Om Ah Hung" the mantric symbols for the body, speech, and the mind are painted at the back of the *thanka* in red. These are believed to help the patron in his meditation and the religious ceremonies. As the Nepali *thankas* are acts of faith and devotion, they are never signed. But in the lower of the corner of the painting is the figure of the artist in a full devotional kneeling posture who has sacrificed his skill and soul for the glorification of the Buddha.¹²

Two other themes are peculiar to Buddhist art in medieval Nepal. First is the dedication of commemorative images after the death of a person or the votive types installed after completing a pilgrimage or fulfilling a vow. Second is the Old Age Rite.

The Old Age Rite: Bhima Ratha (Janko)

According to the ancient tradition, the Old Age rite is performed after a man has seen one thousand full moons. But a Nepali Buddhist performs his *janko* when he reaches the age of seventy-seven years, seven months and seven days. After performing this rite, his place is assured in the heaven of Amitab Buddha. A stupa is built to commemorate the Bhim Rath, also known as *ushnishavijaya*. The Newars perform this rite with great pomp and show, dedicating a painting depicting the goddess within the stupa. The stupa is placed on a high pedestal in front of which is attached the potrait of the donor riding a chariot drawn by three horses. The ride is, perhaps, symbolic of his ride to the western paradise of Buddha Amitab. Attached to the circular body of the stupa is the effigy of the goddess Unsnishavijaya. The super-structure of the stupa is a spire of thirteen rings representing the thirteen stages of enlightenment. The spire is sheltered by a parasol (light umbrella) to which is attached festive streamers and which is crowned by a vase of immortality. This stupa may grace the domestic shrine of the donor's family or be dedicated to the monasteries.

Conclusions

To conclude, the Nepali medieval artists were not just imitators of Pal art, and they were innovators and had both ideas of their own and a long artistic tradition, that had been shaped by Nepali's history and environment. While Nepali artists assimilated the artistic experiences of India, they moulded them into their own fold according to their needs and requirements. Nepali medieval Buddhist art has been characterized by certain features that are quite distinct from the contemporary Indian art. First, in Nepali Buddhist art one witnesses the inlaying of precious and semi-precious stones like the star-ruby, garnet, moon-stone, and turquoise in ornaments. Second, the figures in Nepali bronzes and paintings indicate a very heavy use of gold. The use of gold continues in the gilding of the roof of Buddhist temples and the beautification of the *gajurs* (pinnacle). Third, the outlines of Buddhist figures in paintings are drawn with careful lyrical fluency, which stands in contrast to the lively figures of Pal art, and finally the landscape, architectural element, and use of colours are different from those of Eastern India. Nepali figures are painted in the background of rocks. The colours also differ in intensity and tonality. For example, in Nepal the red is tinged with a touch of crimson, whereas brighter illuminations are in vogue in the Indian tradition. Thus, the pigment shades in the Nepali illuminations in manuscripts and wall paintings are generally more subdued than the Indian example.¹³

Nepali artists beautifully synthesized the foreign elements into their art work and came up with some of the finest specimen of Buddhist art in Asia.

While the Pal art disappeared from India after the Muslim invasion, Nepal was able to preserve and develop it, for the Nepalis made their art-work a part of their socio-religious life. This was done in two ways.

- a. The abstract vajrayan philosophy was simplified for the laymen in visual aids by paintings and sculptures in the *bahas* and *bahis*. The tradition of painting was kept alive by painting the auspicious symbols like the stupa, the eyes, the *kalasa* and the *pancha* Buddhas in the walls and the door-ways.
- b. There also developed a tradition among the Newar Buddhists of Nepal to build a stupa with a painting of Ushnishavijaya inside it to commemorate the seventy-seventh birthday of a Buddhist. Again, paintings and sculptures of a family Buddhist deity were also made after completing an austere vow or after coming from pilgrimage.

It is the above socio-religious factors that have been responsible for preserving the Vajrayanic school of art in Nepal. Thus, a student of Nepali art history will come across thousands of Pal-styled art in the Kathmandu valley in all mediums – stone, wood, bronze and canvas. They certainly far exceed in number the collection in all the museums of India and elsewhere in world. After the destruction of the Nalanda University, Nepal became the home of the Pal-styled art in South Asia. Nepal not only evolved this school of art to perfection but also managed to export it into Tibet, China, and inner Mongolia. This art is still a living tradition in Nepal.

Notes

1. This paper was presented at an international seminar on “Pal Art”, Patna University, held on September 21 and 22, 1991.
2. For more on the spatial location of Kathmandu, see P. Karn, *Nepal- a Cultural and Physical Geography* (Lexington: Kentucky, 1960); H.M.G., Nepal, *The Physical Development of Kathmandu Valley* (Kathmandu: H.M.G. Nepal, 1969); also Harka Gurung “Geographic Foundations of Nepal,” *Himalayan Review*, Vol. I, 1968, pp. 1-10; Harka Gurung, “Landscape Patterns in Nepal,” *Himalayan Review*, Vol. IV 1971, pp. 1-10.
3. The account of the pilgrim is given in Samuel Beal, *Life of Hiuen-Tsang* by Shaman Hwui-li (Delhi: Oriental Book Reprint Co., 1969), p. 178.
4. The expression *baha* (*bahal*) is the distorted form of the Sanskrit term *vihar*. *Bahi* also denotes a Buddhist establishment in Nepal; but if *baha* refers to a bigger Buddhist settlement, then *bahi* refers to a smaller Buddhist enclave. Among 338 total Buddhist monasteries in Nepal, only 24 of them do not belong to the Kathmandu valley. The number of

- viharas* according to their specific location include: Patan (185), Kathmandu (106), Bhaktapur (23), Thimi (9), Sakhu (9), Banepa (2), Panauti (1), Khampu (1), Nala (1) and Dolakha (1). For more on *Bahas* and *Bahis*, see John Locke, *Buddhist Monasteries of Nepal: A Survey of Bahas and Bahis of Kathmandu Valley* (Kathmandu: Sahayogi Prakashan, 1985).
5. The expression *yab-yum* denotes both holy father holy mother. For more on cosmogony of the Nepali stupa, see Krishna Deva, *Buddhist Art in India and Nepal* (Banarasi: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1987), pp. 1-22.
 6. The result being that "Lhasa" to a great extent became a Nepalese colony. And it was chiefly Newars who built temples there, painted images; their reputation spread all over central Asia, and they were called from far away, even in more recent times, for decorating religious buildings." Sylvain Levi, *Le Nepal*. Vol. IV (Paris: Bibliotheque d'Etudes, tomes, 1905-1908), p. 63.
 7. See also D.R. Regmi, *Medieval Nepal*, Part I (Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1965), pp. 614-667.
 8. Pal influence in Nepal is also seen in the cult of Mahisasur Mardini and the Dakshinkali cult. Another important cult in western Nepal that is a subject of much contemporary research is the *masta* cult. The *masta* cult, which embodies both male and female deities together with the *ath bhaies* and *bara bhaies*, also comes from Bengal and reflects Pal influences. See Chakravarti, Chintaharne, "The Antiquity of Tantricism", *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. VI, 1930, pp. 114-126; C. Chintaharne, "The Cult of Bara Bhaies in Eastern Bengal", *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Vol. XXVI, 1930, pp. 379-388.
 9. Ulrich Von Schroeder, *Indo-Tibetan Bronzes* (Hong Kong: Visual Dharma Publications, Ltd., 1981), p. 301.
 10. See Pratapaditya Pal, *Art of Nepal: Catalogue of the Los Angeles Country Museum Art Collection*. Berkely: L.A. County Museum, 1985, p. 148.
 11. See also Ernst Waldschmidt, *Nepal: Art Treasures from the Himalayas*, trans. by David Wilson (New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., 1969), pp. 67-68.
 12. For the above information, the writer is grateful to the greatest living Nepali *thanka* painter, Siddhimuni Sakya. His paintings are alive and full of colour. Today his single piece of painting is sold in the international market from 60,000 to 200,000 Nepali rupees.
 13. See also Pratapaditya Pa, *Art to Nepal*, op, cit. p. 147-48.

THE USE OF THE MOTHER TONGUE IN PRIMARY EDUCATION: THE NEPALESE CONTEXT

Ramawatar Yadav

It is through his mother tongue that every human being first learns to formulate and express his ideas about himself and about the world in which he lives.

UNESCO, 1953

Background

It has now become a commonplace of contemporary thinking that language is a highly emotionally charged issue, an aid and a barrier to national development, an advantage and a disadvantage to an individual, a centripetal force that may unite a nation, and also a centrifugal force that may drive a society apart and ultimately divide a nation.

In Nepal, language is possibly the most important area where there are race/ethnic/caste differences. This has been the centre of much political controversy lately - so much so that a group of 77 members of Parliament submitted a memorandum to the Minister of Education for making Sanskrit "compulsory" from grade 1 through 10 in public schools, and recently, as a retort as it were, a group of 90 members of Parliament submitted a signed petition to His Majesty's Government against this political manoeuvre. It is anybody's guess what course the remaining members of Parliament might take.

As early as 1951, at a Unesco meeting of specialists in Paris, it was recommended that every effort should be made to provide primary education in the mother tongue for the simple reason that it is culturally, psychologically, and pedagogically more appropriate to do so. The Unesco report concludes:

... pupils should begin their schooling through the medium of the mother tongue, because they understand it best and because to begin their school life in the mother tongue will make the break between home and school as small as possible.

(UNESCO 1953/1968:691)

In 1990 at a World Conference on Education for All, held in Jomtien, Thailand, some 1500 participants from 155 nations recognized that

... traditional knowledge and indigenous cultural heritage have a value and validity in their own right and a capacity to both define and promote development.

(WDEFA, 1990:2)

The delegates proclaimed a World Declaration on Education for All, which declared categorically that

Literacy in the mother tongue strengthens cultural identity and heritage.

(WDEFA, 1990:6)

The Constitution of Nepal 2047/1990 guarantees the fundamental right of the individual to receive primary education in his/her mother tongue:

प्रत्येक समुदायले बालबालिकाहरूलाई प्राथमिक तहसम्म आफ्नो मातृभाषामा शिक्षा दिने गरी विद्यालय सञ्चालन गर्न पाउनेछ।

3:18:2

The Constitution also guarantees the fundamental right to preserve and foster the growth of language, script and culture of a speech community in Nepal:

नेपाल अधिराज्यमा बसोबास गर्ने प्रत्येक समुदायलाई आफ्नो भाषा, लिपि र संस्कृतिको संरक्षण र सम्बर्द्धन गर्ने अधिकार हुनेछ।

3:18:1

The National Education Commission Report 1992 recognizes the need for a clearcut policy and planning to impart primary education through the medium of the mother tongue:

नेपालका विभिन्न क्षेत्रमा छरिएर रहेको विभिन्न राष्ट्रिय भाषाहरू बोल्ने परिवारका बालबालिकाहरूलाई उनका भाषामा प्राथमिक शिक्षाको व्यवस्था गर्न स्पष्ट नीति र योजनाको आवश्यकता छ।

(NECR, 1992:6)

The Commission recommends that:

नेपाली मातृभाषा नभएका नेपालका अन्य राष्ट्रिय भाषाभाषी क्षेत्रका विद्यालयमा शिक्षाको माध्यमको रूपमा राष्ट्रिय भाषाहरूको प्रयोग गर्न सकिनेछ।

(NECR, 1992:29)

Against this background, the present paper will discuss the use of the mother tongue as a medium of instruction in primary education in Nepal.

Three Reasons and Two Objections

Three Reasons

The above brief overview presented a global as well as a national concern for the use of the mother tongue in primary education. In this section, the discussion focuses on three specific reasons for which the mother tongue should be used as a medium of instruction at the primary education level in Nepal.

First is the phenomenon of heavy wastage in primary education in Nepal. A recent study has shown that: (a) wastage in primary education in terms of repetition and drop out is more than 50 per cent in grade one, (b) the repetition rate is highest in the first grade, (c) only 35 per cent of the primary pupils successfully complete the five-year cycle, and (d) one primary school graduate takes 12.51 pupil years to complete the primary education cycle (CERID: 1990). The non-use of the mother tongue of the non-Nepali-speaking pupil as a medium of instruction is known to be one of the conclusive contributing factors to the high rate of attrition in primary education in Nepal. The study concludes that:

The language spoken by the child has also much to do with his retention at school. Because Nepali is used as the medium of instruction, a non-Nepali-speaking child cannot easily cope with the classroom instruction and so he stands to a greater chance of dropping out of school.

(CERID, 1990:36)

The second reason has to do with the issue of participation (or, nonparticipation) of a pupil in the primary education program in Nepal. The government of Nepal may set its policy priorities at the primary education level to consist of such lofty goals as universalizing primary education, providing education for all, and improving the quality of classroom instruction; nevertheless, a close look at the prevailing situation reveals that

much remains to be done in realising these goals. An influential study (CERID, 1984) demonstrated that of the variables adversely affecting the educational participation of rural children, the non-use of the mother tongue of a non-Nepali-speaking pupil assumes a significant role. A major finding of the study is that:

The probability of a child participating in education was, other things being equal, higher if the language he speaks at home is Nepali.

(CERID, 1984:iii)

The study concludes that:

... the probability of participation in education for a child who spoke Nepali at home was higher by .124 than for a child who spoke another language at home. The reasons for this strong association between Nepali-speaking children and educational participation are obvious. Nepali-speaking children would feel comfortable in the classroom and enjoy school life whereas it might be a threatening experience for non-Nepali-speaking children.

(CERID, 1984:94)

A concrete example of the serious problem faced by Tharu primary school children in understanding Nepali in Sunsari, Chitawan, Dang and Kailali (incidentally, Tharus are perceived to be an acknowledged educationally disadvantaged community) was reported by CERID in 1988. The study concluded that:

... the greatest problem faced by the children in their school is the problem of communication. Nepali as the medium of instruction obstructs learning. They hardly understand anything taught in Nepali. They cannot express themselves adequately in it. The compulsion of learning through Nepali retards their educational growth.

(CERID, 1988:22)

The third reason relates itself to the findings of Basil Bernstein, a British sociologist interested in the role of language in socialization, i.e., how a child acquires a specific cultural identity and responds to that identity. Bernstein claims that there are two quite distinct varieties of language in use in society. In its simplest form, Bernstein's argument is that while the middle class has access to both an "elaborated" and a "restricted" code, the working class is generally confined to a "restricted" code of language (Bernstein 1971). Bernstein's claim, in my opinion, has grave implications for the problem of the educability of non-Nepali-speaking children in Nepal who end up being basically confined to the "restricted" code of the language of school

instruction. In particular, children from non-Nepali-speaking communities are likely to find themselves at a disadvantage when they attend a primary school for two reasons: one, there is a hiatus between the symbolic orders of the school and those of their family; second, the school curriculum and textbooks make extensive use of the elaborated code of the language of instruction. One may go as far as to say that our schools are simply not made for these children. Bernstein's observations on the disadvantageous situation experienced by a working class child in England may be applicable almost wholesale to the non-Nepali-speaking child in Nepal:

To ask the child to switch to an elaborated code which presupposes different role relationships and systems of meaning without a sensitive understanding of the required contexts must create for the child a bewildering and potentially damaging experience.

(Bernstein, 1972)

Extending the argument a bit further and bringing in an element of controversy, I would like to submit that a great majority of non-Nepali-speaking users/consumers of Nepali control but only a "restricted" code of the Nepali language. This linguistic deprivation continually conspires to be a major deficit to the non-Nepali-speaking individual, who may meet unequal chances for advancement and upward mobility in social, educational, political, economic, as well as administrative realms of life in Nepal.

Two Objections

It is quite common to come across a number of objections that are advanced against the use of the mother tongue; only two will be discussed here.

One common objection to the use of the mother tongue assumes the form of a threat perception to national unity. In other words, a common plea from political zealots is that the use of non-Nepali languages is potentially divisive and therefore unsuited to national interests. Little do the zealots realise that they merely speak the language of politics, i.e., they use words that succeed and policies that fail. The Constitution of Nepal 2047/1990 dispels the mist of doubt lingering in the minds of zealots in unequivocal terms:

विभिन्न धर्म, जात, जाति, सम्प्रदाय र भाषामाषीहरूका बीच स्वस्थ एवं सुमधुर सामाजिक सम्बन्ध विकसित गरी सबैको भाषा, साहित्य, लिपि, कला र संस्कृतिको विकासद्वारा देशको सांस्कृतिक विविधता कायमै राखी राष्ट्रिय एकतालाई सुदृढ गर्ने नीति राज्यले अवलम्बन गर्नेछ।

The second objection to the use of the mother tongue as a medium of instruction assumes the form of the following argument: the nation is "just not ready" for it - in view of the lack of textbooks and reading materials written in the medium of the bewildering mass of languages spoken in Nepal.

Two immediate reactions spring to my mind. First, the argument is reminiscent of the Panchayat regime when it was blurted out that the people of Nepal were just not ready for democracy. Time has shown to the contrary. Secondly, about 40 years ago, when I was still in the middle school, textbooks and reading materials in Nepali were virtually nonexistent. Suddenly, a set of glossy textbooks written in Nepali and printed in Darjeeling appeared on the scene. Today we are ready to impart education through the medium of Nepali; 40 years ago we were not. By the same token, given the political commitment and the concomitant financial support coupled with linguistic research, we believe that we might very soon be ready with the textbooks and reading materials in a number of languages of Nepal. It is surely utopian to hope that Nepal can endow every speech community with a complete vernacular school system and a complete library full of vernacular textbooks and reading materials, but a start will have been made after all. And this we believe is significant.

The Number Game

How many languages are spoken in Nepal? No definitive answer to this question can be given at the present state of research.

The Census Report of 1952/54 lists 36 languages as being spoken in Nepal. The Census Report of 1961 lists 36 languages, and the rest are relegated to "Others" and "Unspecified Languages". The Census Report of 1971 lists 17 languages, and the rest are subsumed under such vague categories as "Local District Languages" and "Other Languages", while the Census Report of 1981 lists only 18 languages as being spoken in Nepal.

The latest Census Report, published in June 1992 as *Population Census-1991* (Advanced Tables) lists 32 languages spoken as mother tongues in Nepal. These are: 1. Abadhi, 2. Bengali, 3. Bhojpuri, 4. Byashi, 5. Chepang, 6. Danuwar, 7. Darai, 8. Dhimal, 9. English, 10. Ghanghar, 11. Gurung, 12. Hindi, 13. Jirel, 14. Kumhale, 15. Limbu, 16. Magar, 17. Maghi, 18. Maithili, 19. Marwadi, 20. Nepali, 21. Newari, 22. Rai/Kirati, 23. Rajbanshi, 24. Raji, 25. Santhal, 26. Satar, 27. Sherpa, 28. Tamang, 29. Thakali, 30. Thami, 31. Tharu, and 32. Urdu.

Of these, 12 languages are spoken by above 1% of the population of Nepal, as shown below:

1. Nepali	53.21%
2. Maithili	11.83%
3. Bhojpuri	6.60%
4. Tharu	4.85%
5. Tamang	4.66%
6. Newari	3.44%
7. Magar	2.24%
8. Rai/Kirati	1.94%
9. Abadhi	1.72%
10. Limbu	1.30%
11. Gurung	1.14%
12. Urdu	1.03%

Most linguists of Nepal are convinced that the linguistic demographic data reported by the Central Bureau of Statistics are both inaccurate and indefensible. In the mid 1970's, the SIL linguists had estimated that 40 "mutually unintelligible" languages existed in Nepal. Currently, in the light of the Linguistic Survey of Nepal carried out by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Council), it is estimated that about 70 languages belonging to four language families are spoken in Nepal.

Textbooks and Reading Materials

The main obstacle to the use of the mother tongues in primary education is the lack of textbooks and educational materials in these languages. What should be done to overcome the situation?

Linguists may tend to view the multiplicity of languages as a positive and potent resource to be harnessed to aid the development of a nation; nevertheless, the existence of a complex and heterogeneous linguistic situation is not always an entirely unmixed blessing for a newly developed democracy like Nepal. There is thus an urgent need to begin to plan the use of the mother tongue as a medium of instruction in a systematic and phase-wise manner.

Circumstances no doubt disallow us from beginning to impart primary education in 70 languages at once. A need therefore arises to decide and determine the number of languages to be selected for the purpose on a principled basis. Two criteria are generally used for the purpose of selection: (i) the linguistic demography, i.e., the number and percentage of speakers of the language, and (ii) the literary status of the language, i.e., the orthography, availability of printed texts, grammar, dictionary, folk literature, other literatures, and so on.

Viewed strictly from the above criteria, Nepali, Maithili, Limbu and Newari may stand out as successful candidates for the purpose in the first phase. In the second phase, a few other Indo-Aryan languages such as Bhojpurī, Awadhī and Tharu (?) may also be chosen as probable candidates since efforts, however scanty, are underway to publish reading materials in these languages. A concerted effort is recently being made at the Royal Nepal Academy to develop a suitable Devanagari writing system for Limbu through a Limbu-Nepali dictionary project; this may facilitate and pave the way for developing an effective and uniform writing system for Tamang, Gurung, Magar, Rai, Sherpa and other hitherto unwritten Tibeto-Burman languages of Nepal. Only the other day the publication of a Rai journal written in the Devanagari script was announced.* It is anticipated therefore that at a later stage these languages may be considered as potential candidates for use in primary education.

What about the languages of those speech communities that are both small in size and socioeconomically disadvantaged? Languages like Kumhale (1150 speakers), Byashi (1450 speakers) Darai, (5030 speakers), Jirel (5220 speakers), Santhal (5870 speakers), Thakali (7470 speakers) and Dhimal (8870 speakers) especially come to mind. The Constitution of Nepal 2047/1990 guarantees the right to linguistic self-determination to all speech communities of Nepal. A policy decision therefore needs to be made to enrich these languages to enable them to cope with educational needs of the respective communities.

The crucial question thus is: how can a language be enriched in order for it to lend itself readily to the exigencies of the modern world? In other words, what does 'language development' entail?

Language planners have determined that language development involves three principal stages: codification, standardization, and elaboration. A brief presentation of the three stages of development in the context of the languages of Nepal is given below.

Codification

In the case of hitherto unwritten languages like Tamang, Gurung, Rai, Sherpa, Darai, Dhimal and a host of others, there is need to select a code, i.e., to create or to use a modified form of an existing writing system. This calls for extensive linguistic research into the morphological, phonological and syntactic structures of these languages. A few hitherto written languages

* Following immediately in its footsteps, a periodical journal of Limbu literature and culture entitled *Yakthung Sapsok Nu Sakthim* and written in the Sirijunga script has been published in Kathmandu in September 1992.

have eschewed the use of traditional scripts and espoused instead a more widely used script for practical reasons. Examples are languages like Limbu, Newari and Maithili, which now use Devanagari. Until recently, however, Maithili had a separate writing system - Mithilaksar - which is historically akin to the Bengali and Oriya scripts. Newari also had its own scripts; "no fewer than nine" different types of Newari writing systems, all deriving from Devanagari, have been enumerated. Limbu too had a well-known script, the Sirijunga script.

The adoption of Devanagari may not be wholly without problems. Examples from Limbu and Maithili are cited here for illustration. In an attempt to reduce Limbu to writing through the Devanagari script, it was found that Devanagari lacked graphemes for such Limbu phonemes as the glottal stop, the low vowels [ɛ] and [ɔ], and for a series of phonemic length contrasts at various vowel heights. Recourse had to be made to interpolating the Devanagari graphemes with a number of diacritical marks to serve the purpose. In the case of Maithili, a number of inconsistencies remain. For example, not all vowel characters in Devanagari correspond uniquely to the sounds they represent in Maithili. Thus, no unique symbols exist for the vowels [æ] and [ɔ]. [æ] is represented by such vowel combinations as *ae*, *ai*, *aya* while [ɔ] is represented by *au* or *ao*, e.g.,

[æ]	[bhæ]	bhae bhai bhaya	'brother'
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Occasionally, [æ] is also represented by *ae*, e. g.,

	[kæ]	kael	'did'
[ɔ]	[pɔlɔhu]	paolahu paulahu	'got (2H)'

One striking peculiarity of the Maithili writing system deserves special mention here. The fully inflected verb forms containing person and honorificity agreement affixes are written variously; thus, [kəhlɔɪnh] 'He (H) said to me' is written as *kahalanhi*, *kahalainhi*, or *kahalainh*. Similarly, [bajɔɪth] 'He (H) may speak' is written as *bajathi* or *bajathi* or *bajaiith*.

Standardization

Once a language is codified in some way, it becomes possible for it to be standardized. Standardization is "the process of one variety of language becoming widely accepted throughout the speech community as a supradialectal norm - the "best" form of the language - rated above regional

and social dialects....." (Ferguson 1968:31). This usually involves the development of such things as reference grammars, dictionaries, and possibly a literature.

A standardized variety can also be used to give prestige to speakers who use it, marking off those who do not, i. e. those who continue to speak a non-standard variety. It can therefore serve as a norm for linguistic behavior of a speech community.

Most languages of Nepal are obviously not so standardized. Nepali is itself still in the process of being standardized. Nepali may boast of an extensive literature but no standard reference grammar of Nepali written on modern linguistic principles is yet available. Besides, the orthography of Nepali is in need of reform and standardization. Some of the main problems of Nepali orthography may be summarized as follows:

- (i) Whether to continue to retain both short and long i and u;
- (ii) Whether to use s consistently for ś and ṣ;
- (iii) Whether to use __ or _ to make vowel nasalization; and
- (iv) Whether to retain separate graphemes for palatal and retroflex (and even velar) nasal consonants.

It should be noted that most of the above questions attain salience in view of phonological studies of Nepali which demonstrate conclusively that such distinctions are not phonemic. The issue of the existence of a multitude of spellings is further complicated by the pundits' extensive knowledge of Sanskrit, which makes them want to stay as close as possible to those spellings, and at times to adopt etymological spellings.

That attitudes of the speakers of a speech community are all important is demonstrated in the case of Maithili. It is a common practice to speak of the Madhubani dialect in north India as the 'standard' dialect of Maithili. The reasons, however, are more extralinguistic than linguistic. Such extralinguistic factors as caste, social status, elite formation, and the Brahman's and Kayastha's inner sense of superiority and pride in their form of speech are chiefly responsible for the label. Furthermore, the so-called 'standard' dialect of Maithili renders itself both uninteresting and unilluminating for serious linguistic research for the simple reason that it is in essence a direct phonetic characterization of Devanagari orthographic symbols as they appear in concatenation to form written words in Maithili.

Elaboration

The third stage of language development is elaboration. A language needs to undergo the process of elaboration in order to possess adequate vocabulary to

meet educational and scientific needs of the modern day society. The process of elaboration may be thought of as expanding the vocabulary of a language by a variety of means, such as lexical borrowing, or the borrowing of whole words; loan translations or calquing; coinage; giving new meanings to existing words; compounding new words; and so on.

To cite an example, Nepali, the national language of Nepal, tends to employ the following measures to expand its vocabulary:

- (i) Sanskritization: Sanskritization seems to be the most common principle behind the expansion of Nepali vocabulary. Conscious efforts are continually made to replace English 'high' vocabulary into the language. *Vimānasthala* for 'airport' and *mahānyāyādhivaktā* for 'Attorney General' are examples.
- (ii) Anglicization: The impact of English is so strong that in most cases a wholesale transliteration of the English word is retained, i. e., as far as the Nepali spelling system allows. *ḍīna* for 'dean' and *kyāmpasa* for 'campus' are examples.
- (iii) Borrowing from other sources: Yet another tendency is to attempt to enrich the vocabulary of Nepali by borrowing words of local color from various regional dialects of Nepali and from other neighboring languages of Nepal.
- (iv) A few ridiculous coinages in the form of direct translation of loan words, e. g., हदुईशून्य for 'H₂O', are not hard to come by in the literature. Nevertheless, these words have soon fallen out of use.

Elaboration is a slow and arduous process for language development. Development of scientific and technical vocabulary in particular is exceedingly time-consuming. Even at the present advanced stage of language development of Nepali, for example, it may be infelicitous to carry prolonged discourse on metaphysics and nuclear physics. The less said the better about languages like Dhimal and Kumhale.

To sum up thus far, the production of textbooks and everyday reading materials that might appeal to the young, e. g., comic books, mystery stories, and collections of folk tales in a language, presupposes that the language in question is suitably codified, sufficiently standardized, and well-equipped with adequate vocabulary. The moral of the lesson is that at this time barring a few most languages of Nepal will be hard put if asked to carry the responsibility of serving as the medium of instruction. To help ameliorate the situation, we propose that a Central Institute of Languages of Nepal (in the fashion of the CIIL, Mysore, India) be established: this Institute will promote linguistic research in the languages of Nepal, appoint

committees for scientific and technical vocabulary development, and prepare pedagogical and educational materials in the medium of the languages of Nepal.

Finally, textbook writing is a difficult job, which requires professional skill and acumen. Textbook writing also entails a thorough linguistic research in the area of vocabulary frequency count. Without such research it may be difficult to specifically determine the content of the teaching material, and the well-known principles of selection, gradation and presentation may not be adhered to. Exactly how important the study of word frequency might turn out to be is evident from a gleaning at lesson 1 (p. 7) and Exercise 2 (p. 33) of the Grade 1 Nepali textbook which, we are told, is prepared after three years of extensive consultation with hundreds of teachers, parents, headmasters, and educationists. The first lesson of the Nepali textbook, used throughout the country by non-Nepali-speaking children, contains such infrequently used lexical items as अगुल्टो and उछिट्याउँ. Exercise 2 (p. 33) of the said textbook uses such lexical items as कत्र (whatever it may mean!), पत्र (a *tatsama* word!) and सत्र (since when did number 17 become a lucky number in Nepal?). As a matter of fact, the very first lexical item in Exercise 1 (p. 33) is कर : are we to assume that कर is the most frequently used word in the Nepali language?

Summing Up

By way of summing up, a word of suggestion to the policy makers. No matter how strange and linguistically schizophrenic it may seem to a monolingual, it is uniquely the case that a Nepali from a certain *terai* locality makes love in Maithili, discusses politics and resents discrimination in Hindi, makes an application for a job in Nepali and does research on laser beam in English. Equally interesting is the fact that our political leaders discuss bills in the Parliament in Nepali and ban the use of other national languages of Nepal in the Parliament, address a mass gathering in Janakpur or Sarlahi in Hindi, and address a NAM Summit in English which is broadcast on Nepal Television in Nepali. The government of Nepal in order to ensure equity should weigh these facts in perfect balance before it determines a language policy on education.

I started this paper with a quotation from a Unesco report; I might as well conclude it with a quotation from a World Bank policy paper on primary education:

Determining a sound language policy will necessarily be heavily influenced by the unique economic, cultural, political, and linguistic factors in each country. However, the balance of available evidence indicates that, under the circumstances in many developing countries, it is most effective to begin with the home language as the medium of instruction and later to switch to the necessary second language.

(World Bank, 1990; 38)

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GUARDIANS OF THE ROYAL GODDESS : DAITYA AND KUMAR AS THE PROTECTORS OF TALEJU BHAVANI OF KATHMANDU

Bert van den Hoek
Balgopal Shrestha

Introduction

On the seventh day of the great Dasain festival (Sept-Oct.) the images of the royal goddess Taleju Bhavānī of Kathmandu are taken down from their lofty position in the Taleju temple overlooking the ancient palace compound of Hanuman Dhoka. The goddess is brought to a room of worship at the back of Mulchowk, a courtyard which is distantly facing the stairs leading up to the temple. In there, special rites and sacrifices are performed over the next three days. The journey of Taleju is a short one, not comparable to the lavish processions (*yātrā*) of various other divinities of Kathmandu. On their way down to the special room of worship, Taleju's Pūjā Kothā, the four images or emblems representing the goddess are covered with shiny cloth (New: *tās*). The doors of the Pūjā Kothā are closed behind the small procession of priests carrying the covered images. Taleju will be just as secluded from the public eye in Mulchowk as she was in her higher temple abode. On the great ninth (Mahānavamī) of the ten Dasain days, the only day of the year that the general public is allowed to circumambulate the sanctum of the Taleju temple, the images of Taleju herself are behind the closed doors of the Pūjā Kothā in Mulchowk. For the occasion, the procession image of Guhyeśvarī, also kept in the Taleju temple, is shown to the public at the Southern gate to the sanctum.

In principle, only those Karmācārya and Jośī (non-Brahmin castes of Hindu ritual specialists) who by hereditary right perform Taleju's daily worship are granted a *darśana*, a sight of the goddess who since Malla times is the main *śakti* (lit: power) of the realm. However secret the rites are kept and however powerful the goddess remains, a gradual decline of the Taleju cult in Kathmandu is undeniable. Once a year it is given grandeur by the official fanfare of Mahāsaptamī, the seventh day of Dasain. At that time the king of Nepal visits Mulchowk to view the *Phulpāti* (a canopy containing flowers) brought from the Taleju temple in Gorkha, the town of origin of the present

dynasty. The *phulpāti* from Gorkha has its own special room, known as Dasain Ghar, in the courtyard adjoining Mulchowk (Nāg Pokharī). The king also receives *prasāda* (blessed items, i.c. flowers) from Taleju Bhavānī of Kathmandu through the main priest (New.: *mū ācāḥju*) without having a *darsāna* himself. As for the higher castes connected with the ancient Malla court, which are still mentioned by Pradhan (1986: 311) as partaking in the *khadga yātrā*, the sword procession on the final night of Dasain, they did no longer appear in 1992. Some of the temple officiants and one gazetted officer holding the (covered) royal sword were the only sword-carriers on an occasion which once marked the glorious war path of both the goddess and the king. Several Jyāpu (Farmers) who also have to play key roles in the final ceremony threatened to leave the scene after an assiduous and probably better remunerated army guard at first denied them entrance on their arrival at Hanuman Dhoka.

That the *khadga yātrā* nevertheless remains an impressive event is in no small measure due to the graceful presence of the dancers embodying Daitya and Kumār together with their respective musical bands. Apart from their presence in the sword procession, Daitya and Kumār make their only appearances in Mahāsaptamī morning, when the images of Taleju are brought down from the temple, and in Vijayā Daśamī morning, when Taleju is brought up again. Both dancers are boys who at the time of their selection for a 5 year period must be between 8 and 15 years old. Daitya has to belong to the Śākya (Goldsmith) community of Kvane, the Lower town of Kathmandu, Kumār to the Tulādhār (Merchant) community of Thane, the Upper town of Kathmandu. If the timing is accurate, the two deified boys for a short while share a single stage inside the palace compound of Hanuman Dhoka on the Mahāsaptamī (7th) and Vijayā Daśamī (10th) mornings of Dasain. They do not form an ensemble, however. When embodying the divinities the two boys are kept strictly separate, and, incidentally, the two of them never met in ordinary life either.

The embodiment of divinities by children or even infants is not unusual in Nepal; the goddess Taleju herself is embodied by the royal Kumārī (Allen 1975), the girl-child who receives the greater part of the popular worship to the goddess. Remarkably enough Daitya and Kumār are to protect the goddess Taleju herself, the central Śakti (lit: power) of the realm, from dangers that apparently may threaten her. The Kumār dancer of the Upper town (Thane) has to protect Taleju from dangers originating in heaven, and he is thereto equipped with a bow and arrow. The Daitya dancer of the Lower town (Kvane) has to protect the goddess from dangers on earth and from the netherworld and is thereto equipped with a dagger.

The Protection of the Protective Goddess

The powerful Taleju Bhavānī thus appears to need protectors (*rakṣak*) at the critical moments of transition, those of descending and ascending her temple abode. Again, it is not unusual for goddesses to have male attendants, most often Bhairava and Gaṇeśa. The latter two also appear as deified children who precede Kumārī in her charriot procession, a configuration which comes closest to a parallel with Daitya and Kumār watching over the movements of Taleju herself. The explicit protective function of Daitya and Kumār, however, distinguishes them from the more common attendants or companions of the Goddess. Equally remarkable is the distinction between the two protectors themselves. Both of them have a martial character, but while Kumār is a god, and is commonly considered a son of the Goddess, Daitya is a demon, an enemy of the gods and particularly of the Goddess herself. In several of the great divine dances of Kathmandu, such as the Bhadrakālī pyākhaṁ (Van den Hoek 1994) and Naradevī pyākhaṁ (Pradhan 1986:348,349), Daitya is the prototypical enemy of Goddess and is, ultimately, always defeated by her. Various other dances of the valley also express the same theme: the only reason for Daitya to exist, it seems, is to be killed by the Goddess, just as, conversely, and more in accordance with the textual sources, the Goddess herself was brought into being to defeat the demon enemies of the gods.

A general description of the festival of Dasain (also called Durgā Pūjā, or in Newari, Mohanī) is given by Pradhan (1986) in his dissertation on the domestic and cosmic rituals of the Hindu Newars of Kathmandu. Interestingly, Pradhan divides the cosmic rituals of the Newar into those situated on the positive pole of the sacred and those situated on the negative pole of the sacred. Needless to say, Dasain, which celebrates the victory of the Goddess over her demon adversary, is placed under the heading "The positive pole of the sacred...". This chapter describes in passing also the Pacalī Bhairava festival, which takes place during Dasain, and the Indrāyaṇī festival, celebrated nearly two months later. The festivals of Pacalī Bhairava's counterparts and of Indrāyaṇī's sister-goddesses, however, are relegated to the next chapter on "The negative pole of the sacred...", indicating the difficulty inherent to this kind of classification.

In just four sentences Pradhan makes mention of the subject of the present article, the performance of Kumār and Daitya during Dasain (1968:309). Brief but accurate, Pradhan's account passes over the apparent anomaly that Daitya is staged in this context to protect the Goddess who gloriously defeats him in the overall pattern of Dasain. A telling Newari poem, which for unclear reasons is inserted in the chapter on the negative pole of the sacred, praises the victory of the Goddess in the most vivid terms. Since the poem has been

translated by Lienhardt (1974:144-145) and already quoted by Slusser (1982:333), it is sufficient here to revoke the last sentence: "You (i.e., the goddess Kālī) are red with blood through the blood-drops of the youthful body of your enemy, the Daitya (quoted in Pradhan 1986:319). The incongruity of the young Daitya protecting Taleju during Dasain goes simply unnoticed. Elsewhere, when treating the sources (1986:370-373) relevant to Dasain or Durgā Pūjā, the Devī Māhātmya in particular, Pradhan proves to be not insensitive to the ambiguities expressed there.

Whether the goddess is called Devī, Durgā, Kālī or Taleju, and her demon opponent Daitya, Mahiṣāsura or Caṇḍa, there is always the strange combination of animosity and mutual attraction between the two opposed parties. Both the textual sources and the present-day conceptions leave no doubt that the demon adversary, most often called Mahiṣāsura or Daitya, is at the same time an ardent devotee of Lord Śiva and an admirer, if not a lover, of the Goddess herself. The killing of Daitya in the Naradevī dances of Kathmandu is most tellingly preceded by an intimate courtship of the demon and the Goddess who kills him. This intriguing matter has been discussed by others quoted in Pradhan (e.g., Biardeau 1984) and more recently by the present writers (Van den Hoek and Shrestha 1992:72,73). Indications are that the riddle is intentional and does not have an instant solution. In trying to disentangle the positive from the negative pole of the sacred, Pradhan separates for himself what is clearly fused in his evidence, and by doing so, he unwillingly demonstrates the sheer impossibility of dividing up the sacred.

Yet the attempt is challenging and deserves further discussion because it touches upon a fundamental issue. All so-called victories of good over evil or their re-enactments, whether in Dasain, Indra Yātrā, Gathā Mugaḥ or any other of Nepal's victorious yātrās, entail the problem of defining the "good". Similarly, all explanations of those festivals in terms of a re-establishment or reinforcement of "order" ignore the obvious disorder with is displayed on those occasions. The *raṁṣāsa* (demon) Gathā Mugaḥ, who is annually expelled from the city in the first festival after the rice-planting season is, at a slightly more hidden level, the hero of the event (Sayami 1980:5). Conversely, in the next festival of Indra Yātrā, the king of the gods appears as a prisoner in his own festival, encaged or bound to the poles which are apparently erected in his honour (Van den Hoek 1992) and which are viewed by most observers as a cosmic confirmation of the royal order. Likewise, and even more so, Dasain is generally considered to express the ultimate victory of order and virtue over disorder and malice, and again, as representing the solid enforcement of the social structure with the king at its apex. The descent of the royal goddess, the numerous sacrifices made to her and the

violent sight of the *khadga yātrā* are in that way seen as a conclusion, the end of the affair rather than the start of a new and dangerous episode.

The appearance of Daitya and Kumār in order to protect the protective Goddess displays just one of the dissonances in the festival of victory, but a telling one. Apart from Pradhan only Todd Lewis (1984), in his dissertation on the Tulādhār of Kathmandu makes mention of the dance of Kumār and Daitya. Lewis devotes two pages (1984:389-391) to the subject, but his account shows all the limitations of a one-caste, one-locality approach. It is inaccurate on quite a few points, including the identity of Daitya, the Śākya counterpart of the Tulādhār Kumār. The identity of Daitya, which is taken for granted by Pradhan and mistaken for Gaṇeśa by Lewis, thus remains puzzling.

At a closer view, Kumār, in the given context, carries with him a riddle of his own. Belonging to the world of the gods, and being a well-known demon-slayer like the goddess herself, Kumār's energies as protector of Taleju are directed against *ākāśa* (the sky), the abode of the gods. The whole configuration thus appears to be a reversal of the established one. On the given occasions Daitya has to ward off the dangers originating from the world of which he himself is the protagonist: the demonic realm. Kumār, on the other hand, has to protect the goddess against dangers springing from the heavenly realm – to which the two of them are held to belong themselves. The performance of Daitya and Kumār, it is clear, does not fit the pattern of the all-victorious goddess who re-establishes the divine supremacy. The functions of Kumār and Daitya suggest that Taleju, in her advance, must fear obstruction from all three worlds: heaven, earth and the underworld. How are the protectors, the young Tulādhār and Śākya boys, supposed to cope with threats that cannot be met by the goddess Taleju herself? As will be seen the two boys are elaborately prepared, but the relation between their training and their principal performance is far from transparent.

The Social Setting: The Tulādhār and Śākya Khalah

Both Daitya and Kumār are selected by lot among the eligible boys (between 8 and 15 years old, with no defects) of the Kvane Śākya and Thane Tulādhār *khalah* (New.: "families", communities). In both cases all local members are involved: There is no *guthi* within either of the communities that has the more specific task of organising the Kumār or Daitya *pyākham* (New.: dance performance). With regard to the special relationship between the merchant community and the cult of the royal family, Lewis argues that, by dancing in the role of a god who protects the goddess who guards the security of the kingdom, the Urāy (the high Buddhist castes of merchants and artisans) express their alliance with royal power while, in return, the king

acknowledges the traders' singular high standing in society. "It is telling", Lewis adds in a footnote without source and explanation, "that in Rana times the relationship broke down so that the military had to intervene on several occasions to enforce the Urāy community's participation" (Lewis 1986:391).

As it is, not all members of Tulādhār and Śākya caste are obliged to participate. The Tulādhār of Kathmandu all live in the Upper city (Thane) but are divided between two quarters: Neta and Asan. Only the Tulādhār of Asan participate in the Kumār pyākhaṁ. The Śākya are divided into a Thane and Kvane population, and only the Śākya of Ombahāl in Kvane participate in the Daitya pyākhaṁ. The caste distinction is generally considered subordinate to the spatial and cosmic opposition between the two parties. Kumār represents the Upper town and Daitya the Lower town in a way analogous to their respective tasks: protection against the evil forces from heaven, and protection against the evil forces from the earth and underworld. As is so often the case, a socioeconomic explanation like the one given by Lewis may be quite true or even obvious, but it does not illuminate the particulars of the ritual proceedings themselves.

In both the Kumār and the Daitya case, an assembly of elders (New.: *nāyo*) supervises the ceremonies. Remarkably, they are at least nominally appointed by a particular government office, the Rāṣṭriya Abhilekhālaya or National Archives. The Śākya and Tulādhār *mū nāyos* (main elders) possess a *lālmohara* (royal ordinance) of King Pratap Singh Shah charging their communities with the responsibility for the Daitya and Kumār dances along with an appropriate royal compensation and remuneration. The *mū nāyos* are assisted in their task by five *khalah nāyo*, family heads, who among other things provide the different musical instruments and musicians that are to accompany Kumār and Daitya. The assembly of *nāyos* is in charge of the all-important worship of Nāśadyo, the god of music and dance. They organize the sacrifices and feasts that are essential in the yearly course of events and more particularly at the installation of a new Daitya and Kumār every five years.

To have a son selected as Daitya or Kumār is not considered an enviable lot. The boys themselves view their role with a mixture of pride and embarrassment, but for the parents it is foremost a matter of concern. Their son, and by implication, the parents, have to obey strict life rules for five years, any breach of which can lead to illness, madness or even death. Both the Śākya and the Tulādhār community collect among their members a sizeable amount of money (nowadays amounting to several ten thousands of rupees) to be given to the new incumbent at start - this in addition to the meagre sum of Rs. 500 which the dancers annually receive from the government. If the lot falls to the richer families, they may try to find an

eligible boy from a more needy family to replace their own son. At least in recent times this procedure seems to be the rule rather than exception.

The evidence to substantiate the fear that a Kumār or Daitya performer is at risk for his life or sanity is not overwhelming. It indeed happened in 1975 that a Kumār died before his term finished, because, it is said, he witnessed some transgressive behaviour of his mother. In the experience of Jogratna Vajracarya, who has for over forty years been instructing Daityas – nine successive ones to date – only one of them showed signs of insanity, and that only after his term finished. Still the cause of his disorder was attributed to not having strictly adhered to the rules of his office which, most importantly, prescribe a daily morning and evening worship of Nāsadyo. As for this ex-Daitya, his sanity could be restored through medical treatment. The statistics of course do not refute the fact that families with a Kumār or Daitya in their midst may live under constant strain.

The training of Daitya and Kumār runs about parallel. For about a month, leading up to their first Dasain performance, they are instructed by a *gubhāju* (a Vajrācārya Buddhist officiant) in their dance. For each of the *gubhājus* it is a hereditary function to be *guruju* (teacher) of the respective dancers, and both of them possess secret texts with directives, mantras and songs for the specific purpose of instructing a Daitya or Kumār. At the end of the dancers' term the *mū nāyos* have to inform the National Archives that a new lottery is to be held. Because the one untimely death of a Kumār performer in 1975 occurred just before his last dance – an event separate from the yearly Dasain performances – the terms of Daitya and Kumār also keep running parallel; both were in their third year of performance in 1992.

To avoid repetition in the description, attention will first be turned to the instruction period and the initiatory dance of Daitya. Kumār's coming into being will then be described in those aspects in which it significantly differs from Daitya's case. Information regarding the beginning and the end of the dancers' career comes from interviews with the Śākya and Tulādhār elders, the respective *gubhājus*, Kumār and Daitya themselves and finally a former Daitya and a former Kumār, all of whom are mentioned in the acknowledgements.

The Coming into being of Daitya and Kumār

The instruction and the rituals that lead up to the formation of a new Daitya every five years, should ideally start about one month before his first performance in Dasain. The actual training period, though, may depend on other circumstances, foremost of which is the readiness of a new candidate. In bygone days, the *gubhāju* (*guruju*, the teacher) of Daitya related, a *māhām* (soldier) from Hanuman Dhoka would come to catch a young Śākya boy – an

account which calls into mind Lewis' above-mentioned footnote about the enforcement of the Urāy community's participation by military means.

The present Daitya, who started in 1990, recalled that his instruction period lasted no more than eight days, which led to a condensation of the rituals required. His predecessor's training, which took over half a month, offered a clearer view of the generally required sequence of preparations. The time schedule, however, is not fixed in absolute terms. Whatever the length of the instruction period, the critical passages are determined by *jyotiṣa*, astrology, and it is the task of the gubhāju to calculate the auspicious moments. The principal moments are:

1. *kisali tayegu*, (New.), the pledge made by the chosen one on his first day.
2. *ākhā tayegu* or *dyo svanegu*, (New.), the establishment of the god Nāsadyo in the new Daitya's house, one day after the demise of the old one - determined by *jyotiṣa*.
3. *ghaṁgalā svanegu* (New.), the attachment of the jingling bracelets worn below the knees, also determined by *jyotiṣa*, but ideally about half-way through Daitya's instruction period.
4. *musi pūjā* (New.), the main pūjā starting on the 5th of Dasain with the worship of Nāsadyo, and continuing throughout the night and the following day up to the first public performance of Daitya on the eve of Mahāsaptamī.

The first ritual act of the boy becoming Daitya is also the most simple one: the day after being selected he goes, together with his guru, to the shrine of Nāsadyo – the god of music and dance – in Ombahāl. Almost every quarter of town has its Nāsadyo, but the particular one in Ombahāl, Padma Niteśvara, is considered to be so powerful that women (who normally perform daily worship at Nāsadyo) cannot enter the shrine. At this Nāsadyo the Daitya-to-be has to offer *kisali* (New.: a small earthen platter containing rice, an arecanut and a coin), which signifies a sacramental bond or promise. Shortly after, but dependent on an auspicious moment (*sāit*) calculated by the gubhāju, the old Daitya will, after partaking in a goat sacrifice to Nāsadyo and a sacrificial meal (New.: *sī kāḥ bhvay*), make his parting dance. The build-up of the new Daitya's sacrality starts only after the demise of the old one, his "falling off the stage", an event that will be described in section 7. The last dance of the old Daitya and the first dance of the new one are performances in their own right, and have nothing to do with the protection of the goddess Taleju.

On the day following the old Daitya's death on the stage, the god Nāsadyo will be brought to the new Daitya's house. This elaborate ceremony is

known by two names, which indicate phases of the process: *dyo säre yāyegu* (New.: transferring the god) and *ākhā tayegu* (New.: establishing the ākhā). Ākhā generally denotes a room dedicated to Nāsadyo and the practice of music and dance. In this specific case it refers to the temporary shrine in the house of Daitya where he is to worship Nāsadyo daily and where he receives his *mohani* (New.: soot mark on the forehead, lit. "charm") and his *makuta* (New.: divine crown) before setting out for a dance. The actual practice for the dance takes place first at his guru's house (without music) and subsequently in the courtyard of his own house (with music).

The process of transferring Nāsadyo to an ākhā or *ākhāchem* (New.: house for musical repetition) is by no means unique in itself. Nāsadyo is a divinity of great importance for the performing arts. He is as essential for the Dhimay music of the Jyāpu (Toffin 1993) and for the Gathu pyākham (Van den Hoek 1994) as he is for the Daitya pyākham, the dance of Daitya. A well-illustrated survey of the characteristics of the omnipresent Nāsadyo is given by Ter Ellingson (1990) in an article subtitled "a photo essay". Unless the ākhāchem in which the musicians or dancers exercise their art is itself a shrine of Nāsadyo – as it is in case of the in-door shrine at Vatu, where Jyāpu exercise their Dhimay and Gathu their pyākham – the god has to be transferred (*dyo säre yāyegu*) to the ākhāchem.

In Daitya's case the ritual procedure is that two pieces of cloth with the features of Nāsadyo – three eyes and a moustache (called Nāsadyo kāpaḥ and painted by a member of the Citrakār, Painters caste) – are brought to the shrine of the god. The small temple in Ombahāl also contains the *aṣṭamātrkāś* (the common ensemble of eight goddesses), but the two Nāsadyo kāpaḥ are hung in front of the square recess in the middle of the back-wall, which represents Nāsadyo himself. The presence of the god is most often signified by one or three empty cavities of rectangular or triangular shape (see Ellingson 1990:238-240). After a sacrifice of one goat there, Daitya himself carries one of the two kāpaḥ to his house. The installation of the god (New.: *dyo svanegu*) consists of putting this Nāsadyo kāpaḥ in the room thereto reserved (New.: *ākhā tayegu*) and the sacrifice of a second goat in the newly established ākhā. That night a special *sī kāḥ bhvay* takes place which links the boy who is in the process of becoming Daitya with the one who finished his term the night before.

In the yearly recurrent goat sacrifices which the Sākya make to Nāsadyo in the night preceding Daitya's Dasain performance, the eight shares in the head of the sacrifice (New.: *sī*) are divided among the six khalāḥ nāyo, the gubhāju and Daitya. The gubhāju receives the most prestigious part, the right eye, Daitya gets the tongue, a part which does not indicate superiority or seniority but which often signifies the locus of divine power (cf Van den Hoek and

Shrestha 1992:66 and Van den Hoek 1992:551). The head of the goat sacrificed on the eve of the old Daitya's parting dance had been divided according to this set pattern. The heads of the two goats sacrificed on the day of dyo sāre yāyegu, the transference of Nāsadyo, will by contrast provide sixteen pieces of sī, in which not only the khalah nāyo but also other members will share in order of seniority. Most significantly, one of the two tongues is still given to the old Daitya, the other to the boy who is yet to assume the Daitya identity. After establishing Nāsadyo in the ākhā, the Daitya-to-be starts taking his lessons from the gubhāju. In the period leading up to the next ceremony (New.: *ghaṁgalā svanegu*) he is only practically instructed in the movements of the dance without any accompanying music and without special dress or divine attributes.

Ghaṁgalā svanegu, the ceremony of tying his jingling bracelets (pieces of cloth set with bells, an attribute of divine dancers in general), marks an important step in Daitya's formation but is not yet the final stage of the ritual sequence. Its timing again depends on a sāit, an auspicious moment calculated by the gubhāju. Both the ghaṁgalā themselves and the musical instruments of the Pañcatāla group which accompanies Daitya's dance are brought to the Nāsadyo shrine. The ghaṁgalā are placed in the cavity of Nāsadyo himself, the musical instruments are arranged beneath on the floor. Again a pūjā including a goat sacrifice is made to Nāsadyo, after which the instruments are handed over to the musicians and the ghaṁgalā to Daitya. The instruments are carried, without being played, to Daitya's home. After taking the sī kāḥ bhvay of the sacrificed goat there, the ghaṁgalā are put on Daitya's legs by the citāyā nāyo – the only nāyo who is not associated with a musical instrument and whose special function is to decorate Daitya. The musicians take up their instruments and Daitya symbolically makes a few steps on their accompaniment. Starting from ghaṁgalā svanegu, his further training takes place in the courtyard to which his house belongs (at present Ganthinani) and is from now on accompanied by music. The teaching sessions are open only to male members of the Śākya khalah.

The next and final stage in the ritual sequence (*musi pūjā*) starts two days before Mahāsaptamī, again with a pūjā and goat sacrifice for Nāsadyo. The principal members of the Śākya khalah will spend the whole night at Nāsadyo. Daitya's final transformation starts only the following day and consists of two parts, the first of which is surprising. Dressed in a white long skirt (New.: *jāmā*) with a turban (New.: *betāli*) on his head and a wound-up cloth around his belt (New.: *jani*) – the attire of Nāsadyo himself, it is said – a third eye and a moustache are painted on his face by a Citrakār (Painter). Thereby he displays the principal features of Nāsadyo and thus makes a first dance which, strikingly, does not reflect Daitya but the god

Nāsadyo himself. After his dance he is made to walk seven steps over lotus flowers and betel nuts, which, according to the *mū nāyo*, marks his final transformation into Daitya.

In the procession to his house, however, this "Daitya" still wears the attire of Nāsadyo. What is more, the *Pañcatāla* music, which usually contains one three-headed drum (New.: *kvatāḥ*) will for once, and only on this occasion, be supplemented with two additional *khim* drummers, called *Bhṛngī* and *Nandī*. On the toraṇa of the Nāsadyo shrine itself, Niteśvara is depicted with exactly those two attendants: *Bhṛngī*, playing the *kvatāḥ* drum, to his right, and *Nandī*, playing a two-headed *khim*, on his left (which is a more general representation, see Ellingson 1990:229). Although the two extra drummers are not bringing in an extra *kvatāḥ* drum, it is clear from their names that they constitute the accompaniment of Nāsadyo. Curiously then, in what is said to be a crucial transformation and *rite de passage*, the young incumbent is deified not as Daitya, but as a reflection of Nāsadyo himself. On the way to his home, Daitya's retinue distributes *samay baji* (New.: mixture of beaten and puffed rice, soyabeans, meat, garlic and raw ginger) as *prasāda* (blessed food) to bystanders, something which will not occur any more when Daitya appears in his proper tenue. Daitya will receive his appropriate dress that same evening, after the *sī kāḥ* bhvay that contains shares in the head of the goat sacrificed at Nāsadyo and another one sacrificed that night in the *ākḥā*. Again there are sixteen *sī* to be divided, among, of course, the *gubhāju*, the *nāyos*, Daitya himself (the tongue) and other members of the *khalāḥ* in order of seniority. The old Daitya may participate, but in contrast with the *sī kāḥ* bhay at *ākḥā* svaneḡu, on the day after his own demise, he is no longer obliged to take part.

Unlike the *ghaṁgalā*, which go from the one Daitya to the other until they are worn out, the appropriate dress of shiny red with yellow brocade has to be newly made every five years at a cost of Rs 3000 (last time). The responsibility for presenting Daitya's attributes on the spot is assigned to specific families who do not live in *Ombahāl* and do not participate in the selection of a Daitya. The dress itself, for example, is brought by the eldest (New.: *thāypā*) of the *Śākya* of *Lagan* quarter. Likewise, a *Śākya* from *Saubahāl* brings the *tvahā*, the four bangles which Daitya wears around his upper and under arms, and a *Śākya* from *Cikaṁmugaḥ Bahāl* brings a necklace of coral. Surprisingly the most important ornament, the divine crown (New.: *makuta*) is sent every five years for inspection or repair to a *Tulādhār* in *Dagubahāl* in *Asan* – the very point of departure for Daitya's counterpart *Kumār* – in what seems to be the only connection between the two groups (mediated, though, by a *Maharjan* (Farmer) who brings the crown to and fro). The assembly of elders which fulfill the main tasks in the

Daitya pyākhaṁ, including the organisation of feasts and rituals, together with the total assembly of musicians (at least five Paytāḥ horn blowers are required) all in all amount to a group of about thirty people involved in the main events in Daitya's first performance.

Daitya's dance in front of Nāsadyo in the attire of that god is not considered his first public performance. Only in the night of that day, after the *sī kāḥ bhvay*, is he dressed as Daitya by the *citāyā nāyo*, the elder who takes care of Daitya's decoration. Before going out, on this and other occasions, Daitya has first to enter the *ākḥā* with his guru, who will give him the finishing touch before he sets out: the black soot mark on the forehead (*mohanī*) which is shared with him by the *gubhāju* himself. For the five years to come, neither of them can take a *mohanī* mark from any other god or on any other occasion. In the *ākḥā* the *gubhāju* also puts the crown on the head of Daitya, who will then step out of the *ākḥā* into the courtyard, greeted with a blaring welcome by the *paytāḥ* (long horn) players.

The first dance itself will not be repeated in the five years to come. It is a public event on a stage (New.: *dabū*) in the locality itself, namely *Cikaṁmugaḥ dabū*, the same stage where also the last dance will be performed, but then in the absence of any public. Daitya is in his movements (the sequence of which, without repetitions, takes only a couple of minutes to complete) accompanied by the *Pañcatāla* music of the *Śākya*. The ensemble consists of at least five *paytāḥ* players, a *tāḥ* (New.: small cymbals), a *babhu* (New.: big cymbals) and a *kvatāḥ* (New.: three-headed drum) player, as well as one or more singers (cf Ellingson 1990:268, who omits the *babhu* cymbals, and Lewis 1984:390, who speaks of a "*thā*" drummer).

In the morning after his first performance Daitya shall, accompanied by the *Pañcatāla* musicians, for the first time act as a guardian of the royal goddess Taleju. Has he, one may wonder, been prepared for that particular task? On inquiry it appeared that not a single component of his training is related to this goddess or to her protection. It is even prohibited for Daitya to take the *mohanī* mark which, during Dasain, is given in the name of the Goddess by every family head to the members of his household. Daitya's training, the *gubhāju* affirmed, is entirely centered upon Nāsadyo. The repertoire of songs, it is true, contains homages to divinities which Daitya passes on his way to Hanuman Dhoka palace, and for whom he makes a short dance en route (New.: *dyo lhāyegu*). Yet none of those is dedicated to Taleju for whom, in the words of the old Daitya, "He has not to bow" (i.e. not to make a *namaskāra*). Similarly absent in his instruction are any references to the character of Daitya himself, that is, to the role he has to enact. Daitya is, in all respects, trained as a devotee of Nāsadyo, up to the point of identification:

during the crucial transition to divinity on the day preceding Mahāsaptamī he does not appear as Daitya but as a mirror image of Nāsadyo. Although that transition does not have to be repeated in the years to come, it is to Nāsadyo that the boy owes worship every morning and evening, both in the ākhā of his own house and at the shrine of the god.

During his five-year term, Daitya cannot take any food touched by somebody else (New.: *cipaḥ*) and cannot sleep outside his own house. In case one of his parents comes to die, however, he has to take up his abode in his guru's house, for he himself cannot be touched by death pollution. Still, even then, he has to make his daily worship in his ākhā, in the house where death has struck. Apparently his association with Nāsadyo not only excludes but also transcends the idea of death pollution that is otherwise so central to Nepalese thought and society. Although, from the point of view of the palace and the royal goddess, the godly performer has to act on three occasions only – and that within a space of time of four days – Daitya remains part of the boy's identity during the whole five-year period. At the same time his vocation as a Daitya dancer seems to be something casual compared to the daily devotion he owes to Nāsadyo.

With regard to the central position attributed to Nāsadyo, Kumār's orientation does not differ from Daitya's; both boys are ardent devotees of Nāsadyo from the beginning to the end. A comparison between them, therefore, does not elucidate main issues like their contrasted identities and their relationship with the goddess Taleju Bhavānī. The initiation into their divine roles and their further course of life run about parallel, yet there are some notable and not always explicable differences. The different stages in the training of Kumār may, as in Daitya's case, be contracted under the pressure of time.

The principal rituals are not determined by jyotiṣa but by convenience, a difference which may be attributed to the fact that Kumār's guruju, in contrast to Daitya's, is not also an astrologer himself. Another, perhaps not all too significant, difference is that in the past two decades, the Tulādhār have replaced some but not all of the prescribed goat sacrifices by duck sacrifices. In the latter case Kumār receives, instead of the goat's tongue, the right wing of the bird as his share, and his guru the head of it, while the other parts (in case of a duck only five) are divided among the nāyos. As in the Śākya khalah, most nāyos stand for the different instruments of the Pañcatāla music. In addition to the mū nāyo, they consist of the kvaṭāḥ nāyo, the paytāḥ nāyo, and the babhu nāyo. There is also a citākāri or citā nake nāyo whose task it is to decorate Kumār and serve food, but he is not considered to be nāyo proper and does not have a share in the sī. A tāḥ nāyo is absent in the Kumār pyākham because the tāḥ are not played by the

Tulādhār themselves but by a group of five Vajrācāryas. Formerly, families other than those belonging to the khalah used to bring different items of dress and decoration for Kumār, like in case of Daitya. Castes other than Urāy participated in it as well, such as Shrestha (giving dress) and Citrakār (giving the jabi for Kumār's loins). At present the nāyo takes care of all attributes except for the shiny upper-dress (New.: *tās*) of Kumār which still comes as a gift from a Tulādhār family of Asan.

A main difference with the setting of Daitya's sacred space is that Nāsadyo is not transferred to Kumār's own house but to that of the mū nāyo in Dagubahāl, and only for the period of a new Kumār's instruction. Afterwards Kumār has to direct his devotion solely to the Nāsadyo shrine in Taḥchembahāl, to which also his guru belongs. At the start of his course Kumār first brings kisali to his guru and then, together with his guru, to Nāsadyo. Just like the *kisali tayegu* by Daitya, this pledge is ideally made on the eve of the demise of the old Kumār. A few days later ākhā *svanegu* takes place, on the occasion of which formerly two goats were sacrificed, one at Nāsadyo and one at the ākhā, according to the same pattern as that of the Śākya. The practice has however been abandoned since about twenty years ago, and hence there is no question of the old and the new Kumār coming together in a sī kāḥ bhay to share the tongues of the animals sacrificed. The old Kumār gets his last share of sī at a sī kāḥ bṛay just before he falls off the stage in his parting dance.

The new Kumār is made to step over three maṇḍalas (New.: *tripada kāyekegu*) on which areca nuts are laid – a ceremony comparable to the seven steps Daitya takes at his final consecration. Apart from installing the Nāsadyo kāpaḥ in a room of the mū nāyo's house, ten nails are driven into the ceiling above Nāsadyo, which are, according to the gubhāju, to protect the ākhā from the ten directions and their overlords. The list of the latter is peculiar in more than one respect, not least because it includes Kumār himself: Indra, Yama, Varuṇa, Kumāra, Vāyu, Īśāna, Nairṛtya, Nāga, Asura and Ūrdhva. The ten nails are encircled by a thread. In this way the guardian of the guardian goddess is guarded in turn against what are generally seen as the guardians of the ten directions: the chain of guardianship appears without beginning or end. At ākhā *svanegu* the new Kumār symbolically practices some dancing passes which he is yet to learn. After about a week of practice the ghaṁgalā bracelets are handed over to him in the ākhā in the *ghaṁgalā svanegu* ceremony which is again less elaborate than that of the Śākya. Instead of the goat sacrifice, the dedication of the musical instruments, and another sī kāḥ bṛay, the performance of a *kalah pūjā* (New.: standard worship with flowers, incense, light and foods) is sufficient. In contrast with Daitya's instruction schedule, Kumār is from the beginning being trained with the

accompaniment of music in Dagubahāl. For specific instructions, or if it proves necessary, he receives complementary teachings in his guru's house.

While Daitya and the music accompanying him pay reverence to many gods but not to Taleju herself, Kumār learns to dance to the accompaniment of songs – not caryāgīt – which are dedicated to three gods: one is devoted to Nāsadyo or Nr̥tyanātha Lokanātha, one to Annapūrnā and one to Guhyeśvarī – who is also *iṣṭadevatā* (the chosen deity) of the gubhāju himself. So, while there is no song dedicated to Taleju by that name, the song and dance to Guhyeśvarī, which are also enacted inside the palace compound for Taleju, do according to the gubhāju refer to this goddess; Guhyeśvarī represents Taleju. As for the rules that accompany the teaching of Kumār, he and his guru may not take a mohanī (charm) prepared by anybody else. Like in Daitya's case this mohanī appears to mark the bond between guru and śiṣya. Although Kumār starts his Dasain dances from Dagubahāl and gets his mohanī only on the way, at the Nāsadyo shrine in Tachembahāl, he is commonly seen as divinized already when he comes out of Dagubahāl wearing his makuta. In the view of the gubhāju the part of the dance which precedes his giving of the mohanī does not yet have the required sacred character.

It is also commonly held by the Tulādhār community that Kumār may not sleep or eat outside his house, and this was partly confirmed, with regard to sleeping, by the young Kumār himself. In this regard the view of the gubhāju is less strict: Kumār is allowed to eat outside but not to eat *cipaḥ*, food touched by others. He may also sleep elsewhere, but not in the house of his mother's brother – who in Kumār's case is to carry him off the stage after his demise. A further rule is that nobody may cross Kumār at the stairs, and if this happens nevertheless – which is likely once a while – a *kṣamā* (forgiveness) pūjā has to be done for Nāsadyo. Although Kumār is to worship Nāsadyo for five years, the training periods for his dance in subsequent years are limited to about a week of rehearsal with his guru. The ritual is likewise confined to one goat (or nowadays a duck) sacrifice and a *śī kāḥ* bṛay on the eve of Mahāsaptamī.

The conclusion of Kumār's initial instruction does not have to coincide with that particular evening as it has to in the case of Daitya. The ritual that precedes the first dance of the divine boys – in Kumār's case performed at Asan dabū – are equally elaborate, however. The final ceremony, which is called musi pūjā by the Sākya but *pidanegu* (New.: "making a first appearance") by the Tulādhār, likewise requires the sacrifice of two goats, one on the eve of pidanegu and one that day itself. The second sacrifice is not executed in the ākhā, but like that of the evening before, at the Nāsadyo shrine itself, where the assembly has stayed overnight. The ākhā, by contrast,

does not receive a sacrifice but is removed on the very day of pidanegu; the Nāsadyo kāpaḥ, and therewith Nāsadyo himself, is transferred back to the shrine in Taḥchembahāl. Appearances are that the Tulādhār are willingly leaving the practice of goat sacrifice in the ākhā, that is, in the house of the mū nāyo. Nāsadyo will be installed there again after five years only, when a new Kumār is to be initiated.

After the morning sacrifice and pūjā at Nāsadyo, the gubhāju hands over the musical instruments to the players, and to Kumār his dress. The mohani that is prepared during the sacrifice will be used for the coming five years at the time of Kumār's dances. After receiving the mohani, the boy will for the first time make a dance. Unlike Daitya he does so in his full dress. Yet, like in Daitya's case, the dance is devoted to Nāsadyo and is not considered to be the first dance of Kumār. The boy also gets a moustache, but instead of a third eye, a *jayabi* (victory sign ?) is painted on his forehead. It is rectangular consisting of seven blocks, a vertical one in the middle with three horizontal ones on each side. Spelled as jay jabhī, it is mentioned by Kasā as an attribute of Nāsadyo without further explanation (Kasā 1965: ४). His guru and the other Vajrācāryas are given a vajra sign while the Tulādhār khalah – consisting of about thirty members – all get a lotus painted on their forehead. There are other indications that Kumār, in this phase of his being, represents Nāsadyo rather than the Kumār who he is yet to become. Like Daitya, he is, on the way to the mū nāyo's house, accompanied by a musical ensemble which includes two extra khim drums. Although the additional khim are not named Bhrngī and Nandī, the attendants of Nāsadyo, the parallel with the Śākya procedure is too close to be insignificant. On the way home the mū nāyo himself plays the kvatāḥ drum.

Only after partaking in the sī, after consuming the tongue of the goat sacrificed that morning, the boy goes out to perform his first dance as Kumār. The first dance takes place at Asan dabū, and even though Kumār has by then obtained his final identity, this performance is given just for the grace of it. It has as yet nothing to do with the specific task assigned to him. Kumār shows himself to the public on his own behalf, independent from the protective role for which he has been called into being. It is as if he still manifests Nāsadyo, be it in the guise of Kumār. In the preface to his collection of songs to Nāsadyo Prem Bahādur Kasā pays attention to Kumār's dance but almost ignores the Kumār identity of the dancer. The Kumo dancer as Kasā calls him, must keep Nāsadyo in him, "draw him along", not only during his dances for Taleju but during his full term as a Kumār dancer. "When his term comes to an end, he is forced down from the stage by the necessary ritual (*vidhi*). Then only will Nāsadyo leave him and set him free from his *bandhan*, his bond (Kasā 1965: ५)

The identities of both Kumār and Daitya then contain a fundamental mystery. No part of their instruction is related either to the goddess they are to protect or to their own identity as Daitya or Kumār. Both of them have an almost exclusive relationship with Nāsadyo. It is as if two originally separate enactments, the divinization of the Śākya and Tulādhār boys in their opposed yet similar identities on the one hand, and the descent of the royal goddess on the other hand, meet each other almost by accident, or, to put it more faithfully, by the grace of some higher agency. For at the moment suprême itself; when Taleju Bhavānī makes her short yātrās up and down her high abode, and Daitya and Kumār perform their dances, nobody would call into question the sense of purpose behind it all. Indeed, if Daitya and Kumār manage to come in time, the sheer synchronicity of events offers enough proof of a divine scheme which need not be fully comprehended by any of the participants. The assignment of Daitya and Kumār in those events, which did not become evident from their own preparations for it, may still have a clue in the overall context of their acts during Dasain. As was observed above, they not only accompany the movement of the goddess, but also the khaḍga yātrā, the sword procession at the conclusion of Dasain. Both events will be scrutinized in the following sections.

The Descent and Ascent of Taleju Bhavānī

Both Kumār and Daitya's own people and the more informed outsiders hold that the two divine figures came along with the goddess Taleju Bhavānī to protect her on her way to Nepal, and that, therefore, the two of them turn up again during Taleju's short moves up and down the temple. Although Taleju is said to have four representations (see also Pradhan 1986: 309), which are covered when they are taken up and down, a fifth one may be added to them. The image of Guhyeśvarī in the form of a maṇḍala, which also resides in the Taleju temple and is shown to the public on Mahānavamī, is taken out in a real yātrā. Accompanied by the guruju peleton (the antiquated army brass band which belongs to the rājguru), the image is carried to the pītha of Guhyeśvarī on the tenth day of Mārga Kṛṣṇa in November. This maṇḍala, which is, together with one of Bhairava, taken in a khat from the Taleju temple to the most powerful Guhyeśvarī pītha to stay there overnight, is alternately called Taleju or Guhyeśvarī, by some people combined to Taleju Guhyeśvarī.

Daitya and Kumār do not however come to accompany the Goddess in what is a real yātrā, but only during the short moves of the four images in Dasain. The timing of those moves is determined by calculating an auspicious moment (sāit), which is to be passed on to the responsible Tulādhār and Śākya elders. However that may be, on Mahāsaptamī morning (1992) both

Kumār and Daitya came late: Taleju had already been brought down. Not only did both of them come too late for the set time, but Daitya, in addition, arrived only after Kumār had already left the scene, while, according to rule, they should have come together. In the morning of the tenth day of Dasain, Vijayā Daśamī, things went better. Daitya and Kumār staged their dance together – but without having any interaction – on the dabū in Trisulchowk, the courtyard adjoining the stairs leading up to the temple, at the very moment that Taleju was being carried up. Their programme, which they also duly performed when coming too late, is identical on both occasions and will be viewed in some more detail now.

On the eve of Mahāsaptamī the elders, the gubhāju and the performing Daitya cq. Kumār have a sī kākḥ bhvay of a goat sacrificed at their respective Nāsadyo shrines (recently replaced by a duck sacrifice in the Tulādhār's case). In the morning of Mahāsaptamī the dressing up and decoration of Daitya and Kumār is almost casual. Daitya remains an ordinary boy until he enters the ākhā with his gubhāju and receives his mohaniṁ tīkā and crown. Kumār's dedication, it was noticed, contains a slight complication : his makuta is put on in the nāyo's house in Dagubahāl but his mohaniṁ mark is given by the gubhāju on the way to Hanuman Dhoka, when the small procession passes the Nāsadyo shrine at Tachembahāl. There Kumār first goes inside the bahāl to worship Nāsadyo with an offering of light (New.: *itā*) and husked rice (New.: *jāki*) in the company of his father. Considering the importance of the mohaniṁ mark it is surprising that Kumār dances as a divinity before receiving it, but, contrary to the gubhāju's opinion, the elders think it does not matter too much.

Both Kumār and Daitya themselves are slightly hesitant to tell about their feelings as divine dancers. Kumār, 10 years old, told that he sometimes has the feeling of being a god during the performance, while Daitya, 17 years old, said that he felt a little unconscious of himself after receiving the mohaniṁ. The previous Daitya however (now 20 years old) did not feel such a change in himself, except during his last dance – when Daitya was passing away from him. Whatever the real feeling of the boys, the show itself is entirely convincing. Kumār makes short but intriguing dances (of about two minutes) in front of Dagubahāl (where the mū nāyo lives), at Asan dabū (the site of his first dance), in front of Tahchembahāl (where he worships Nāsadyo and receives the mohaniṁ), in front of Janabahāl (the residence of Seto Macchendranāth) and at Indrachowk, before entering Hanuman Dhoka. Lewis (390) reports that the performances inside the palace compound are closed to the public. In fact the public attention is considerable and, especially at Vijayā Daśamī, the stage (dabū) in Trisulchowk where Daitya and Kumār are performing together is surrounded by a crowd of onlookers. Only white

people and very black people (negroes) are refused entrance.

Inside the palace compound both Kumār and Daitya dance for a few minutes at the stage in Trisulchowk as well as in front of the Tribula shrine at the foot of the Taleju temple. Then they proceed to Mulchowk (in line with the temple stairs and Trisulchowk) where Taleju resides in her (closed) Pūjā Koṭhā. After a short dance in Mulchowk they divert their course to the more Eastern Nasalchowk, the courtyard which was in Malla and early Shaha times the place for performing drama at the palace. After staging a similar dance there, Daitya and Kumār leave through Hanuman Dhoka. In front of the palace gate they make a very short dance before returning by the same way as they came and stopping at the same places for a dance to greet the main gods (dyo lhāyegu).

No effort will be made here to describe the dance movements of Kumār or Daitya. Kumār does not display a martial outlook, but by his serpentine movements, he certainly casts a spell on the public. The bow which Kumār carries goes without an arrow and is held by him without feigning its actual use. Both Daitya and Kumār are accompanied by Pañcatāla musicians. Daitya appears the more aggressive one, especially towards the end of his dances when, brandishing his dagger, he makes a sudden advance before coming to an abrupt standstill. In contrast with Kumār he first dances in the courtyard (Ganthinani) of his own house, where the ākhā is established, and does so again at this return, just before entering the ākhā with his guru to remove the spell. Like Kumār he also dances in the alley leading to the ākhā, just outside his own courtyard. Beyond his own abode, on the way to and from Hanuman Dhoka, he dances when passing Cikammugaḥ dabū (the site of his first dance) and once more at the crossroads of Maru, before proceeding to Hanuman Dhoka.

From the viewpoint of time then, and also from that of the ritual involved, the outward manifestation of Kumār and Daitya on the Mahāsaptamī and the Vijayā Daśamī morning of Dasain, represents only a fraction of the energies that have been vested in them. They can complete their tour in just over an hour, while their actual presence at Taleju's residence inside the palace compound is confined to about twenty minutes. What we see are two divinized boys who, provided with their proper weapons, dashing approach Hanuman Dhoka from the North and the South. Those directions also mark the very distinction between them, with Kumār belonging to the Upper city and oriented towards the sky, and Daitya belonging to the Lower city and oriented towards the netherworld. When both of them meet in the very centre of town, it is striking to note that their separation remains. There is no clash between them but no other exchange either. Evidently the separation between Thane and Kyane has to be maintained in the domain of the Goddess who

supposedly transcends the division.

To protect the Goddess, it appears, the two chosen guardians should not form one party, but, on the contrary, they must constitute two opposed ones. This striking feature is significant within the overall ritual structure of the city, as will be seen in the concluding section. First another riddle has to be tackled, namely the presence of Kumār and Daitya during the *khadga yātrā* in the night of Vijayā Daśamī. The goddess Taleju has returned to her abode that very morning and will not be taken out until next year. And reversely, in the night of Vijayā Daśamī, the parties of Kumār and Daitya do not again enter the domain of the royal goddess. They join the sword procession when it comes out of the palace. If their main task and their accumulated powers are all directed towards protecting the goddess, how to interpret the necessity of their presence during the *khadga yātrā*?

Khadga Yātrā

The ceremony called *khadga yātrā* (New.: *pāyo*) is observed at different levels of society and in various manifestations. In every Newar household a mostly secret *khadga yātrā* is performed in or starting from the household shrine (New.: *āgañcheṃ*) where, among other things, a *kalaśa* (jar) representing the Goddess is installed. The climax of this *khadga yātrā* is the cleaving of a pumpkin – a common replacement of a buffalo and of the buffalo demon – with a sword. Only the male members enact this symbolic victory of the Goddess over her enemy, making shaking movements as if possessed. The household ceremony generally takes place in the morning of Vijayā Daśamī, but the Kusle or Jugi caste performs it the day before and the Tulādhār of Asan the day after Vijayā Daśamī. A peculiarity of the latter is that they bring the *khadga yātrā* outside and make a round of Asan shaking their swords before they cleave the pumpkin in a courtyard – with the youngest member, who also went ahead in the procession, taking precedence over the elders.

During the day and during the night of Vijayā Daśamī, the tenth day of Dasain marking the victory of the goddess, various other *khadga yātrā* parties go out from different *dyocheṃ*, a nearly complete list of which is given by Pradhan (Map III, after p. 313). Some of those offer a spectacular sight. The *pāyo* group of the Vatu Bhadrakālī *dyocheṃ* comes out in the dress of the *gaṇa* of the goddess and her attendants. Like in divine dances such as the Gathu Bhadrakālī *pyākhaṃ*, they wear the robes of the *aṣṭamāṭṛkā*. Although they go without masks, the different *māṭṛkā*s are identifiable by the colours of their robes. Brandishing and shaking their swords the *gaṇa* makes three short moves in Vatu quarter, one to the East, one to the South and one to the West, before going back into the *dyocheṃ*. Just preceding their expedition a *baupā* (a portion of special food for malevolent spirits) is brought out and

deposited in front of the dyochem to placate the *bhūt-pret*, the ghosts.

One would expect the *khadga yātrā* of the royal palace to be more impressive than the one staged by the *Jyāpu* of Vatu. On the contrary, however, the *khadga yātrins* of the central goddess do not represent her *gaṇa* and, like the *Tulādhars* of Asan, they go about in ordinary dress. In 1991 the 12-yearly *Bhadrakālī pyākhaṃ* took place starting with the exchange of swords (*khadga siddhi*) between *Bhadrakālī* (embodied as a masked dancer) and the king of Nepal in the night of *Vijayā Daśamī*, in front of the Northern gate to Taleju temple (*Simha Duvāḥ*). The eleven masked *Gathu* dancers representing the *gaṇa* of *Bhadrakālī* took up position there, shaking their bodies and their specific weapons. The king exchanged swords with *Bhadrakālī* at the moment that the *gaṇa* was met by the *khadga yātrā* coming from the *Simha Dhoka* (the Western gate of the Taleju temple). *Kumār* and *Daitya* performed their dance facing the *Bhadrakālī gaṇa* and the *khadga siddhi*. Because of the added lustre of the king's sword exchange with the goddess, the number of sword - carriers from the palace was considerably higher than in 1992 (for the *Bhadrakālī pyākhaṃ* see Van den Hoek 1994). In ordinary years the king, who supposedly once took lead in the *khadga yātrā* (Pradhan 1986:311) does not attend. In the absence of the impressive *gaṇa* of divine dancers, the ceremony bears a much more sober character. The luster given to it springs from the outstanding roles of *Daitya* and *Kumār*. Their presence in the *khadga yātrā* remains a mystery, however, for which no clarification could be obtained. Only the overall composition of the event may still hold a clue to it.

The *Karmācāryas* start the enterprise with a *kotaḥ pūjā* (a standard set of offerings on a brass plate) in the room adjacent to the *Pūjā Koṭhā* which Taleju herself has left that morning. In that room (New.: *naḥlasvām taye kothā*) the sacred *naḥlasvām* (New.: barley and maize sprouts grown in the dark) of Dasain is still standing (worshipped daily by a *Rājopādhyāya* Brahmin from *Ghaṭasthāpanā* onwards) and also the swords are placed there. The *kotaḥ*, the brass plate containing the items of worship, is prepared by *Jyāpu* ladies who are called *laykumisā*, palace women, but the *pūjā* itself is performed by the *Karmācāryas* in secret. After completing his worship, the *mū ācāḥju* (New.: Taleju's main priest) personally went to the *Hanuman Dhoka* to let in the *Jyāpu* who had been stopped there by the army guard. Inside *Mulchowk* several items were handed over to them. A wooden image of *Hanuman* on a stick is given to the *Jyāpu* who will go ahead of the sword procession, according to the *mū ācāḥju* to announce its coming. Two other *Jyāpu* men received a torch of wood, with cotton soaked in oil wrapped around the top of it. Another two were to carry *baupās*, with paper masks of *Bhairava* and *Kumārī* attached to them. Finally two *Jyāpu* were given sticks

(New.: *chali kathi*) with which they were to guard the royal sword in the procession. Significantly, one of them represents Thane and the other one Kvane. Six people including the *mū ācāḥju* took up swords, among whom also one very young *Karmācārya* and a *Jośī*. The royal sword was brought from a special room by a government official. When the party came out of *Simha Dhoka*, *Daitya* and *Kumār*, with *Daitya* going in front, joined the head of the procession preceding not only the *pāyo* party but also *Hanuman* and the *baupā*-carriers. They thus go ahead of the actual *khaḍga yātrā*, but that initial sequence could not be maintained all the way. *Daitya* and *Kumār* have to perform their own dances, for which the rest of party does not wait. Furthermore, *Hanuman* moves forward and backward in an unpredictable way and appears really possessed because, according to the *Karmācāryas*, a mantra is cast on him by the *mū ācāḥju* in *Mulchowk* when he wraps a turban around the head of the person to carry – and to be – *Hanuman*. Interestingly, *Daitya* and *Kumār* all along make the same shaking movements as the sword-carriers make or should make. After coming out of the Western gate of the *Taleju* temple the procession moves first in a Southern direction to the crossroads just below *Kāṣṭhamanḍap*, and then, passing *Maru Gaṇeśa*, it goes Northward through *Pyāphal* to the army quarters of *Kamphukot*. It crosses the notorious kot and passes the *Mahādeva* temple and *Makhan* on the way to *Vaṅghaḥ* (*Indrachowk*), the northernmost point.

Kumār and his company leave the procession there, at *Indrachowk*, and return home. *Daitya* returns with the procession through *Makhan* back to the palace and takes leave there. The two *bau* are deposited at *Simha Duvāḥ* (the Northern gate to *Taleju*) in front of the right and the left lion-guardians, who according to some informants, again represent the *Thane* and *Kvane* divide. Then the party continues to the Western gate of the *Taleju* temple and waits there till the *Simha Dhoka* is opened to let them in again. Once inside they ascend the stairs of the *Taleju* temple and circumambulate it. Down the stairs the *khaḍga* are collected by the *Jośī*. The *mū ācāḥju* then performs an elaborate welcoming ceremony (*lasakusa*) for the swords and for the *Hanuman* image by turning a *simpha* (New.: wooden measuring pot always used for this purpose) over them, performing a *kotaḥ pūjā*, and symbolically handing over the key as well. The key taken is not the one to *Taleju's Pūjā Kothā*, but to another secret room of worship in *Mulchowk* where the swords are kept the rest of the year and where only *ācāḥjus* may enter. They again do a short *pūjā* there, according to their saying to put the swords to rest for one year. Thereby *Dasain*, the greatest festival of *Nepal*, formally ends. It would however be a misrepresentation to view this ending as a rupture in the ritual activities. Not only do several *khaḍga yātrās* – such as the ones in *Kilāgal* and *Bhagvān Bahāl* still have to come out, but also, in that very night, other

Karmācāryas perform a homa in front of Annapūrṇā at Asan marking the start of the yātrā of this central and popular goddess. The chain of events, and the network of ritual relations, is hardly ever broken. But Daitya and Kumār's performances stop until next Dasain, unless it happens to be the year of their demise, which will be dealt with in the next section.

What exactly is their role in Dasain? Their participation in the khadga yātrā appears to contradict the common statement that they only exist to protect the goddess. Reactions by some participants to this question might indicate a clue. The Śākya nāyo remarked that formerly, but beyond living memory it seems, Daitya and Kumār also had to attend at events like royal weddings and coronations. According to Kumār's guru, the two divinized boys participate in the khadga yātrā to protect the royal sword. All those answers were extracted, but the views expressed seem to fit the overall context, which includes not only the movement of the goddess, but that of the swords as well. What Kumār and Daitya appear to protect is the śakti of the realm in the widest sense of the word: its power, which is first of all embodied by the royal goddess who can be called the central śakti herself. This śakti does not however stand on itself, but exists in relation to its shareholder, the ruler of the realm; his sword in particular contains the śakti of the goddess.

Curiously enough, during the centuries that the kingdom of Nepal was divided, Taleju Bhavānī remained the protective goddess of all three Kingdoms of the Valley, which were often at odds with each other. The same goddess was to give victory to the kings of Patan, Bhaktapur and Kathmandu, but on which side would she be? The nature of the goddess Taleju Bhavānī is clearly more complicated than is indicated by the term 'protective' goddess – which suggests that she may give victory to one party only and defeat to the others. Perhaps equally curious is that the protective goddess of the kingdom has in turn to be protected, not by a single party, but by two young protectors who are, not only in a topographical but also in a cosmological sense, opposed to each other. Likewise the royal sword is on both sides protected by what is called in Newari a *chali kathi*, a mace. The two stick carriers, however, again manifest the opposition in orientation. One of them belongs, like Kumār does, to Thane, the Upper part of the city, the other has to belong to the Lower part, Kvane. The opposition between the two opposed realms of the city appears to be in-built, as if the śakti exists by the grace of parties that are opposed to each other. Daitya and Kumār closely resemble each other, yet, or perhaps for that reason, they do not enter into a complementary relationship but are kept carefully apart.

The Demise

Both Kumār and Daitya have to die, symbolically one might say, but who or what passes away in them is even harder to determine than in case of the divine dancers of the Gathu pyākhaṁ (Van den Hoek 1994). The Śākya mū nāyo suggested that in former times a Daitya might serve until his real death or at least as long as he was able to perform. That the embodiment of Daitya is now confined to five years might be due to the requirements of the time. As it is, however, both the coming into being and the demise of Daitya and Kumār constitute one of the most significant and ritually elaborate aspects of the whole divine enactment. Daitya and Kumār have to be young, and in order to be so, they have to die in time. From the viewpoint of mythology, Daitya is the young lover and enemy of the goddess, killed by her before he comes of age. Kumār, of course, represents a different case, as he, from the puranic point of view, is the son of the goddess. His demise will also be seen to be different from that of Daitya. Yet, if any god stands for eternal youth, it is Kumār, and in that respect there is no difference with Daitya. Both of them require a youthful embodiment.

Daitya is left alone to die at the same stage where he performed his first dance, Cikāmmugaḥ dabū. A sī kāḥ bhvay precedes his final dance. At his going to the stage and at the start of his dance the musicians still accompany him. Then his ghaṁgalā (bracelets) are taken off and the music retreats. Nobody is allowed to see his demise. The Jyāpu who is to catch the boy when he falls off the stage should not look at the parting dance either. Anybody who breaks the prohibition will die vomiting blood, it is told. Because the event happens at late night, there will probably be no bystanders to be warned anyway. Daitya got some special instruction from his guru for his final part, the only dance without the accompaniment of music. In his memory it took more than half an hour of dancing alone before he started to feel unconscious. During his five year term he had never felt possessed. It was only when Daitya left him that he got such an experience. Having become unconscious he fell off the stage, and did not regain consciousness until his guru touched him at home to take off his dresses.

After his demise Daitya is carried home by the Jyāpu covered with a white shroud like a dead man. There is, according to the gubhāju, no need to revive the boy. Since it is Daitya who died in him and not the boy himself, the latter will recover by himself, freed from Daitya's presence. According to the mū nāyo he is revived by some water sprinkled by the gubhāju together with the uttering of a mantra. However that may be, his mother gives a formal welcome (New.: lasakusa) to her son with a kotaḥ pūjā. After his dress is taken off downstairs the now ex-Daitya shares a ritual meal (sagaṁ) with the other members of the khalah. According to the ex-Daitya, the Daitya-to-be

had already started his training a few days before his own demise, contrary to the ideal sequence. Old and new Daitya had talked together on how it was and would be. Neither of them had been chosen by lot; they replaced the ones who had been drawn. After Daitya's demise the ākhā in his house ceases to exist and the Nāsakāpaḥ is removed and put at the Nāsadyo shrine by the gubhāju.

In contrast with Daitya, Kumār will not be left alone to die. His last dance at Asan Dabū is a public event, in which he is accompanied by the musicians to the very end. One of the musicians, the kvatāḥ player, actually brings about the end. By pushing him further and further with his drum he is causing Kumār's falling-off-the-stage, *kvaphāyegu*. The same Newari term is used for Daitya's downfall, but, in its literal meaning of "dropping", "causing to fall down" (Manandhar 1986:34) it seems better applicable to Kumār's case. The gubhāju's explanation for the seemingly involuntary fall of Kumār is that the kvatāḥ drum, while pushing Kumār, draws his śakti out of him. The divine power, according to Kumār's guru, also entered Kumār through the kvatāḥ drum, while the power of the drum itself, it is known, originates from Nāsadyo himself.

The present Kumār has been proposed by his father who wanted to continue a family tradition; both he himself and his own father, the present Kumār's grandfather, had been Kumār in their time. Kumār's father remembers how he was pushed off the stage, but also that he fainted while falling off. Like Daitya, the fallen Kumār is to be covered with a white shroud like a dead man. The one who carries him home is not a Jyāpu, however, but his mother's brother, a relative who plays a major part in the initiation ceremony (Vratibandha) of Newar boys. When in the Vratibandha ceremony the boys are dressed like sannyāsins (world renouncers) and are given the choice to renounce the world, their mother's brother stands ready to catch them in case they might indeed choose to do so. Since Kumār can be considered to have renounced the world for five years in his partly divine identity, the death of the divinity in him can also be seen as a re-socialization. From that point of view it is most appropriate that he is carried by his mother's brother on his way back to the social world.

When the present Kumār's father woke up from unconsciousness, he found himself back in his house, where his Kumār dress and decorations had already been taken off. His guru was there to give him the ritual food (sagaṁ) together with a Sanskrit śloka. In Kumār's case there is no ākhā to be removed, although a new temporary one has to be installed in the mū nāyo's house for the instruction of the new incumbent. It is often said by the participants and also by Kumār's gubhāju that it is not the boy who dies, naturally, but Kumār, the divinity who was in him. At the same time it is

not clearly stated that the god Kumār himself is supposed to die.

The intermezzo between the demise of the old Kumār or Daitya and the forming of a new one is kept as short as possible. Yet a sacrifice seems to be made, but one in which neither the boy nor the god is a clearly recognizable victim. What appears to be dying is the living presence of the god, shortly after it reborn in a new and again young embodiment. Nevertheless the short lapse of time between the passing away of the god from the one embodiment and his rebirth or re-entry into another one carries with it the signs of death. Part of the symptoms are experienced by the boys themselves in their falling unconscious. Nobody stated that the boys are at that time partaking in the process of dying, but it is all the same considered inauspicious to enact the passage of death, albeit only that of the god embodied. It is one of the less outspoken reasons to find a replacement in case one's son is chosen by lot to be Kumār. Finally, while the god has to make his re-entry into a new incumbent, the boy has to make his re-entry into human society, undone from his divinity. Although the feelings of unconsciousness, the symptoms of death, can conveniently be attributed to the boy's abandonment by the god, a certain parallelism between the two of them, godly embodiment and god embodied, remains lurking in the background, escaping nobody's notice. In Kumār's as well as in Daitya's case, both the boys and the divinities are reborn, but the *personae* who incorporated the divinities effectively die in that capacity.

Conclusion

The short manifestations of Daitya and Kumār during Dasain are somehow disproportionate to the elaborate ritual complex of which they are part on their own account. Or to turn it the other way around: The labyrinth of rules and procedures to which Daitya and Kumār are subject seems to go far beyond the stated purpose of their protecting the royal goddess. The more so since that very purpose does not at all come forward in either the instruction of the boys or the ritual proceedings that lead up to their performance. While embodying different characters, the attention of both Daitya and Kumār is almost exclusively devoted to Nāsadyo, who appears to transcend not only the divinities embodied by the boys, but also their death. During the interval between their demise and their re-entry into new incumbents, the gods seem to be retaken, as it were, by Nāsadyo. The quality of Nāsadyo to transcend the divine play of which he himself is the source and origin, is also seen in other divine dramas which show an alternating cycle of life and death.

There is no phenomenon which is not historically grown, and on the face of it, it seems as if in Kumār's and Daitya's case a divine drama dedicated to Nāsadyo is only loosely linked to the central goddess and the major festival

of Kathmandu. The mū ācāṇḍju of Taleju, for one thing, is not aware of the different backgrounds of the boys – Śākya and Tulādhār – or of the complicated ritual pattern which they are part of in their own environment. Historically speaking, little can be said. Both the khalah of Daitya and the khalah of Kumār possess a lālmohara of king Pratap Sing Shah, the successor to Prithvi Narayan. The performance of Kumār and Daitya undoubtedly goes further back to the Malla period and is said to have existed in other towns as well. According to Kumār's gubhaju, Prithvi Narayan Shah did away with the Kumār/Daitya pyākhaṁ, which was subsequently restored however by his son Pratap Singh – who therefore appears in the official documents as the patron of the performance.

Apart from the strikingly loose connection between Daitya's and Kumār's training on the one hand and the stated purpose of their existence on the other hand, there appears to be another dissonant. The Tulādhār and the Śākya are Buddhist castes, and the royal goddess is not considered to be a Buddhist divinity. The signs of Buddhism in the Daitya and Kumār pyākhaṁ are slight. When asked about it, the gubhāju of Daitya told that Buddha is a few times invoked in the secret texts used for the instruction of Daitya. According to Kumār's gubhāju, the dance of his pupil is, at least ultimately, based on a Buddhist text, the Ratna Candraketu Mahāpratihāra. Kumar's crown also contains five jewels representing the Pañcabuddha. Both gubhājus, however, were frank in admitting that the actual performance of Kumār and Daitya has little or nothing to do with Buddhism. From the historical point of view, indications are that the Śākya and Tulādhār were once called upon to participate in a palace ceremony relating to a Hindu goddess, in a way comparable to the royal Kumārī, the Śākya girl's embodiment of Taleju Bhavānī.

History cannot illuminate the matter any further, and what we see at present is a ritual complex surrounding the royal goddess in which Kumār and Daitya apparently occupy a fitting position. The question is: what is the sense of their appearance, of their contrasting identities and of their so-called protection of the royal goddess? Their appearance at the descent and ascent of Taleju does not offer any real clue to the question. As was seen above, Taleju readily descends in the absence of her protectors when they come late. The khaḍga yātrā at Vijayā Dasāmī, the culmination of Dasain, presents us with a different case. Not only do Daitya and Kumār make special dances then, they also go ahead in the procession, making the same shaking movements as the sword-carriers. According to his guru, Daitya, who goes in front, actually participates in the khaḍga yātrā brandishing his dagger, followed by Kumār displaying his bow. Rather than just protecting the goddess, they are thus seen to lead the śakti of the realm in a way which befits their martial

character.

What remains is the riddle of their adverse identities. Why is Kumār's counterpart a Daitya and not, as Lewis wrongly assumes, Gaṇeśa, or for that matter, Bhairava ? Instead, the very essence of the couple seems to be that they are not complementary but opposed to each other, as if it is necessary for the warlike expedition to incorporate its adversary. And that seems to be exactly the case. Not only Daitya and Kumār, but also the two stick carriers accompanying the royal sword, represent Thane and Kvane, a division which has all the characteristics of a ritualized battle field (Van den Hoek 1993). If we look into the wider context of Dasain, the main good fortune expected from the royal goddess is that she provides the king with the power of victory. Ironically, during the centuries of political division, each of the Malla kings of the Valley kept Taleju as their protective goddess. This was not due to a transcendental view: Between, and even within the kingdoms, divisions were not transcended at either the human or the divine level. The kings of Patan, Bhaktapur and Kathmandu nevertheless continued to depend on one and the same protective goddess to bestow the power of victory on each of them. There is, again, a truth hidden in that irony.

Of old, the sacrificial nature of warfare was pre-eminent – in spite of all mundane interests involved. War, sacrifice and capital punishment, being closely related, constituted the three sacred tasks of a king since Vedic times – as has been succinctly shown by Heesterman (1985:108-127). In another essay, Heesterman touches upon the role of the woman in it all – not the goddess, but the wife of the sacrificer-king. The woman, who passes out of her own family, has to remain an element of insecurity between two lineages which, through her, establish or maintain a connubial (marital) alliance. In a sacrificial contest – Heesterman's attention centers upon a Vedic midsummer festival – the sacrificer's wife plays a central part because she also represents her own relatives whose connubial (marital) link with the sacrificer's party she embodies (Heesterman 1985:134-136). A similar argument pertains to the battlefield: in a configuration of enemies who are at the same time related to each other – such as existed in case of the Malla kingdoms – women may find themselves embodying both sides in a conflict.

To return to the protective goddesses, their position parallels that of a woman who is related to different parties. As argued elsewhere (Van den Hoek and Shrestha 1992:73), the power of the protective goddess seems to derive from the very fact that she maintains relations with opposed parties, with the enemy and with her "own" party. This may be seen symbolically expressed in the relationship she has with her prototypical enemies: Mahiṣāśura or Daitya. In the great day of victory she beats the demon enemy and thereby protects the realm. With whom, however, is Daitya to be identified? From

Vedic to Puranic times the demonical aspect and the evil character of kings in general is amply expounded. The goddess, then, may bring victory or defeat to either one of the parties engaged in war. As the *mū ācāḥju* of Taleju explained, Daitya may have demonical traits, but he nevertheless belongs to the *gana*, the retinue of the goddess who slays him : the goddess incorporates her enemy.

The *khadga yātrās* which come out of different Taleju temples at Vijayā Daśamī are not, and were not, opposed to each other in terms of good and evil – nor were, for that matter, parties engaged in actual war opposed in those terms. Instead, the *khadga yātrā* in Kathmandu with its twofold royal mace representing Thane and Kvane, and with Daitya and Kumār at the head of it, already displays the two sides of the battlefield or sacrificial arena internally. Daitya and Kumār may, when going ahead, be considered the protagonists. They have to die young, perhaps not only because the scriptures prescribe them to be forever youthful, but also because they are heading a sacrificial party which cannot remain without victims at set times. The opposition, between Daitya and Kumār, which is contained in the *khadga yātrā*, is also embodied in the very nature of the goddess who is not bound to one side in a contest, nor to one ruler or dynasty. Rather she oversees the sacrifice of war as such and claims its victims.

The symbolic enactments of Dasain, of course, have more than one layer of meaning. Daitya and Kumār are explicitly said to protect the protective goddess, and there is no justification to refute that view. The explicit purpose of Daitya's and Kumār's performance, however, is hardly borne out by the rituals observed. Daitya's and Kumār's coming into being is brought about by Nāsadyo, who also survives and recreates them in a new human embodiment. Because Nāsadyo, the patron of temporal grace, has close associations with the death and rebirth of various divine dancers (such as in the *Gathu pyākham*) and with the periodical rejuvenation of musicians consecrated to him (such as the *Jyāpu Dhimay*), there is no real contradiction between Daitya's and Kumār's dedication to him, and their dance to protect the protective goddess.

Given the superior power of Taleju Bhavānī the purpose itself seems incongruous – unless protection is taken in a much broader sense than saving the skin of the goddess. A possible extension in meaning should include the leading role of Daitya and Kumār in the *khadga yātrā*, the manifestation of the *śakti* of the realm. The *śakti* of the goddess has to be nourished in many ways, rather than to be protected in the strict sense of the word. Plenty of sacrifice has therefore been made to her on the great eighth and ninth days of Dasain. Yet the ultimate sacrifice is that of war, symbolically expressed by the goddess' slaying of her demon enemy on the tenth day of victory. The

khadga yātrā fulfills a similar purpose. It is unlikely that it has ever been the start of a real war party; therefore its composition is too heavily loaded with symbolism. It did however prelude the war season in times that war and sacrifice were still the main sacred duties of the king – which happened to be so until a few centuries ago. In the composition of the surviving khadga yātrā, war primarily appears to be a matter of sacrifice, like it was in bygone days.

The ghosts from the North and the South, for whom the two baupā offerings are brought along, the contrasting divine fighters, and the royal mace-bearers expressing the same division of the sacrificial field, are all included in the symbolic enactment of the path of war. The protection of Taleju Bhavānī, in this context, extends to her interests in the sacrifice of war, of which the goddess of victory is the primary recipient. The victory of the goddess lies with the victims, who, it should be added, will themselves enjoy the fruits of sacrifice as well. The kingdom will be reborn through sacrifice, whether it is in victory or defeat. And, as long as any candidates can be found, our Kumār and Daitya will through dying be forever young.

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CONTRIBUTION OF INFRASTRUCTURES TO AGRICULTURAL GROWTH IN NEPAL

Y.B. Thapa

INTRODUCTION

Issues

The relationship between the development of social and physical infrastructures and the rate of growth of agricultural production (Agri-GDP) is of great interest to decision makers and researchers. A knowledge of this relationship would help us to formulate a rational policy for the development of infrastructures and their spatial distribution with the objective of modernising the agricultural sector in Nepal. Since more than two thirds of the people in the remote and rural areas live in abject poverty, the results of this study will also provide appreciation of the larger contribution of the infrastructures in the over all socioeconomic development.

Planned Development Efforts

The past development plans have consistently accorded high priority to the development of infrastructures and the creation of institutions that would support economic expansion. First, the 1956-70 plans laid emphasis on (1) transport and communication and (2) industry. Second, during 1970-80 plans accorded priority to (1) agriculture and regional development and (2) transport and communication. Lastly, the 1980-97 plans returned to "basic needs" such as (1) agriculture and poverty alleviation and (2) social services. The above investment patterns by economic sectors, its regional allocation and building of institutions have in some way affected the process of growth of the agricultural output and its productivity. As a corollary, the infrastructures would redistribute the benefits of agricultural growth among the regions, districts and households.

Hypotheses and Objectives

The rates of agricultural growth are hypothesized to be high in those areas where the public investment on infrastructures is high. So, a decision to develop an area or leave it backward will be operational by

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discriminatory allocation of resources to develop the social-overhead capital. The specific objectives of the study have been to (1) estimate the trend growth rate of the agri-GDP, cultivated area and land productivity by district and (2) examine the relationship between the rates of agricultural growth and development of the social and physical infrastructures.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

Growth Curves

The rate of growth of agri-GDP has been estimated by applying the geometric exponential function. This function gives discrete and compound growth rates, which are constant.

Growth Rate-Production Functions

The cause-effect relationship between the agricultural growth rates and the indices of infrastructures in some "q" function as specified below:

$$(G_1, G_2, G_3, P_1, P_2) = q(Z_1, Z_2, Z_3, Z_4, Z_5, Z_6, D_1, D_2)$$

Where,

G_1 = rate of growth of total agri. productivity, 1967/68-90/91

G_2 = rate of growth of total agri. productivity, 1985/86-90/91

G_3 = rate of growth of agri. GDP, during 1985/86-90/91

P_1 = agri. GDP per cultivated hectare, average of 1988/89-90/91

p_2 = agri. GDP per economically active rural labourer, 1988/89-90/91

Z_1 = irrigated area as percent of the cultivated area in 1988

Z_2 = agri. research and extension work force per 1,000 ha in 1990

Z_3 = educated labour force as percent of agri. labourer in 1981

Z_4 = motorable road length per 100 sq. km of the area in 1989

Z_5 = transport and communication scores in 1976/77

Z_6 = industrial capital formation per capita in 1986/87

D_1 = "1" if cropped area growth rate is 5% or more; otherwise, "0"

D_2 = "1" if cropped area declined by 1% or more; otherwise, "0".

DATA

Agricultural Production and Productivity

The Central Bureau of Statistics' estimates of producers' national average farm gate prices at 1976/77 levels were used to aggregate the agricultural commodities by districts (CBS 1984). From 1967/68 onwards, the then Department of Food and Agricultural Marketing Services (DFAMS) published the district-wise estimates of area, yield and production of food grains (paddy, maize, wheat, millet, barley), cash crops (potato, mustard, jute, sugarcane and tobacco). Also included were the data on the production of

the following commodities for the 1985/86-90/91 period: (1) meat (buffalo, goat, sheep, chicken, duck and pork), milk (buffalo, cow and goat), eggs (hen and duck) and wool; (2) fish (extrapolated backward on a prorata basis for 1985/86 and 1986/87); (3) pulses (lentil, chick pea, pigeon pea, black gram, grass pea, horse gram and soyabean); (4) tea; and (5) cotton. Finally, production of the fruits and vegetables for 1989/90 are from the Horticultural Master Plan. Production of ginger for 1989/90 was obtained from the project office.

The ratio of the DFAMS's cropped area to the NPC's cultivated area (for 1990) gives an estimate of the aggregate cropping intensity, and the level of productivity (NRs/hectare) or the rate of its growth refers to the ratio of agri-GDP per unit of cropped area.

Infrastructures

Irrigation, the agricultural research/extension network and the educated labour force increase agriculture's supply capacity. Industrial capital formation, road density and the transport/communication network increase the farm products' demand, which in turn contributes to increasing the rate of growth in agri-GDP. Construction of indices of growth of infrastructures is a complicated work. First, comparable time-series data on the physical and social infrastructures at the district level do not exist. Second, infrastructure variables are too heterogeneous to make a single composite index. Nevertheless, we attempted to construct the following sector-specific six indices of infrastructures.

Irrigated Area (IRA)

The government has been spending over one-half of the agricultural sector's total budget allocation to develop irrigation facilities. Data on development of irrigation for 1988 are based on the Irrigation Master Plan (HMG/UNDP/IBRD:1990). Irrigated area as percent of cultivated area in 1990 gives a physical measure of capability to harness water resources to increase the productivity of land and labour.

Research and Extension Manpower (REMP)

The agricultural extension network by districts as of 1990 is represented by the total number of extension officers (EXO), Junior Technicians (JT) and Junior Technical Assistant (JTA) who deal with crops, horticulture, livestock, fishery, jute, cotton and tea.

For quantifying a combined index of the agricultural research and development (R & D) net-work by district, we first apportioned the class-3 and some class-2 agricultural research officers of the R & D farms as the

research manpower stationed in the district where the particular R & D farm is situated. This accounts for about fifty percent of the R & D manpower in the agricultural farms and stations. Second, the "district level" R & D manpower in one district also has "externality or spill-over" benefits to the adjoining districts. We hopefully internalized this effect in other district(s) by reallocating some district level R & D manpower to the neighbouring district (s) in proportion to the R & D programmes launched by any R & D farm to the other districts.

The relative importance of different levels of technical manpower for the growth of agriculture is assumed to have a linear relationship with their educational levels. Therefore, we took a five-year graduate (e.g., B.Sc., B.V.Sc. or B. Tech.) as a common denominator, and synthesized a weighted REMP as follows:

$$\text{REMP} = 0.7 * \text{JTA} + 0.8 * \text{JT} + 1.07 * \text{EXM} + 1.13 * \text{ROM}$$

REMP per 1,000 cultivated hectare by district gives a measure of the intensity of agricultural research and extension infrastructure that would boost up the rate of growth of agriculture.

Educated Labour Force (ELF)

Education embodies certain skills that contribute to productive tasks. The government spends around 4.79 percent of its annual budget in education, and in addition, people spend around 2.04 percent of household expenditures for education.

Population Census-1981 provides information about the educated manpower in agriculture in six categories: (1) educated without schooling (WS); (2) below secondary (BS); (3) SLC or equivalent; (4) intermediate (IM); (5) graduate (G); and (6) post-graduate (PG). To construct a weighted sum of educated labour force (ELF) in agriculture, we assigned a unit weight to the secondary level of education and then adopted a system of weight proportional to the number of years of schooling as follows:

$$\text{ELF} = 1.6 * \text{PG} + 1.4 * \text{G} + 1.0 * \text{IM} + 1.0 * \text{SLC} + 0.5 * \text{BS} + 0.25 * \text{WS}$$

A rise in the ratio of ELF to the economically active population in the agricultural sector (which is roughly equivalent to the rural sector) would contribute to higher levels of productivity and a faster rate of economic growth.

Roads Density Index (RDI):

The extent of the road network reflects the degree of spatial integration of an economy. The Department of Roads published statistics on the length of blacktop road (BR), gravelled road (GR) and earthen road (ER) as of mid-1989 by district for the first time in 1991. We made a weighed road density index

(RDI) as follows:

$$\text{RDI} = \text{Sum} (1.0 * \text{BTR} + 0.3 * \text{GR} + 0.1 * \text{ER}) / \text{Area by District.}$$

The higher weights for the better roads reflect their effectiveness and durability. As of mid-1989 a motorable road of some kind had touched 53 out of 75 districts.

Transport and Communication Score (TCS)

In order to develop a measure of the mobility of goods and people and the interaction of ideas and exchange of messages among the people, the National Council for Science and Technology (NCST) had prepared transportation scores for 48 districts and communication scores for all 75 districts in 1976/77. The transportation score (TS) reflected (1) domestic air passenger movement and (2) road accessibility. The communication score (CS) represented (1) money orders and (2) various postal parameters (e.g. density by population and area and the volume of mail and like). NCST had included more variable in computing the CS than the TS. Thus the CS was 2.25 times more inflated than the TS. To obtain a weighted TCI, we assigned here a higher weight to the TS than the CS. This had two objectives, namely: (a) to deflate the already overblown CS, and (b) to accord higher weight to TS as:

$$\text{TCS} = 0.9 * \text{TS} + 0.1 * \text{CS}$$

The higher weight assigned to the transportation scores and lower weight to the communication scores reflect the higher importance of transportation for the Nepalese agriculture which is of high-weight-low-value-type.

Industrial Capital Accumulation (ICA)

Industry contributes to agricultural growth through the inter-industry input-output linkage as well as by providing an urban market for the farm products. Based on the 1986/87 Manufacturing Census by districts conducted by CBS, we have:

$$\text{ICA/Capita} = \text{Manufacturing \& grain-mills assets/Population}$$

RESULTS

Trend of National Income and Trend of Agri-GDP per Capita

Rates of growth of GDP, non-agri-GDP and agri-GDP during the 1964/65-90/91 have been accelerating. Since the non-agri-GDP also depends on agri-GDP, the performance of the farming sector and the latter's determinants will have propound economic and social welfare effects in different regions and to different people. The pattern of agricultural growth shows that (1) the productivity of the food grains and cash crops is declining in the mountains and hills; and (2) even after we lumped together the food grains and cash

crops, livestock products, fishery, fruits, vegetables, pulses, tea, cardamom and cotton, it is found that the growth rate of agricultural productivity in the mountains and hills is barely half of that in the Terai (Table 1 & 2).

Table 1: Compound Rates of Growth of GDP, Sectoral-GDPs, Population and Income per Capita by Economic Stages, 1964/65-90/91

Sector & Stage	Growth Rate (%/year)	R ²
Population	2.38	0.99
GDP	3.66	0.98
o/w NAGDP	4.60	0.96
AGDP	3.12	0.95
GDP Growth:		
1964/65-73/74	1.84	0.90
1974/75-82/83	2.75	0.92
1983/84-90/91	4.74	0.99
Agri-GDP Growth:		
1964/65-73/74	1.63	0.78
1974/75-82/83	1.17	0.39
1983/84-90/91	5.17	0.97

Table 2: Rate of Growth of Agri. GDP (Q), Farm Productivity (P) and Population by Development Blocks in two Phases 1967/68-90/91.

Region	Agri-GDP (Q) and Productivity (P)				Population Growth	
	1967/68-90/91		1985/86-90/91		1971-91	1981-91
	Q	P	Q	p	I	II
Mountain	1.95	-0.25	5.77	1.70	1.20	1.04
Hill	2.68	-0.94	7.84	2.90	1.64	1.62
Terai	2.16	1.13	7.31	4.16	3.48	2.76
Nepal	2.35	0.32	7.42	3.73	2.37	2.08

2. Inter-Correlation among Infrastructures

The correlation between the agricultural research cum extension and industrialisation is highest (0.53), followed by the correlation between education and transportation cum communication, (0.50) and the correlation between roads and irrigation (0.46) (refer table 3). Surprisingly, agricultural research cum extension and irrigation do not go hand in hand. As noted later,

the multiple correlation between the rates of agricultural growth and the explanatory variables is more than the inter-correlation among the latter.

Table 3: Correlation Matrix Among Infrastructure Variable

Variable	Irrigation	Education	Research/ Extn	Roads	Industry	Comntn & Transptn
Irrigation	1.00	0.38	-0.10	0.26	0.38	0.60
Education		1.00	0.09	0.46	0.37	0.50
Research & Extn.			1.00	0.53	-0.00	
Road				1.00	0.31	0.40
Industrialization					1.00	0.39
Communication & Transportation						1.00

District-wise Rates of Growth of Agri-GDP and Productivity

The rate of growth of the combined productivity of food grains and cash crops is the main dependent variable. The results show that in 50 out of 75 districts, the rates of growth of the food grains and cash crops are negative or nil (Table 4 and 5).

Table 4: Relativ Distribution of Rates of Cereals and Cash Crops Productivity, 1967/68-90/91

Range of Growth Rate	No. of Districts	Percentage
Below -2.0	2	2.7
-2.0 to -1.5	5	6.7
-1.5 to -1.0	20	26.7
-1.0 to -0.5	14	18.7
-0.5 to 0.0	3	4.0
0.0 to 0.5	10	13.0
0.5 to 1.0	10	13.3
1.0 to 1.5	3	4.0
1.5 to 2.0	4	5.3
2.0 to 2.5	3	4.0
above 2.5	1	1.3
Total	75	100.0

The data on the agricultural production for 1967/68–90/91 cover 10-crops: paddy, maize, wheat, millet, barley, sugarcane, jute, tobacco, oil seeds and potato. If we subtract the productivity growth rates from the corresponding rates of growth of the total agricultural outputs by district, we can obtain the rates of growth of the cropped area by district (not shown here). Further, if we subtract the rates of the growth of population by district during the 1971 to 1991 period (which are published by the Central Bureau of Statistics) from the total agricultural output growth, we can also obtain the rates of growth of agricultural income per capital by district. Such data will be very useful for district level planning purposes.

The agricultural growth rates for 1967/68–90/91 cannot be used as the dependent variable in the regression analysis because (1) many revisions in the cultivated area during the past twenty-five years make it difficult to isolate the systematic relationship between the variations in the agricultural growth rates and the variation in the indices of the infrastructure variables; and (2) the data about the area under production and production of the cereals and cash crops alone are available at the district level from 1967/68 onwards.

The agricultural GDP for 1985/86–90/91 covers 18 products: five cereals and five cash crops (mentioned in the preceding paragraphs), pulses, meat, milk, egg, wool, fish, tea and cotton.

Relationship between Agri. Growth and Infrastructure Network Productivity Growth-Production Function in the Long-run

Under a simple linear model, infrastructure variables explained as much as 62.9 percent of variations in the combined rate of growth of food grains and cash crops (Table 6). The coefficient of determination (R^2) is much greater than any of the partial inter-correlations among the explanatory variables (table 3). The Cobb-Douglas production function gave a little lower but good R^2 equal to 0.5243. That is, the relationship between the rate of growth of agricultural productivity and the level of development of the infrastructure net-works is straightforward, linear and significant.

Infrastructures that increase the rates of the growth of agricultural productivity in the long term are (a) agricultural research and extension manpower, (b) road density, and (c) irrigated area. This relation underlines the priority with which to develop such facilities in those areas where the agricultural productivity is declining and the food security is at risk.

Agricultural productivity has, unfortunately, a negative relation with the stock of educated labour force (i.e., human capital) irrespective of whether we consider mass education as percentage of the agricultural labour force or on a per hectare basis. This might be a reflection of a historical syndrome characterized by the following:

- (1) Most people do not regard agriculture as an enterprise, though it is a way of life of the "low class" people and a source of rent for the absentee landlords.
- (2) Education itself might have very little skill content in it.

Table 5: Rates of Growth of Agri-GDP, Productivity and Area by District and Region in Two Stages During 1967/68-90/91 ()**

District	1967/68-90/91		1985/86-90/91		
	Agri - GDP	Yield	Agri- GDP	1985/86-90/91	Yield
1. Taplejung	1.53	-0.69	11.26	-1.32#	
2. Shankuwasawa	5.66	-0.19	7.10	3.06	
3. Solukhumbu	0.58	0.32	11.65	-0.46#	
4. Panchthar	4.50	-0.77	2.86	1.37	
5. Ilam	3.56	-0.91	8.96	8.85	
6. Tehrathum	3.23	-1.48	2.57#	4.04	
7. Dhankuta	3.49	-1.46	2.88	3.70	
8. Bhojpur	2.00	-1.16	8.51	1.52#	
9. Khotang	3.87	-2.06	14.74	-5.50#	
10. Okhaldhunga	0.37	-1.23	5.11	-1.66	
11. Udyapur	0.07	-0.59	5.35	3.44	
12. Jhapa	1.48	0.47	10.80	10.07	
13. Morang	1.51#	1.18	5.55	4.34	
14. Sunsari	2.83	1.79	6.22	3.32	
15. Saptari	1.13	0.23#	5.3#	5.71	
16. Siraha	1.41	0.55	7.74	6.43	
17. Dolakha	2.78	-0.65	3.00	2.76	
18. Sindhupalchok	1.41	0.06#	7.03	5.00	
19. Rasuwa	6.34	2.01	6.10	1.42#	
21. Ramechhap	2.16	-1.47	4.48	4.67	
22. Sindhuli	2.49	-0.15#	10.28	3.45	
23. Kavre	4.21	-0.08#	13.24	11.32	
24. Bhaktapur	1.27	2.07	4.57	6.46	
25. Lalitpur	-1.03	0.63	7.59	8.25	
26. Kathmandu	-0.05	1.20	5.20	9.72	
27. Nuwakot	4.40	-0.27	6.98	1.97	
28. Dhading	4.76	-0.83	4.80	-5.27#	
29. Makwanpur	1.72	0.32#	8.65	5.81	

30.	Dhanusha	1.16	0.98	7.17	6.60
31.	Mahotari	0.67	0.95	7.02	6.92
32.	Sarlahi	3.92	1.61	4.32	5.56
33.	Rautahat	0.16	0.58	3.57	6.08
34.	Bara	4.83	3.10	6.64	5.26
35.	Parsa	4.71	2.43	1.26#	-0.41#
35.	Chitwan	1.25	0.45	5.38	5.24
36.	Manag	0.23	1.80	0.65#	2.18#
38.	Mustang	0.12	0.18#	3.72	3.46
39.	Gorkha	4.74	-1.30	7.46	3.66
40.	Lamjung	3.49	-1.21	8.75	2.39
41.	Tanahu	3.80	-1.14	6.34	5.63
42.	Kaski	2.24	-1.10	7.04	4.67
43.	Parbat	3.37	-1.16	14.64	-5.01
44.	Syangja	4.11	-0.99	12.02	-3.99
45.	Palpa	3.63	-1.17	2.55#	4.59
46.	Myagdi	0.93#	-1.12	9.83	5.69
47.	Baglung	2.52	-1.09	7.03	0.81#
48.	Gulmi	1.72	-2.42	6.61	0.87#
49.	Arghakhanchi	1.98	-1.34	8.58	-3.71
50.	Nawalparasi	2.66#	1.90	5.26	3.21
51.	Rupandehi	1.86	1.21	3.26	3.47
52.	Kapilvastu	1.23	0.33#	2.63#	3.66#
53.	Dolpa	-0.41	-1.78	0.63	-7.71
54.	Mugu	0.18	-1.23	2.20	0.67#
55.	Humla	-0.64	0.64	2.24#	5.49
56.	Jumla	0.09	-0.71	3.61	3.91
57.	Kalikot	0.28	-0.86	6.58	-0.46#
58.	Rukum	5.88	-0.91#	29.62	9.15
59.	Rolpa	4.62	-1.15	8.50	-2.37
60.	Pyuthan	1.37	-1.57	6.49	6.16
61.	Salyan	2.99	-1.98	8.09	-0.45#
62.	Jajarkot	0.86	-1.87	6.79	2.25
63.	Dailekh	1.39	-1.31	8.02	-0.05#
64.	Surkhet	5.63	-1.29	6.72	4.50

65.	Dang	2.78	-0.35	6.04	3.88
66.	Banke	1.13#	0.81	12.21	8.00
67.	Bardiya	1.20	0.91	8.37	0.86#
68.	Bajura	0.09	-0.90	-0.69#	-4.37#
69.	Bajhang	0.09	-0.94	8.61	0.27#
70.	Darchula	3.16	-1.24	2.56	2.93
71.	Achham	1.30	-0.82	7.51	0.76#
72.	Doti	0.83	-1.58	3.03	3.13
73.	Baitadi	1.00	1.21	8.01	-1.07#
74.	Dadeldhura	2.09	-0.89	8.34	7.15
75.	Kailali	2.61	0.64	10.58	5.03
76.	Kanchanpur	6.27#	0.85	9.04	3.35#

Note: # is equivalent to Zero at 90 percent level of confidence.

Table 6: Infrastructure Variables as the Determinants of the Rates of Growth of Total Productivity of Food Grains and Cash Crops (1967/68-90/91)

Variable (*)	Linear Equation	Log-linear Equation		
	Coefficient	T-Static	Coefficient	T-Static
Communication	0.00278	0.945	0.00250	1.933
Research & Extn.	0.05813	2.846	0.00361	2.815
Road	0.02822	3.446	0.00031	1.682
Educated Labour	-0.13439	-3.658	-0.01060	-3.107
Irrigation	0.04064	7.079	0.00813	4.999
Industrialization	-0.00011	-0.364	0.00045	1.433
Constant	-0.76157	-2.594	-0.00757	-2.130
R Square	0.62902		0.52428	
Standard Error	0.77161		0.00379	
F - Statistics	19.21637		12.49042	

* Capital assets in the manufacturing and grain mill sub-sectors as separate variables did not turn significant in the model.

- (3) Educated people might be lacking a work ethic or respect for dignity of work.
- (4) Educated labourers and managers might be in over-supply in relation to other factors of production, which leads to an appropriate input-mix.

Likewise, the farm productivity growth rates do not show any relationship with the accumulation of capital in the manufacturing and the grain mill sub-sectors taken together or separately.

Output and Productivity Growth-Production Function in Short-run Output

The predicted intercept of the 1985/86-90/91 agri-GDP annual-growth-rate-production curve is 5.06 percent for the year 1985/86, which will be shifted upwards by the land-augmenting technologies or scaled downwards by the land-consuming developments (table 7). A strategy to augment cropping intensity will pay off by increasing the annual rate of growth of farm output. For example, the dummy variable for the growth of cropped area can boost the farm output growth rate by 2.09 percent points; the annual rate of growth of agri-GDP will be 5.06 percent *plus* 2.09 percent equals 7.15 percent.

Conversely, the expansion of urban settlement into the farming area would prune the rate of growth of output by 3.28 points; the intercept of the output growth curve will be 5.06 *minus* 3.28 equals 1.78 percent per year. Capital accumulation in the manufacturing and grain mills sectors contributes to the rate of growth of agri-GDP, but ironically the agricultural research and extension manpower do not show a significant relationship with it.

**Table 7: Results of Regression of Agri. GDP Growth Rates
(1985/86-90/91) against the Infrastructure Variables**

Variable	Log-linear Equation		Linear Equation	
	Coefficient	T-Static	Coefficient	T-Static
Urban Expansion	-0.01176	-2.078	-3.27952	-1.970
Research & Extn.	-0.00462	-0.873	-0.14851	-1.428
Industrialization	0.00256	2.093	0.00126	0.851
Cropped Area Growth	0.01255	2.932	2.89014	2.716
Communication/Trnsp.	0.00375	0.752	0.01402	0.951
Education	0.00280	0.210	0.12775	0.691
Irrigation	-0.00072	-0.109	-0.01792	-0.598
Roads	-0.00047	-0.635	0.00968	0.211
Constant	0.01541	1.102	5.05841	3.242
R Square	0.29933	0.24452		
Standard Error	0.01454	3.85165		
F Statics	3.52452	2.67026		

Productivity

Road and irrigation profoundly increase the annual rates of growth of productivity, even during the short run (table 8). The stock of capital assets in the manufacturing and grain-mill sub-sectors increased the agri-GDP growth rate, but it did not contribute to the growth of productivity. Industry might have led to growth in the extensive farming but not intensive one.

Land and Labour Productivity Functions

Higher levels of agri-GDP per hectare and agri-GDP per labourer at a particular point may contribute to higher rates of growth of productivity, at least over the medium period. Agricultural research and extension, educated labour force, irrigated area, industrial development and motorable road density increase the productivity of land (table 9). Industry and roads also increase the productivity of farm labour.

**Table 8: Determinants of Productivity
Growth Rates 1985/86-90/91**

Variable	Coefficient	T-Static
Communication & transp.	0.01314	0.956
Research & Extn.	0.06945	0.738
Roads	0.03925	1.038
Education	0.10424	0.617
Irrigation	0.04493	1.700
Industrialization	0.000002	0.166
Constant	-0.36656	-0.270
R Square	0.23702	
Standard Error	3.55073	
F - Statistics	3.46891	

**Table 9: Regression of the Agri-GDP per Hectare and
Agri-GDP per Labourer (1988/89-90/91 Average)
(Cobb-Douglas production function)**

Variable	Agri-GDP per Hectare		Agri- GDP per Labourer	
	Coefficient	T-Value	Coefficient	T-Value
Connctn/Transp.	-0.02477	-0.412	0.04348	0.668
Research & Extn.	0.24135	4.050	-0.04888	-0.758
Roads	0.01527	1.758	0.01619	1.723
Education	0.18116	1.143	0.10446	1.609
Irrigation	0.12615	1.669	0.13907	1.701
Industry	0.02543	1.740	0.02188	1.385
Constant	3.35505	20.300	-0.04824	-0.270
R Square	0.38297		0.37304	
Standard Error	0.17615		0.19051	
F - Statistics	7.03425		6.74334	

Human capital such as the educated labour force and agricultural research and extension manpower are found more effective in increasing the land productivity. The Increased income from such sources may largely follow the distribution of land. Irrigation and industrialization are found to be more effective in increasing the labour productivity. The latter might make direct contribution to the wage earners' welfare.

Summary and Conclusion

The present study examined the agricultural growth by region and district and the contribution of infrastructures in increasing the rate of growth of agriculture.

The study concludes that a mismatched public investment in infrastructures is a key factor behind the lopsided agricultural growth. First, agricultural development is "dualistic". Agricultural growth in the prosperous regions and districts (producing cash crops and fine food grains) is high, whereas the agricultural situation in the backward districts (which have predominantly subsistence farming) is stagnant or declining. Obviously, this will exacerbate the inequitable growth of income of purchasing power, undermine food security, exacerbate regional disparity and discourage investment in the rural economy.

Second, the share of productivity in the 1967/68-90/91 rate of growth of food grains and cash crops in the Terai is 52 percent, but the decline in

productivity reduced the growth rates of food grains and cash crops by -12.8 percent in the mountains and by -35.1 percent in the hills.

Third, infrastructure variables (both social and physical) explain as much as 62.9 percent of variations in the rate of growth of agricultural productivity at the district level. Agricultural research and extension manpower, road density and irrigated area have increased the long-term (1967/68-90/91) agricultural productivity. Further development of these facilities, especially where productivity is declining, deserves priority.

Fourth, for the 1985/86-90/91 rate of growth of agri-GDP (which covers cereals, cash crops, pulses, livestock products and fish), the predicted intercept of the annual-output-growth-rate-curve is 5.06 percent. The dummy variable for cropped area growth rate has shifted up this intercept by 2.09 percentage points, while that for expansion of urban area has shifted-down the farm outputs' average growth rate by 3.28 percentage points. That is, any strategy to increase the cropping intensity will pay off by rapidly increasing the annual farm output growth rate, but the current unfolding of urban area in the fertile farm land is a self-defeating practice. Manufacturing and agro-processing mills contributed to increase the rate of growth of agri-GDP.

Fifth, agricultural research and extension, educated labour force, irrigated area, industrial development and roads increased the level of land productivity. Irrigation, industry and roads have increased the productivity of labour.

The Eighth Plan needs to strengthen the interrelationships among sub-sectors such as irrigation, roads, agricultural research/extension, education or manpower development as inputs for agricultural and rural development. The Plan concedes that the objective of irrigation is "to enhance the credibility of irrigation systems through improvement in management."

However, the Plan fails to specify that the irrigation supply bureaucracy would be efficient only if it is made accountable to the demand side, that is, the Department of Agriculture Development (DAD) and the farmers' cooperatives. Moreover, the Department of Irrigation (DOI) alone spends over one-half of the agricultural sector's total development budget, but the institution is held responsible to develop only 54.8 percent of the target of 293,895 hectares of irrigation (Which is very inefficient compared to the performance of the Agricultural Development Bank and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which could develop nearly half of the irrigation facility at lesser cost per hectare). DOI's few large projects spread over a half dozen districts in the Terai to make up 67.3 percent of its irrigation targets! This approach will lead to development of a few pockets at high cost.

The plan also fails to bring up-front an integrated irrigation, energy and agriculture plan for implementation.

The Eighth Plan's road sector has good objectives of "promoting the complimentary relationship between various geographical and socio-economic sectors" and "linking farms with markets". However, the road sector programmes are biased towards the Terai and towns, and they lack emphasis on the regional growth axes, hinterland development and the life-support approaches for people in the remote areas.

On the supply of human capital, the Eighth Plan has accurately identified the education sector's objectives as "to make citizens aware, capable and productive" and "increase the internal efficiency of education sector and to raise the quality of education". However, a just and efficient education programme remains to be articulated. On the demand side, the socio economic institutions and planning methods are unable to employ the 650,000 jobless, make the 1,000,000 under-employed more productive, and use the additional 200,000 labour force added every year. Out of this nearly 2,600,000 work force in search of jobs, the planners aim to employ 1,400,000 work force.

Against the above prospects, the agricultural/rural research and development programmes need to concentrate on how the creative power of the 2.6 million extra workforce can be streamlined to develop agriculture, agro-forestry, agro-industry and rural infrastructures. Industry and trade sectors need to do more to strengthen their backward linkages with farming, energy and water resources development and forestry. To conclude, the physical and social infrastructures should be developed by according priority to the requirements of agriculture, and within it, the needs of the backward districts and backward sub-sectors.

Acknowledgements

This article is dedicated to late Sardar Baldev Sing who died in Maharashtra soon after he completed his M.Sc. in Statistics from Punjab Agricultural University/Ludhiana in 1980. Mr. Baldev was an active member of the Punjab Students Union.

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IN QUEST OF MAHĀKIRĀNTĪ

George van Driem
Rijksuniversiteit Leiden

The birth of Mahākirāntī

After my grammatical studies of Limbu and Dumi, I undertook to make a study of Lohorung.¹ Before this work could be completed, I was called to Bhutan in 1989 where I was asked to write a first grammar of Dzongkha, the national language of Bhutan. Simultaneously, the Royal Government of Bhutan asked me to undertake the "First Linguistic Survey of Bhutan" in order to establish the number of speakers, genetic affinity and distribution of all the languages of the kingdom. This ultimately led to the appearance of *The Languages and Linguistic History of Bhutan* and to the establishment of a permanent Linguistic Survey of Bhutan under the Dzongkha Development Commission in line with the Royal Government's language policy of studying and preserving the country's diverse native linguistic heritage.

During the course of this work, I was anxious to find a language in Bhutan which was like the Kiranti languages I had studied in Nepal. In the initial stages of the survey, no such language presented itself, but I was exhilarated when I ran across a speaker of the language known as Gongduk in Monggar and found that his language exhibited a conjugation much like those of the Kiranti languages, and afterwards I journeyed to the remote Gongduk speaking area itself. Before the first survey had been completed, I was to learn that Gongduk was not the only language in Bhutan with a Kiranti-type verbal agreement system. Black Mountain Monpa also has a Kiranti-type conjugation. This led me to hypothesize that these languages might be closely related to the Kiranti languages and possibly form a genetic grouping together with the Kiranti languages, a grouping which, in my thoughts, I called Mahakiranti. I dreamt of finding a link between Kiranti and Lepcha, and the Gongduk personal pronouns led me to suspect that future research might uncover such a link. Of course, I knew that conjugational systems showing agreement with more than one actant were widely attested throughout Tibeto-Burman and were not limited to Kiranti (van Driem 1993a), and I also knew that DeLancey (1989:320) was on the right track

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when he wrote that "the notion that all of the Tibeto-Burman languages exhibiting a suffixal agreement paradigm belong to a single branch of the family is certainly dead". Relegating all languages sharing certain features of cognate verbal morphology to the same genetic sub-grouping would lead to a ludicrous phylogeny for Indo-European, and this is certainly the case for Tibeto-Burman as well.

Nonetheless, the tantalizing prospect of possibly discovering a Kiranti or Kiranti-like language in Bhutan led me not to discard my Mahakiranti hypothesis. When the Swiss linguist Balthasar Bickel visited Bhutan in 1991, I playfully told him that I had discovered two Kiranti languages in Bhutan. Suspecting that I might have fallen prone to a bout of levity, Bickel asked me whether this was really true. My knowledge of these languages was still quite limited, and because of the lack of stunning lexical correspondences between Gongduk, Black Mountain Monpa and the Kiranti languages, I chose to evade this question, which did not require much effort amidst the banter and mirth which prevailed at the house of my Bhutanese friend Karma Tshering that evening. Privately, therefore, I continued to entertain the Mahakiranti hypothesis until such time as a closer assessment was possible.


Alas, subsequent scrutiny of Black Mountain Monpa revealed that this language was clearly an East Bodish language and therefore not a candidate for Mahakiranti. Closer investigation of Gongduk similarly proved that the language was not an obvious candidate for my Mahakiranti construct, and I tentatively identified Gongduk as an independent sub-grouping within Himalayish, although the possibility that a Kiranti-Lepcha link might be established in the future cannot be excluded.

Fruits of the Quest in the East


In synopsis of the results of First Linguistic Survey of Bhutan, there are nineteen languages spoken in Bhutan. This number includes (1) Tibetan, which is somehow not really viewed as "a language of Bhutan", mainly because it cannot be identified with any particular geographic location within Bhutan, and (2) Nepali, which is not originally native to the kingdom but is now very much considered to be one of the languages of Bhutan, spoken in the southern belt. The Nepali of these eastern pioneers has come to diverge from standard Nepali in much the same way as Afrikaans has from Dutch. Dutch came to be spoken on the Cape shortly after Jan van Riebeeck landed there in 1653, which gives Afrikaans a considerably greater time depth than "tāḍhe" Nepali. Nonetheless, certain developments in "tāḍhe" Nepali and Afrikaans are highly similar, such as the changes in the tense and agreement system of the verb. The influx of Hindi loans and calques into Bhutanese Nepali parallels the many English borrowings in Afrikaans. Bhutanese

Nepali is spoken predominantly by people who became assimilated in a process of linguistic and cultural Indo-Aryanization during their historically documented eastward migration, and most Bhutanese Nepali are of Tamang, Gurung, Magar, Limbu, Newari or Rai extraction. This too parallels the complex ethnic make-up of the Afrikaans speaking population, whereby even the linguistic background of the "white" segment of the Afrikaans speaking population is mixed, much of it being of German ancestry. Therefore, the Nepali spoken in southern Bhutan merits detailed study by scholars of Indo-Aryan linguistics and language change.

With the exception of Nepali, all languages spoken in Bhutan belong to the Bodic branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family.



With the exception of Tshangla, Lhokpu, Lepcha and Gongduk, the Tibeto-Burman languages of Bhutan belong to the Bodish sub-branch of Bodic.²



(3) Several Central Bodish languages are spoken in Bhutan. The most prominent of these is Dzongkha, the national language. Historically, Dzongkha is the Bhutanese vulgate of the ancient language, the literary exponent of which is Classical Tibetan. Classical Tibetan, known in Bhutan as Chöke "language of the Dharma", has served as the literary and administrative language throughout Bhutan for centuries, and the name of its Bhutanese vernacular form, Dzongkha, literally means the *kha* "language" spoken in the *dzongs* or military strongholds throughout Bhutan. Dzongkha is the native language of the 'Ngalong population of western Bhutan. The

'Ngalong migrated to western Bhutan from Tibet in the 9th century, just as the Anglo-Saxons migrated to Britain from the Continent in the 5th century. Other Central Bodish languages in Bhutan other than Tibetan, already mentioned above, are Brokpa, Brokkat, Lakha and the curious Cho-ca-nga-ca-kha, the sister language of Dzongkha, spoken in the Kurichu Valley.

(4) The East Bodish languages of Bhutan can be divided into an Archaic East Bodish branch and a Mainstream East Bodish branch. The Archaic branch consists of the western and eastern dialects of Black Mountain Monpa, the former known as 'Olekha, after the clan name 'Ole. Mainstream East Bodic includes Dzala, Chali, Dakpa, Bumthang, Kheng, Kurtöp and the one dialectally diverse language known variously as Mangde, Henkha, 'Nyenkha, 'Adap or Phobjikha. If the Bumthang, Kheng and Kurtöp languages were to be considered three discrete dialect continua within a single "Greater Bumthang" language, a view which is somewhat defensible on purely linguistic grounds, the number of languages spoken in Bhutan would be reduced to seventeen. The East Bodish languages occupy all of central and northeastern Bhutan.


(5) The main language in eastern Bhutan is Tshangla, better known as Sharchop or Shâchop. The exact phylogenetic affinity of this language is uncertain, but it has been designated here as a sub-grouping within Bodic. (6) Lepcha is spoken in an enclave in south-western Bhutan. Although the Lepcha homeland lies primarily in Sikkim, the Lepcha speaking enclave in Bhutan is of some antiquity. (7) Lhokpu, the language of the *ḍoyās*, is spoken in southwestern Bhutan, but its former extent must have been greater. Lhokpu, or an extinct Lhokpu-like language, appears to have been the linguistic substrate onto which ancestral Dzongkha was first transplanted. The language is curious in that it shows some lexical similarities to Kiranti, although these will have to be subjected to more thorough investigation. Yet the language shows no verbal agreement of the Kiranti type. (8) Gongduk is the only language in Bhutan other than Black Mountain Monpa to exhibit an elaborate conjugational morphology of the Tibeto-Burman type, with agreement with more than one actant. It is spoken in an inaccessible mountainous area within the Kheng district overlooking the intraversable torrent of the Kurichu.

The finding of Mahākirāntī

Benedict (1991) coined the term "extinct proto-language" to denote a hypothetical proto-language which has been shown never to have existed. Such is the case for Austric, which was proposed by Wilhelm Schmidt (1906) and was supposed to have given rise to the Austronesian and Austro-Asiatic (Mon-Khmer, Munda, Nicobarese) languages. If an assumed proto-

language is shown by comparative research not to correspond to any historically real common ancestral phylogenetic mother tongue, then this defunct hypothetical construct can be called an "extinct proto-language". Was Mahākīrānti then an extinct proto-language?

To answer this question, let us first look at the tentative phylogeny of Himalayish languages which I proposed in *The Languages and Linguistic History of Bhutan*.



It is often pointed out that the status of sub-groupings within Sino-Tibetan is uncertain, a tell-tale testimony to the state of the art. I have recently cited several authoritative but quite different views on higher-level sub-groupings in Tibeto-Burman (van Driem 1994b). The highly tentative nature of certain lower-level sub-groupings must also be stressed. Although some groups, such as East Bodish, manifestly represent real phylogenetic units, some other groupings remain rather hypothetical. For example, it may prove untenable to classify Lhokpu outside of Himalayish, and it may prove incorrect to classify Gongduk within Himalayish. In fact, the reality of the Himalayish grouping itself is moot.

It will be my contention here that Mahākīrānti is presently a more well supported hypothesis than Himalayish, and that Mahākīrānti consists of at least Kiranti and Newar. I have argued that there is a Newar-Kiranti genetic link, and these arguments are supported by Genetti's Dolakha Newar data and Jørgensen's Classical Newar studies. On the basis of a comparative study (van Driem 1994a), it has been demonstrated that the Dolakha verb is shown to be a generally more faithful reflexion of the Proto-Newar system than the Classical Newar verb. On one hand, Classical Newar has retained vestiges of a verbal agreement system like that exhibited in Dolakha. On the other hand, Classical Newar exhibits the rudiments of the conjunct-disjunct system of modern Kathmandu Newar.

Dolakha conjugational affixes can be readily related to their cognate morphemes in other Tibeto-Burman verbal agreement systems. Yet, certain features of the Dolakha verb suggest a closer genetic relationship with the Kiranti languages, e.g. the fact that the Dolakha reflex of the Tibeto-Burman

proto-morpheme *-<u> is a suffix, and that this suffix indexes third person patient involvement. Comparison of the verbal morphology constitutes only one type of evidence which has yet to be corroborated by regular lexical and phonological correspondences, but inflexional comparison provides evidence of a highly sound and compelling kind, and, to our present state of knowledge, this evidence points towards a greater genetic affinity between Kiranti and Newar. The probability of finding regular lexical and phonological correspondences between Kiranti and Newar seems high, for various scholars have speculated about a closer genetic link between Kiranti and Newar. The linguistic evidence therefore supports the idea that the Kiranti kings, mentioned in the chronicles and who long ago reigned in the Kathmandu Valley, may very well have been ancient Newar. If so, they may at that time not have been ethnically and linguistically all that different from their Kiranti brethren. Once the provocative results of Michael Witzel's extensive toponymical research in the Kathmandu Valley are published, more light may be shed on this matter.

At present, Kiranti and Newar together form the hypothetical genetic unit within Tibeto-Burman which I propose be known as Mahākirāntī. I sought in the East but found in the West.

Notes

1. This article is based in part on a paper which I presented at the 13th conference of the Linguistic Society of Nepal at Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur on November 26th, 1992.
2. The abbreviation TGTM in the tree stands for Tamang-Gurung-Thakali-Manangba.

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SQUATTING IN THE KATHMANDU VALLEY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Kathleen M. Gallagher

In recent years the urban population of Nepal living in places of 10,000 population and more increased by 116.5% and grew at a rate of 8.03% per annum, compared to a 2.39% annual growth rate for the rest of the country (Central Bureau of Statistics 1987: 180). Socio-economically, much of this urban populace will be marginalized, and many will end up in squatter settlements.

Squatting refers to the occupation of land to which one possesses no *Lal Purja* (land ownership certificate), or in the case of renters, the occupation of land, housing or rooms to which the landlord possesses no ownership certificate. Early studies on squatting conducted in 1985 estimated the squatter population in Kathmandu to be approximately 2,000 (Norwegian Institute of Technology and Oslo School of Agriculture 1985:45); by 1988 this figure had nearly doubled to 3,700 (University of Trondheim and Norwegian Institute of Technology 1988:42); and today it is safe to estimate that the squatter population has quadrupled or stands somewhere between eight and ten thousand.

Squatting is a complex issue encompassing a variety of problems at the national, local and personal level. This paper seeks to explore the historical factors which contributed to the present increase in squatting in the Kathmandu valley.

The Urban Form of Kathmandu

Many cities in South Asian have a rich and long history, and Kathmandu is no exception. The three largest cities in the Kathmandu valley (Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur) represent some of the oldest cities in Nepal. Whether one adheres to Hindu accounts that Krishna came here in search of Kamadhenu or more popular Buddhist chronicles that claim Manjushree visited the valley on a pilgrimage to Swayambhunath, both legends profess that the form of Vishwakarma was assumed and he drained the lake covering the valley at what is today called Chobar Gorge (Hasrat 1970:1-33).

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Historical evidence indicates the existence of Kathmandu as early as 200 B. C. Raja Gunakamdeva is said to have founded the city in 723 A. D. (Throndsen 1989:30). Most notable among the rulers during Kathmandu's "ancient" period (approximately 900 B. C. to 880 A. D.) are the Kirant and Licchavi Kings. The "middle" or medieval period (approximately 880 to 1768 A. D.) witnessed the rise of the Malla kings, especially famous for their patronage of the arts. The modern period (1768 onwards) was under the rule of the Shah kings. A description of Kathmandu would be incomplete without mentioning the Newars, Kathmandu's predominant ethnic group, whose highly developed economy and material life was integral to the development of a flourishing urban culture. A wealth of natural resources, fertile agricultural land, thriving trade with Tibet and India, and a hardworking indigenous populace made early Kathmandu a prosperous, powerful and growing city.

Eliade describes the arrangement of space in many Indian cities as the symbolic and religious reflection of a mythological or celestial mode (Rowe 1974: 230-35). So too the Malla rulers implemented city planning according to Hindu principles.

The diagrammatic town layouts were believed to have the same cosmic-magic effect on the initiated town dweller that the mandala (a Graphic reproduction of the universe used for contemplative thinking) had on the yogi.

(Pieper as quoted by Throndsen 1989:28)

Sekler describes the layout, plans, street patterns and squares, housing and the relationship of narrow streets to open areas in Kathmandu as revealing a superb sense of design, mastery of materials, and highly developed sense of craftsmanship (Kansakar 1988:18).

Preeminent in the planning of ancient Hindu cities was the axiom that spatial arrangements should reflect caste relationships (Rowe 1974: 230-35). Prestige decreased, both secularly and ritually, from centre to phriphery. Housing segregation among different caste groups was also prevalent in Kathmandu. The area within the walled city was reserved for high caste Hindus (with the exception of Muslims) while outcastes such as sweepers, butchers, executioners, etc. were relegated to the periphery (Oldfield [1880] 1974:90-100). Furthermore, both housing size (not more than two stories) and roofing materials (no terra-cotta tiles) were prescribed to these outcastes (Kansakar 1988:19-20).

With respect to patterns of land use in Kathmandu, Oldfield observed that the valley lowlands were generally reserved for paddy cultivation (both

because of their productivity as well as unhealthy dampness for residential use); high level lands, on the other hand, housed the cities, town and villages (Oldfield [1880] 1974:95). To further conserve space, housing expansion demonstrated a strong tendency towards vertical expansion; houses were built of two, three and four stories, utilizing as little horizontal spaces as possible (UNESCO as quoted by Kansakar 1988:19)

A transformation of Kathmandu's urban form, however, began with Prithvi Narayan Shah's conquest of the valley in 1768. As the need for protection and separation between Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Bhaktapur became less important after the Gorkha conquest, the fortified walls separating these three kingdoms were allowed to decay and almost completely disappear (Oldfield [1880] 1974:95). At this time the Valley also witnessed the large scale outmigration of Newari businessmen, traders and artisans (particularly from Bhaktapur) as well as streams of immigrants from Gorkha and western Nepal. Not surprisingly, King Prithvi Narayan Shah's high ranking officials as well as other nobility were rewarded with the construction of palatial residences and gifts of land. Moreover, extensive tracts of public and private land were reserved for army barracks and parade grounds (Kansakar 1988: 21-2). The irreplaceable loss of outmigrating Newari artisans combined with the Shah Kings' increased emphasis on military expenditures (reflected in both land utilization and decreased patronage of arts), marking the beginning of the transformation of Kathmandu's urban form.

With very few exceptions, after the death of King Prithvi Narayan Shah, the Nepal politics was characterized by palace intrigues, violence, and a blatant disregard for the welfare of the common people. M.C. Regmi refers to Nepal's nineteenth century political structure as an "agrarian bureaucracy." Specifically, the sole goal of the state apparatus was the continual extraction of the agricultural surplus for the maintenance of power and affluence of the ruling elites. Various forms of bonded labour, regressive taxes and exploitative landlord-tenant relationships were only a few of the institutions that imprisoned a majority of the people in a cycle of indebtedness (Regmi 1978). Likewise, Kathmandu's urban form reflected the turbulence and injustice of the times, especially under the Rana regime (1846-1951).

The large, white Western style palaces and spacious enclosed gardens which were the trademark of the Ranas led to a morphological change in the city (Kansakar 1988:24). The horizontal expansion of these buildings greatly decreased the availability of agriculturally fertile land in Kathmandu. As the number of palaces increased, so too did the need for roads linking them with the city core. In turn, the construction of radial roads from the city core led to the linear development of settlements along the routes such as Kalimati, Baneswar, Dilli Bazar, Balaju, and Dallu where poor people from Kathmandu

moved for business and at the same time it provided food, shelter and trade for the people coming from outside the Kathmandu Valley including those involved in the military and administrative services of the government (Kansakar 1988:25).

Finally, the appropriation of valuable land in and near the city core considerably limited housing options for a growing urban populace, and many were compelled to construct houses on whatever vacant land was available (Kansakar 1988:25). Thus, the sporadic and uncontrolled use of available public land had begun.

Morphological change under the Ranas continued after the 1934 earthquake, when reconstruction projects introduced the concept of wider roads and New Road assumed the character of a modern commercial center. Prior to 1934, New Road represented one of the most densely populated areas in the city core. After reconstruction, however, land and housing in this area was beyond the reach of many of its former residents; additionally, those displaced by new municipal buildings were relocated in what is today known as Naya Bazar (Kansakar 1988:26-7). Thus, the inefficient appropriation of large tracts of urban land through the construction of palaces, roads and inappropriate municipal buildings continued under the Rana regime.

In summary, the urban character of Kathmandu prior to 1768 was marked by a unity of form and function reflected in the thoughtful layout of the city, caste segregation according to Hindu principals, and a utilitarian use of land and housing. A shift in priorities by subsequent rulers began to manifest itself materially in Kathmandu's urban form. Specifically, the Shah kings' emphasis on military expenditure followed by the palatial residences, roads and "modern" urban planning principles of the Ranas changed the veneer of Kathmandu forever. From the 1950's onwards, however, an even greater modification in Kathmandu's urban form was to take place. Some of these changes (such as urbanization and the introduction of foreign aid) were going to occur at an intense and rapid pace, catching both citizens and government planners off guard. Furthermore such accelerated change was to generate a variety of urban problems, including the emergence of squatter settlements.

The Changing Urban Form of Kathmandu and the Emergence of Squatter Settlements

Urbanization and its concomitant challenges of adequate housing and appropriate urban planning have generated "radical changes in social, economic and political life" all over the world. Thus, any discussion of Kathmandu's changing urban form and squatting must begin with a brief discussion of population growth and migration, two important predecessors to urbanization and the emergence of squatter settlements.

In the 1952/54 census, Nepal's population stood a just over eight million; by the 1981 census this figure exceeded fifteen million. Between 1961 and 1971 the population growth rate accelerated (2.50%); in the 1981 census this population growth rate reached an all time high of 2.62% (CBS 1987:7). A decrease in the crude death rate due to improvements in health care is usually attributed to this growth. While medical care may have improved slightly, worsening conditions in rural areas due to population pressure precipitated a stream of outmigration from the villages. Sinha (1980: 76) states, "In a sense, all decisions to migrate are based on economics." While marriage, natural disasters and occasionally social reasons are all motivating factors for migration in Nepal, economic factors predominate. According to the 1981 census, nearly sixty percent of the male lifetime migrants had migrated for reasons of trade and commerce, agriculture and service (CBS 1987:168).

Push factors for outmigration in rural Nepal include archaic land tenure systems, physical degradation (erosion and deforestation), spiralling unemployment and increased modernization of the village economy accompanied by changes in consumer behaviour inappropriate to most villagers (UNICEF 1987:8-35). Unfortunately, marginalized families in the rural sector, though targeted as the main beneficiaries of various land reform acts, were usually too vulnerable economically or unorganized to claim any newly established rights (UNICEF 1987:26). As more and more families are pushed into the subsistence and landless categories, migration is their only option for socioeconomic survival, and many migrate to urban areas. In 1971, 12.2% of all inter regional migration was from all areas to urban areas (Sharma 1989:61). Not surprisingly, many of these migrants are pulled to Kathmandu with the hope of securing jobs. That Kathmandu also functions as Nepal's administrative and political centre, offering an array of educational, medical and other facilities, undoubtedly also attracts these migrants.

In addition to worsening conditions in the villages, two other factors precipitated an increase in immigration throughout Nepal. After the advent of democracy in 1951, the Kathmandu valley opened up to Nepalis and foreigners alike. Indian businessmen and Western development workers poured into the capital. During the Rana period, entry and exit visas into the valley had been strictly controlled (Kansakar 1988:27). The introduction of air travel and extensive road building in the 1960s not only expedited travel within Nepal but linked it with the outside world as well. Of special importance were the Tribhuvan Rajpath and the Arniko Rajmarg. The road to Kathmandu had been literally paved, and many migrants followed it. Next to the Terai, the Kathmandu valley ranks second in destination for all inter regional urban migrants (30.4%) (CBS quoted by Sharma 1989:61). Kathmandu remains the prime destination for white collar employment and

the major locale for the convergence of the middle class from all over Nepal. In recent years it has also attracted a sizeable immigrant population that thrives on the increasing demand for services generated by an expanding city (Sharma 1989:42).

Such immigration as well as natural population growth combined to give the Kathmandu valley an urban growth rate between 1971 and 1981 of 3.83% (Sharma 1989:21). In 1987, Kathmandu Town Panchayat alone was estimated to have 308,000 inhabitants (Throndsen 1989:21). During 1970s, increases in the population of the city core and adjacent areas were especially high; the density in the ten core wards of Kathmandu is above four hundred persons per hectare, with two wards approaching densities as high as twelve hundred persons per hectare (Sharma 1989:43). Sharma (1989:43) notes that these densities are extremely high, as Kathmandu is not characterized by high-density, high-rise buildings common to most Western cities. Needless to say, the combined effect of natural population growth, immigration, urbanization and increasing population density not only radically altered Kathmandu's urban form, it also created a shortage of adequate housing.¹

According to Nepal's Basic Needs Strategies, the minimum housing requirement for urban areas was defined as thirty square meters of floor space per household (Malla 1990:21), or six square meters per person. Basic Need's targets were designated as 380,000 housing units by the year 2000 (Malla 1990:26). Despite these well intention projections, about 50% of the households in Nepal are estimated to own floor space below 5.25 square meters per person (Throndsen 1989:41). In Kathmandu alone, approximately 10,000 houses are said to be "substandard," and an estimated 21% of the total population is homeless (Shrestha and Kaltenborn-Lunde 1990:7). Obviously there is a shortage of adequate housing in Kathmandu.²

Thus far this section has described how the forces of natural population growth, migration and urbanization created a dense urban environment and thereby contributed to the housing shortage in Kathmandu. While an effort was made to elucidate the relevance of these factors to Kathmandu, they are nonetheless national trends shaping the development of urban areas all over Nepal, especially in the Terai. This discussion now moves from the general to the specific, recounting events in Kathmandu's recent past that not only changed Kathmandu's urban form but also created the background for squatting. Specifically, attention will be given to changing patterns in land use, alterations in traditional styles of housing, economic factors and sociocultural factors.

The Shah kings' and Rana's legacy of changing Kathmandu's traditional patterns of land use has continued up to the present day. An increase in government buildings, industrial estates, the Ring Road and the Tribhuvan

International Airport were four of the worst offenders in this regard (Kansakar 1988:28). Increasing needs of the new partyless Panchayat System prompted a surge in building construction. Between 1964 and 1978 government institutions accounted for a 7.8% increase in land use. The government institutional buildings between Tundikhel and Tukucha and the National Trading Building at Teku are just a few examples. Various industrial estates (such as the Balaju Industrial Estate, the Bansbari Shoe Factory, etc.) not only used up huge tracts of land, they also resulted in new residential areas in nearby vicinities. Kanti Hospital at Maharajgunj, the Maternity Hospital in Thapathali, the Royal Nepal Academy Hall at Kamaladi, and the introduction of diplomatic missions likewise generated residential growth (Kansakar 1988:27-8). Two of the largest encroachments upon agricultural land were the airport and the Ring Road. The Ring Road alone required 162 hectares of land (World Bank quoted by Kansakar 1988:30) (more than Kathmandu's old city boundaries) and continues to consume valuable space, particularly at busy intersections, as isolated houses and small settlements spring up along its edge. Of course, this outward expansion of Kathmandu was greatly enhanced by both increased public bus service as well as the availability of electricity, piped water and other infrastructure to increasing numbers of outlying residential areas.

Not only were more and more buildings being built, their manner of construction unnecessarily used up urban space. Housing construction in particular ran counter to traditional patterns of land use. Foreign personnel that came to staff diplomatic missions and development offices also brought with them a preference for "bungalow" style houses, which were quickly adopted by Kathmandu's middle class. These Western style houses took up more horizontal space than their traditional Newari counterparts; furthermore, they also always had a compound enclosed by a wall, thereby taking up even more area. In summary, the rapid horizontal expansion of Kathmandu in the 1950s and especially the 1960s depleted the city of fertile agricultural land. The practice of reserving the Valley's rich low-lying *khet* for paddy cultivation and relegating residences to the higher, less easily cultivable tar became less and less popular. In short, recent patterns of land use and housing style do not conform to the traditional land use system to even a limited degree. Kathmandu's urban form was not only changing, it was becoming unrecognizable.

Obviously, if land availability in Kathmandu is decreasing while the urban population continues to increase, competition for both housing and land will also increase, driving up the prices of these commodities. According to the Land Revenue Department, from 1954 to 1964 the average cost of one ropani of land within Kathmandu skyrocketed from Rs 1,000 to Rs. 7,000

(Kansakar 1988: 57), in 1978 this figure rose to Rs. 42,000 and in 1985 the average cost of one ropani of land in Kathmandu cost Rs 561,000 (Kansakar 1988:58). Housing in Kathmandu has become an expensive marketable asset. As stated in a recent report by the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning, the urban housing situation is characterized by an increasing gap between affordability and shelter cost (Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning 1988). Spiralling land prices and construction costs have made it considerably difficult for even a middle class civil servant to build a house (Kansakar 1988:51).

As elucidated in the preceding paragraphs, much of Kathmandu's urban sprawl can be attributed to an increase in residential area; such areas, however, do not cater to low income families. According to the 1988 Nepal Rastra Bank Household Budget Survey, 58% of all urban household earn less than Rs. 1,000 per month; 17% do to even earn Rs. 500 per month (Malla 1990:23). The absolute minimum cost for a house with a floor space of thirty square meters, a plot costing at least Rs 23,000, comes to a total of Rs. 68,000, a figure far exceeding the affordable limit of most households in Kathmandu. The situation is even more severe for households whose monthly income is less than Rs. 500. Low caste families near the city core are especially vulnerable to rising prices of land and housing. Historically, the land prices in Kathmandu varied between different caste areas. Low caste and out caste residential areas (located primarily on the western side of town) were less expensive (Throndsen 1989:45). Today, however, all land close to the city core is of high value.

Even renting a room is becoming less and less of an option for low income families that cannot enter the competitive land and housing market. In the 1950s and 1960s less well-to-do families had a fairly good chance of securing inexpensive rooms on a rental basis. Such rooms were usually located in a building's least desirable location: the damp ground floor, and other areas lacking light and ventilation, etc; living conditions may not have been ideal, but they were cheap. Soldiers serving in the capital at that time were even more fortunate; city dwellers were happy to give them ground floor rooms for free, sometimes with the added bonus of firewood, for security reasons (Gurung 1990). Increasing population density, however, has forced the conversion of these inexpensive ground floor quarters into other uses - *pasals* (shops), for instance. And where such rooms are available, they are no longer affordable. It is even becoming difficult for families fortunate enough to own some land and a house to meet their own space requirements. Partitioning of rooms is a common response to a lack of living quarters. With each passing generation, however, the amount of available space that a father has to pass on to his sons decreases; ultimately even family members

are forced to leave.

In addition to renting cheaper ground floor rooms, a second option for extremely poor families in search of housing in Kathmandu was the *dharmasalas*, *satals*, *pauwas* and *patis*.

Traditionally, these public rest houses connected to a temple have served a variety of functions; lodging for pilgrims, resting stops for transient travellers, residences of a longer duration for gurus and sadhus, and the meeting place for many local events of both a religious and secular nature. Additionally, these public rest houses were often permanent homes for Kathmandu's most destitute, who had been abandoned for various reasons: the mentally and physically handicapped, elderly women, orphans, etc. Only occasionally were entire families found to be permanently residing in a *satal* or *dharmasala*. Gradually, however, whole families have begun moving into these public rest houses; nowadays even the space in the *dharmasalas* is completely saturated. *Satals* and *dharmasalas* are graphic examples of Kathmandu's changing urban form; once quiet sanctuaries nestled amidst art and architecture, today they are not unlike crowded slums.

Sociocultural factors are also modifying Kathmandu's urban form, especially changes within the caste system and family structure. With respect to caste, it would have been unthinkable a few generations ago for low castes and untouchables to dwell in the same vicinity as higher castes as they are now doing throughout Kathmandu. As Muller-Bonker (1988:31) points out, however, "spatial organization structures are also disintegrating because they often no longer fulfil practical requirements, such as the need for space in a growing population. Ritual factors, then, are slowly being abandoned in favour of economic and practical considerations.

Kathmandu's family structure is also evidencing change, with an increasing number of families choosing to live separately instead of within the more traditional structure of a joint family system. It should be noted, however, that this may not be indicative of a complete breakdown of the joint or extended family system per se. To elaborate, while many families in Kathmandu may be nuclear by residence, ritually and economically they may still be classified as joint. Nevertheless, whether a family is completely or only partially nuclear, if they are residing separately then they are taking up space, thereby adding one more unit of consumption to an already inadequate housing supply.

Conclusion

The incidence of squatting in the Kathmandu valley and the rest of Nepal continues to increase. Solutions to the problem begin with an understanding of the phenomenon itself. Any exploration into squatting in the Kathmandu

valley means very little without the perspective of history. The first portion of this paper tried to recapture Kathmandu's traditional form, particularly as it existed under the Licchavi and Malla Kings prior to unification. This section concluded with a description of how Kathmandu's urban form began to change with the conquest of Prithvi Narayan Shah and also under the Rana regime. The second portion of this paper dealt more exclusively with events in Kathmandu's recent past that helped create today's squatting, such as rising rates of urbanization, an increasing gap between housing affordability and cost, sociocultural factors, and so forth. It is hoped that such historical perspective lends insight and sensitivity to current understanding about squatting in the Kathmandu valley and the rest of Nepal as well.

Notes

1. The above urban statistics are invaluable indicators of trends, but it should be noted that as of yet Nepal still lacks a clear and comprehensive definition of an urban area. To illustrate, the 1961 census designated an urban area as a locality inhabited by not less than 5,000 people, the 1962 Town Panchayat Act raised this figure to 10,000 and this number was lowered again in 1976 to 9,000. Changes in nomenclature (an "urban area" was called a *Shahar* in the 1952/54 census, a Nagar Panchayat after 1962 and is today known as Nagar Palika) also occurred. Finally there have been many changes in the boundaries of urban areas. These limitations must be kept in mind while interpreting any urban data in Nepal.
2. As with the urban data, it should be noted that the absence or precision and consistency in many of these figures complicates an analysis of the housing situation in the Kathmandu valley. To elaborate, in some studies housing was simply defined in terms of adequate floor space; in other studies "housing" included basic amenities like water and even electricity. Even where objective parameters exist, they may not necessarily agree; for instance the minimum floor space per person was sometimes defined as six square meters, at other times as 5.25 square meters. While definitional discrepancies abound, all the relevant research cited in this text agreed on one point: there is a shortage of adequate housing in Kathmandu.

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THE PATTERN OF DEVELOPMENT IN NEPAL: A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Sudhindra Sharma

The Pattern of development exhibited by Nepal can be explained in terms of the interactions between four variables: world system conditions, state, class and cultural values. The role of each of these variables has changed in different periods of Nepalese history. During its formative years, the expanding Gorkha state and cultural values in the form of Hindu religious ideology had been the major forces shaping Nepalese society. During subsequent periods, world system conditions in other words, global and regional capitalist conditions and the new classes they gave rise to, have played a more active role in affecting the pattern of development and social change in Nepal. With a greater integration of the Nepalese state into the world system, the role of the state and the hold of dominant cultural values on the Nepalese society have weakened.

This paper first attempts to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the development process in Nepal. Second, it undertakes a historical analysis of the development process in Nepal based on this framework. It also delves on the causes and consequences of the 1990 crisis.

The Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework proposed here incorporates the major ideas of Marxist, Weberian and modernization schools. It borrows the concept of world system conditions and ideas of class conflict and alliances and their role in societal transformation from the Marxist school. From the Weberian tradition it draws ideas on the role of the state and its effect on society. The idea of cultural values and their role in societal formation is derived from the Weberian and modernization schools.

Synthesis along these lines have been undertaken before by Hagen Koo (1986) in explaining the development process in South Korea, Taiwan and other newly industrialized countries (NICs). Lacking in Koo's framework, is recognition of the role of cultural values and how these relate to the state and

class alliances. A more inclusive conceptual framework is elaborated in Figure 1.




Fig. 1: The Interrelationship of Variables in the Political Economic Processes of Nepalese Development.

This framework does not assume cultural values, the state, class and world system to be mutually exclusive and independent, but acknowledges their interaction and interdependence. It is furthermore grounded in historical analysis.

World System Conditions

A key concept in this framework is world system conditions. The importance of this concept has been highlighted by two often complementary traditions in development studies, dependency and world system perspectives associated, respectively, with Andre Gunde Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein.

The basic tenet of dependency theory is that development or underdevelopment processes in third world countries can only be understood in the context of development processes in advanced capitalist countries. Development and underdevelopment are partial and dependant structures of one global system. The relationship between the developed first world and the underdeveloped third world is one of dependency, commonly defined as the "conditioning situation in which economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others" (Dos Santos, cited in Koo 1984:35). The penetration of capital from the industrialized countries, the "core" to the less industrialized countries, the "periphery" powerfully affects the economy, class structure and ultimately the entire social structure of the peripheral society.

The world system theory is formulated at a higher Level of abstraction than dependency, its sister concept. It stresses the independent significance of the world capitalist system and its impact on socioeconomic processes in all nations: core, semi-periphery or periphery (Wallerstein cited in Koo 1986). Here the primary concern is not with the unilateral relations of a periphery nation with a core nation as in dependency, but with the multinational structures of capitalist relations, world-wide division of labour, the movement of advanced capital and the cycles of global capitalism. (Koo 1984: 36). This perspective holds that the cycle of world capitalism defines the mobility chances of a periphery nation becoming a semi-periphery or a semi-periphery ascending to core status.

The chief merit of dependency and world system theories is their stress in the role of external economic conditions in inhibiting and even retarding third world development. The meaning of this for analysis of the development process in Nepal is that understanding of the changes in the state apparatus, caste/class structure and even cultural values must take into account the penetration of capitalism in South Asia and its subsequent consolidation after the emergence of Independent India. The effect of a resilient national bourgeoisie in India, intent of expanding and strengthening its position in the peripheral areas, needs consideration. It also means looking into the balance of payments between Nepal and India as well as the revenue source of Nepal's successive five year plans and the conditions imposed by these.

Class Structure

Another key element in this framework is class structure. Classic writers on this subject are Karl Marx and Max Weber. Those following Marx define an individual's class position in terms of his or her role in the production process, while those following Weber see class in terms of their market situations.

On the question what constitutes a class, Marx writes, "The owners of mere labour power, the owners of capital and the land owners whose respective sources of income are wage, profit and rent - thus wage laborers, capitalists and land owners - constitute the three great classes of modern society based on a capitalist mode of production (quoted in Dahrendorf 1965:9). Thus for Marx, private ownership or non-ownership is the primary criteria for defining class.

Weber conceptualizes class primarily in terms of market situation. According to Weber, "the term class refers to any group of people that is found in the same class situation" (quoted in Giddens 1982). The class situation for Weber includes the typical chance for the supply of goods, external living conditions and personal life experiences in so far as this

chance is determined by the amount and kind of power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods or skills for the sake of income in a given economic order (Anthony Giddens, 1982).

The dependency and world system theorists conceive classes primarily in terms of relations of exchange rather than relations of production and therefore are closer to the Weberian tradition than the marxian. Following Weber, they conceive market situations to broadly include the labour market, the consumer market and the credit market (Koo 1986: 40). This approach tends to regard the internal class structure of the peripheral country as derivative of the world system. In doing so, it de-emphasizes the importance of class interests and political struggles of social classes in a peripheral society.

Within the Marxian tradition, the structural approach of Nicos Poulantzas (1973, 1982) represents an advance in the conceptualization of class. He defines class in terms of three dimensions: economic, ideological and political. Poulantzas concedes the possibility of different factions of the dominant class controlling various apparatus of the state. He acknowledges the possibility of conflict and competition among these factions but gives ultimate primacy to class struggle.

In the work of Cardoso and Falleto (1979) Poulantzas's class structural approach is integrated with the dependency and world system theory. In their classic work *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, Cardoso and Falleto show how different countries in Latin America with different types of alliances, ranging from a bourgeoisie oligarchy in Chile to a broad based democratic alliance for power in Uruguay, succeeded or failed depending upon both external economic links and internal class alliances and conflicts. (Orthodox Marxists contend that their units of analysis are not really "classes", but social groups with certain structural relationships.)

This approach to class analysis requires relating the domination of a certain class or alliance of classes over the state apparatus to both regional economic conditions and internal historical conditions. It would involve indentifying the coincidences of interest between local dominant classes and international ones and examining how this nexus is challenged by local dominated groups and classes.

Role of the State

The third variable in the framework has to do with the state. Recent studies by Marxists, Neo-Marxists and Non-Marxists alike have tended to view the state as an important actor in its own right.

Marxist scholars studying states in Western Europe acknowledge the "relative autonomy" of the capitalist state. Instead of claiming that a

capitalist class directly controls the state apparatus ("state in the executive committee of the bourgeoisie"), modern Marxist scholars agree that the capitalist state is free from active control by members of the capitalist class. What it does instead is "to protect and sanction a set of rules and relationships which are presupposed by class rule of capitalist state" (Offe and Ronge in Giddens 1982).

Non-Marxist scholars assign more autonomy to the capitalist state. Skocpol, Evans and Rueschemayer, for instance, argue that "state conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and people, may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflections of the demands or interests of social groups, classes or society" (Skocpol 1985:25). It is not completely dominated by class interests nor is it above class interest. It is instead, as Skocpol puts it "Janus faced, with an intristically dual anchorage in class divided socioeconomic structures and an international system of states" (Skocpol cited in Held 1983:68). Skocpol's emphasis on the state, is in tune with those scholars, who in studying states in Latin America, Africa and Asia, have noted the relative autonomy of the peripheral state.

The relative autonomy of the third world state has been attributed to several structural conditions. First, the peripheral economies typically contain more than one mode of production: capitalist, pre-capitalist and transitional ones. Since the mode of production is indeterminate and no one class holds the balance of power, it becomes easier for the state to assume greater responsibility (Gold, Hamilton, Trimberger, etc. in Koo 1984). Second, third world countries with colonial histories have inherited a strong state bureaucracy which controls and regulates the indigenous social classes (Alavi 1974). Third, the state in peripheral nations, because of the insufficiently developed local capital, assumes the central role for solving bottleneck problems, developing the infrastructure and bargaining with multinational corporations (Petras in Koo 1984).

By acknowledging the relative autonomy of the state, we can understand the options available to the Nepalese state at various stages in history; options which were nevertheless constrained by regional and global economic conditions, internal class alliance and conflict, and the cultural values that the state had come to sponsor over time.

Cultural Values

The school of social thought which assigns importance to cultural values in leading to social change (i.e., the modernization school) is beginning a resurgence after being eclipsed for over two decades (So 1990:60). This new modernization school, however, differs from the classical one in several important respects. It (1) treats tradition and modernity as inclusive rather

than exclusive concepts, (2) focuses on concrete cases, (3) does not assume a unidirectional path of development towards the Western model, and (4) gives more emphasis to external constraints than before. Its similarity with classical modernization schools lies in its focus on the role of internal factors - cultural values and social institutions - in societal transformation.

The term "cultural values" as used here it refers mainly to religious ideology. Since world-view, primarily derives out of the religious domain at least in traditional societies, this variable has been assigned importance here. However, this is not to imply that religious ideology has a unidirectional effect on social and economic behavior. Religious ideology is also influenced by other factors such as class conditions and the existence or absence of state sponsorship. This conceptualization of cultural values is closer to the spirit of Weber's work than the simplistic notion that it unidirectionally affect social and economic behavior.

What this variable entails for our analysis is that the policies of the Nepalese state during its formative and subsequent periods has to be understood in the light the roles of a Hindu state. To further examine how cultural values have interacted with the role of the state and class conditions in affecting the pattern of development in Nepal, issues such as the symbiotic relationship between Hindu religion and the Nepalese state, the effect of Hindu ideology on caste and class formation, the nexus between the ruling class and the variant of Hinduism that receives state patronage etc., need to be addressed.

Historical Analysis

For the purpose of the present analysis, Nepal's history has been categorized into different epochs corresponding roughly to dominant types of political economy. These epochs are:

- (1) The tributary state (1700- 1884)
- (2) The semi-colony (1885- 1949)
- (3) The periphery (1950- 1989)
- (4) The present (1990 onwards)

See Table 1 for a summary and assessment of the pattern of development in different periods of Nepalese history based on the four variables discussed earlier, in other words, world system condition, state, class and cultural values.

The Tributary State (1700 - 1884)

This era corresponds to the period immediately preceding the creation of modern Nepal and the one following it. This period can also be regarded as

pre-peripheral Nepal or pre-contact period with capitalist powers (Mishra 1987).

Even before this period, from the thirteenth century onwards, the political economy of Nepal was undergoing many changes due to the migration of high caste Hindus from northern India. Specifically, it led to the gradual replacement of the communal-kin centered mode of production by the tributary mode. This was accomplished by the high caste migrant's knowledge of plough agriculture and advanced military technology (Blakie et al 1980:25).

In the cultural sphere, the migrants brought from India a nascent Saivist Hinduism, that variant of Hinduism which was prevalent in northern India before the Muslim conquest (Rose 1974:34). For these migrant Hindus, Shankaracharya was probably the last Hindu reformer. Their rituals were Saivist with a great deal of Tantric practices - their patrons being the nath yogis of the Kanphatta order.

The religious ideology of these migrants for a lack of better term, might be called "defensive Hinduism". This term is preferred over "Brahminism" (understood to mean cultural values peculiar to high caste Hinduism as Bista uses the term) because of the latter's association with the Brahmin caste. "Brahminism" is a misnomer because it was the ruling nobility as well as the brahmins who actively sought to enforce this creed.

The religious ideology of the migrants is called "defensive Hinduism" because their entry into the Nepalese hills from the Indian plains was motivated by the defence of their faith, viz. Hinduism, against the growing tide of Islam. Ironically, although these migrants had originally entered the hills with the intention of safeguarding their faith, with the consolidation of their rule, the policy of Hinduizing the local communities was aggressively pursued.

The Muslim invasion of northern India adversely affected Kshetriya kingship and secular Brahminhood (i.e., the function of Brahmins as advisers to the King and as judiciary in contrast to the purely priestly functions), representing probably, the most organized aspects of Hinduism (Weber 1958: 306-320). What the high caste migrants tried to achieve in the Nepalese hills was to forge a symbiotic relationship between monarchy as the form of government and Sanatana Hinduism as the religion - a relationship that had been severed in northern India. Over the centuries, with the dissolution of the Mahayana Buddhist Empire of the mallas in far Western Nepal and in the formation of twenty-two and twenty-four principalities, progress was achieved in this direction through the alliance of kshetriya kingship and secular brahminhood. With king Prithvi Narayan Shah's unification of the

country, the ideal Hindu Kingdom was established. Nepal was conceived by its founder to be the only pure Hindu Kingdom in all of Hindustan.

In the early phases of unification, the expanding Nepalese state came into contact with British mercantalism. However, mercantalism could not make much headway because the young state effectively protected itself by banning the import of foreign goods and encouraging local artisan and craft products.

Since the emergence of modern Nepal was primarily a result of military campaign, the state was, so to speak, dominant from its very inception. Moreover, since the early Nepalese state was a military state, the military personnel constituted the most important segment of the state apparatus. The military personnel were assigned land -grants (Jagir) by the Nepalese state. Unlike the feudals in Europe who constituted a class by themselves, the Jagir owners in Nepal could never become a class apart from the state because their entitlement to land was decided by the central authority. The control of the state apparatus, or more specifically, control over the military machinery was of crucial importance in ensuring the continuation of their privileged.

The unification campaign had been initiated under the leadership of the Shah Monarchs. Nevertheless, different military families, as commanders of the Gorkha army had been instrumental in expanding the frontiers of the Nepalese state. Towards the end of the campaign, the King's power waned and state reign went effectively into the hands of those military families. During this same period the young state's expansion was checked by the East India Company. The competition for the control of the state in Nepal led to bloody struggles between the different military families. From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards state machinery went effectively into the hands of the Rana family. The power of this family was consolidated through the institution of hereditary Prime Ministership (Stiller 1989: 101-120).

Control of the state apparatus and Hindu religious ideology influenced subsequent class formation along caste lines. The royal family by virtue of control of state apparatus constituted the nobility while "high caste" Brahmins, Thakuries and Chhettris constituted the rest of the elite. This does not mean that all Brahmins, Thakuries and Chhettris were automatically recruited into the elite due to their high caste rank. Rather, those Brahmins who by virtue of being priests to the Gorkha ruler, Chhettris serving as commanders in the expanding Gorkha army and Thakuri petty rulers who co-opted with the Gorkha regime constituted the elite. Whereas, the bulk of indigenous Tibeto-Burman ethnic communities like the Gurungs and the Magars who served as soldiers in the Gorkha army were not recruited into the elite due to their lower caste rank and remained subject classes. The majority of Newars were also treated as subject classes. The subject class also included the Indo-Aryan artisan castes such as the blacksmiths, tailors and cobblers.

During the end of this period, in 1854, a legal code was introduced which reinforced the symbiotic relationship between Hindu religion and the Nepalese state by formally institutionalizing caste into state polity. The code placed all groups existing in the country into five broad categories arranged in a vertical order. This social universe was paraphrased as *charvarna chattisjat* i.e. four varnas and thirty-six castes (Sharma 1989:163).

The category at the top consisted of *tagadharies* i.e. the sacred thread wearing castes headed by the Brahmins, and followed by the Thakuri, Chhetri, ascetics and various Newar castes. The next social category were the *matwalis* or alcohol consuming castes. They had two subcategories: one consisted of the unenslaveable group e.g. Magar, Gurung, Sunwar and other Newar castes. The other was the enslaveable group e.g. Bhote, chepang, Tharu etc. which was deemed lower than the former. Below these came the impure castes. This had also two separate categories: impure but touchable castes like butchers, Washermen, Musicians, Muslims and Europeans, and the impure and untouchable castes like blacksmiths, cobblers, tailors and sweepers. If the first three were pure castes in the sense that water could be acceptable from them, the last two were impure castes or from whom water could not be acceptable (Hoffer 1979:43-46; Sharma 1989).

The promulgation of this code legitimized the dominance of Indo-Aryan high castes over other sections of society because it was after all, "a system conceived by and for the protection of their own interests" (Andras Hoffer 1979:40). Not surprisingly, social stratification and class formation during subsequent periods in Nepalese history tended to follow caste lines. One effect of the code was that the non-Hindu groups came to deal with the state as the state defined them - in the guise of castes. Another effect was acculturation and Sanskritization (LeVine 1987:72). Ironically, the religious ideology that the ruling class in Nepal sponsored, not only insulated them from foreign Muslim and later Christian influences but also distanced them from reformist Hinduism. Not only were Christian missionaries forbidden from entering into the country, reformist Hindus were also prohibited from propagating their faith. The price had to be paid during later periods.

Semi Colony (1885 - 1949)

The inception of this period marks the decline of the Chinese Empire to the north which for Nepal meant that the balance of power policy could no longer be effectively pursued. Thus this period marks Nepal's integration into the sphere of British capitalism while managing to retain the periphrernalia of a sovereign state. The alliance of the ruling class in Nepal with British Imperialism in India meant that the rulers had a measure of internal autonomy while the control of trade and foreign policy rested firmly in

British hands.

From this time on, resistance offered by the state on the recruitment of the "Gurkhas" by British Imperialism was withdrawn. The British were allowed to openly recruit the "Gurkhas" who were invaluable as mercenaries for the protection and expansion of British capital interests in India. The "Gurkhas" who comprise of the indigeneous Tibeto-Burman subject class such as the Magar, Gurung, Rai, Limbu and Tamang communities were experiencing growing poverty because of the fast-paced disintegration of their communal-kin centered mode of production and enlisted in the British army in growing numbers. For providing access to the Gurkhas, the British started making an annual present of one million rupees for the Rana Prim Minister from 1919 onwards. The amount was doubled following the second world war (Mishra 1987:121).

Meanwhile changes were taking place in other areas as well. A feudal mode of production was emerging in the Terai (Blakie et al. 1980:31-40). These extensive tracts of forest and fertile agricultural land had come under the state during its expansionist phase. The state made land grants in the form of rent free tenure to members of the ruling families, military officials, priests and ex-petty rulers for the purpose of opening up virgin lands, clearing timber and from 1920 s onward, promoting irrigation.

During this period, since the railway line in northern India was expanding rapidly, it became increasingly profitable for the Nepalese state to exploit the forest and trade these and the agricultural products with British India. The trade figures during the late nineteenth century had exceeded twelve million Rupees (Mishra 1987:119). The value of exports during this period was four to five times the value of imports. The export consisted of timber, rice and cash crops. The revenue earned from exports enabled the ruling class, the small but growing feudal-dependant class and the households earning remittances from the British Indian army to import cotton cloth, yarn, metal ware, glass ware and other finished products including luxurious items from England.

To cater to the needs of these people a new group of people, that of merchants, slowly began to grow. These merchants came from two different backgrounds. The first were the indigenous Kathmandu based Newar merchants who had earlier been trading with Tibet. The other was the Marwari merchants who entered Nepal from India. These nucleus merchant families could be regarded as the precursors of the modern mercantile bourgeoisie class in Nepal.

The state under the Rana regime consisted simply of two organs: the administration and the military. The main function of the administration was the collection of revenues and the maintenance of law and order, the latter in

order to facilitate the former (Blakie et al. 1980:32).

During this period due to the specific policies followed by the Ranas, a landowning class emerged. At the apex of this class were the aristocratic Rana and Shah families. At the base of this class were high caste Brahmin, Chhettri and Newar families who were in the military and in the administration, the *bhai bhardar*. This class, however, cannot be regarded as an independent class since it arose primarily as a result of the state granting them the right to own certain land. It was not by virtue of being a landowning class that they controlled the state apparatus, but because they controlled the state apparatus, that they continued their existence as a landowning class. In fact, there had been plenty of instances when due to political reasons, these lands were confiscated by the state. Thus, in order to retain the land they had to continually support the central authority.

In 1923 a treaty was signed between Nepal and British India which granted a formal independence to Nepal. It is this treaty which characterizes Nepal as a semi-colony (Blakie et al. 1980:28). The incorporation of Nepal as a semi-colonial state involved many of the disadvantages of colonialism with none of its advantages. The native household craft and artisan industries were destroyed but no new factories with modern technologies were established. At a time when the British established a transport and industrial infrastructure in India, the Nepalese ruling class did not allow railway lines inside Nepal. While in India a new bourgeoisie class could grow up, in Nepal this class was singularly lacking.

During a short time, during the mid-1930s, there appeared a possibility of inward looking indigenous national development through the institution of Industrial Development Board (Udyog Parishad). This did not materialize because of unrestricted import of British goods to Nepal and the reluctance of the ruling class of support it whole heartedly since it could ultimately undermine their own autocratic rule.

In the ideological sphere, the state continued its patronage of "defensive Hinduism". At a time when Hinduism in India was undergoing a reformation through organizations such as the Arya Samaj, Brahmo Samaj, Ramkrishna Mission, etc. These denominations were discouraged from propagating their messages in Nepal. While in India these reformist organizations reinterpreted Hindu scriptures to advance social justice and make room for modernity, the state sponsorship of obscuritan Hinduism in Nepal precluded this possibility. The result has been that Hinduism in Nepal has remained a bulwark against attempts at greater social justice and economic progress.

Towards the middle of the twentieth century, the Rana regime came to an end abruptly. The threat to the Ranas came from two sources, one external,

the other internal. Externally, it came from the withdrawal of the British from India. Internally, it came from the insurrectionary activities of the Nepali Congress who were supported by certain disaffected elements of the Rana family. The legitimacy of Rana rule in Nepal swiftly eroded when King Tribhuvan identified himself with those opposed to the Rana rule.

The Periphery (1950 - 1989)

The beginning of this period marks a formal break with the Rana regime and the reinstatement of the Shah King. It marks a period of Nepal's first experiments with multiparty democracy, later to be outlawed by the King. This period also marks the introduction of Panchayat rule with the Monarch assuming absolute powers.

From 1950 onwards Nepal has seen, in economic terms at least, as a "peripheral" area with respect to the Indian "centre"; key features in this relationship being the "exchange" (it is really surplus appropriation) of labour and primary products for wages and finished manufactured goods (Seddon et al. 1979:35).

From this period onwards, although Nepal's trade with India grew rapidly, the terms of trade increasingly became unfavorable for Nepal. By 1980, the volume of interstate commodity trade had reached Rs (NC) 6429 million. Export continued to consist of primary goods and non fuel raw materials while imports consisted of manufactured goods, fuel, chemicals and food items- the value of exports being only three fourth of the total imports. The Nepalese state tried to redress the trade deficit through income from tourism, remittances from India and elsewhere and interstate grants and loan (Mishra 1987:126).

A land reform program was implemented by the regime in 1964. A survey conducted for the evaluation of the land reform program reveals that 63.1 percent of households possessing holdings of less than 1 hectare, accounted for only 10.6 percent of the total land area, whereas, 10.4 percent of households, having their holding in excess of 5 hectares, accounted for as 60.5 percent of the total area (Shrestha 1990:53). Thus inspite of the land reform, agriculture in Nepal continued to be marked by concentration of land holding, absentee landlordism, insecurity of tenure, exhorbitant rent and primitive farming practises.

In terms of government sources of revenue for development, there was a minimal taxation of land. The total revenue from the agricultural sector did not exceed one percent of GDP (Shrestha 1990:54). The fact that the landed aristocracy also controlled the state apparatus explains why no serious and adequate attempt had been made to bring about any structural change in the taxation system.

The regime sought to make up for the inadequate mobilization of internal resources through external grants and loans. The percentage of external resources for financing development grew so rapidly that it accounted for 70.6 percent of the total development expenditures in the seventh plan 1986-1990. However, in terms of economic performance, the regime could achieve only 2.7 percent growth in GDP per year during the period between 1965 and 1985 (Shrestha 1990:9)

The Panchayat decades (1960-90) also saw the intervention of the state in the industrial, commercial and agricultural sectors. But in spite of state intervention in the economy, it failed to implement policies to ameliorate the conditions of the vast majority of the population. In spite of anti-poverty state sponsored programmes such as Integrated Rural Development, Small Farmers Development programme, Minimum Basic Needs, etc. the peasantry was getting poorer. Nepal during the seventies was reported to be among the twentyfive poorest countries in the world (Seddon 1987). By the eighties, it had probably slipped to the poorest five category.

The Panchayat regime was characterized by a weak legislature and a strong bureaucracy. Remaining under the close supervision of the Palace Secretariat, the bureaucracy was the instrument for implementing the decisions of the Palace. Through rapid expansion of the bureaucracy, the regime was also able to control the level of political opposition by absorbing potentially dissident young intellectuals into the system. Between 1960 and 1980 alone, the number of civil servants rose from 3,000 to 70,000 (Gupta in Baral 1990:130).

The class structures during this period was characterized by a small hereditary aristocracy at the apex followed by a feudal-dependent class, a small but growing professional middle class, mercantile bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie and urban proletariat in the middle and vast peasantry at the base.

A new class to emerge during this period has been the professional middle class. This may be attributed to the rapid expansion of the bureaucracy and investment on education and infrastructure made possible through the influx of foreign aid, grants and loans from 1950s onwards. This class consists of lawyers, doctors engineers, journalists, university and college teachers and those in the bureaucracy and government owned corporations. Unlike other classes, this class is more diverse in terms of ethnicity and class. This class, however, is not entirely free from state control since members of this class have to rely on the state for their salary.

The state apparatus during this period was effectively in the hands of the hereditary aristocracy. Since it ultimately controlled both the administrative and military organs of the government, this class did not allow any other self-reliant class outside of the state, to emerge. Even the mercantile

bourgeoisie needed privileged access to this class to obtain licenses and dealership.

This class also tried to reinforce its position in society ideologically, by using religion. It invigorated the version of Hinduism historically aligned with the state (earlier labelled "defensive Hinduism") through the efforts of Sanatana Dharma Seva Samiti. Although officially, the job of the Samiti was to redefine and expand Hinduism in actual practise, it propagated a highly Sanskritized Sanatana Hinduism and limited itself to undertaking ritual sacrifices (Joshi and Sharma 1989:52). The 80s witnessed a growing coverage of the Samiti's various activities in the government sponsored national TV, radio and newspapers. Ironically, through its activities, the Sanatana Dharma Seva Samiti further alienated the less Sanskritized Tibeto-Burman communities and the unorthodox professional middle class (Joshi and sharma 1989:53).

Since the time when the King assumed absolute powers, a movement had been underway - sometimes active, at other times dormant - to restore the parliamentary form of democracy and limit the absolute powers of the monarch. During the early months of 1990, this movement snowballed into a mass popular uprising ultimately forcing the King to dissolve the panchayat system and lift the ban on political parties. The two main forces that had led the "revolution" (Whether or not it was a revolution is still subject to controversy) - the Nepali Congress and the Communist parties - then formed an interim government, which among others, drafted a new constitution delimiting the powers of the monarch and enshrining parliamentary democracy. A general election organized by this interim government led to the Nepali Congress securing majority of seats in the parliament and consequently forming a new government.

The 1990 Crisis and After

In retrospect, the crisis of 1990 and the breakdown of the old order, can be explained more satisfactorily if we take into account the interactions of the four variables mentioned earlier, in other words, world system conditions, the state, class and values.

World System Conditions: The change in Nepal took place at a time when the world capitalist system was undergoing of fundamental change with socialist countries in Eastern Europe emerging as democracies and reintegrating with the world capitalist system. At the regional level, it marked the growing strength of capitalist India as a regional and economic and military power to impose herself on her less developed neighbors. In the case of Nepal this involved a year long trade and transit embargo which the

Nepalese state, being a land locked country, was increasingly unable to cope up with.

The State: The state under the influence of the hereditary aristocracy, was increasingly unable to halt the trend towards a growing immiserization of the mass of people. The trade and transit embargo by India seriously undermined its capacity to deliver the goods, which in turn, led to its breakdown. Thus the revolution in Nepal was not the result of commercialization of agriculture and the subsequent revolt of the peasantry, which many theorists assume to be the cause of revolutions in the third world. It was primarily the result in the breakdown in the state apparatus which was caused by political tensions between India and Nepal. The events in Nepal fit in well instead with the theory put forward by Skocpol which accounts for political changes in third world countries in terms of the breakdown in the state apparatus, which in turn, results from interstate rivalry in the world market economy (Skocpol 1989).

Class: The Panchayat System during 30 years of its rule paradoxically enough, spawned a new class that led to its own termination. The regime through foreign money and opportunities that poured in, expanded the administrative service and educational and development programs - creating in the process, an economically mobile middle class. This class, by putting its strength behind the Nepali Congress - Communist Parties united front, and aligning with petty bourgeoisie, urban proletariat and certain disaffected elements of the mercantile bourgeoisie, was ultimately successful in wresting power from the hereditary aristocracy.

Values: In the values sphere, it marked the growing strength of secular forces vis-a-vis religious traditionalism in Nepal. Both the Nepali Congress and Communist Parties, inspite of differences in political ideology, are secular in the sense that they do not draw inspiration from religious sources or mingle politics with religion. The victory of these ideologies and the weakened hold of the Hindu Monarch, indicate the decline in religious traditionalism in Nepal. This is in stark contrast to events overtaking India which witnessed the growing clout of Bharatiya Janata Party, a party which advocates a Hindu polity. Similarly, unlike uprisings against the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe which derived inspiration from religious sources, the domestications in Nepal had a distinctly areligious character.

From the above discussion it can be inferred that the change of 1990 was primarily a change in the form of regime instead of a change in the form of state. The state in the post 1990 era has emerged less as a result of class

confrontation and struggles than a changing realignment of classes, wherein certain classes have so to speak, walked out to support the enemy.

The post 1990 Nepal still retains Hinduism as the official religion inspite of a stiff resistance by a large segment of the population. Although the state's sponsorship to archaic variant of Hinduism i.e "defensive Hinduism" has been suspended, the present constitution still remains ambiguous about religious freedom. Since the state no longer gives patronage to "defensive Hinduism" while it retains the symbiotic relationship between Hinduism as the official religion and Kingship as the official polity, the character of this "Hindu State" reveals in part a breach with tradition and in part a continuation of it.

Since monarchy has been considerably weakened, if not transformed into a figurehead in the new constitution, so could one guess the same fate for religion : a symbol with no significant consequences for the polity. The reason it has been difficult to disentangle the relationship between Monarchy and Hinduism in Nepal is due to the fact that these two forces, in the form of kshetriya Kingship and secular Brahminhood have been closely aligned from the 13th century onwards. Given such historical precedents, it is unlikely that Monarchy will be retained and Hinduism will not, or that Hinduism will be retained and Monarchy will not. Probably both constitutional monarchy and Hinduism as the official religion will be retained during the 90s, but with reduced roles for both in the affairs of the state.

The Nepalese state during the 90s has weakend considerably. It is no longer the main employment generating agency that it was during the panchayat years. Having no longer the ability to generate its own revenue, and having to be more dependent on donor agencies, it has no recourse but to ask the private sector to undertake many of its functions. Its trade policy has also witnessed a growing liberalized labour-intensive export-oreinted industrialization specializing in carpets and textiles.

Although the hereditary aristocracy's monopoly on the state apparatus has ended, no single class dominates the state. With the weakening of the state and the growing clout of the private sector, new equations of class alliance could emerge. Traditional elites such as the Brahmins, Chhettris and Newars have been less enterprizing than the groups that have hitherto remained marginal to the mainstream Nepalese society such as Marwaris, Tibetans, Thakalis, Manangis, etc. Once privatization gains momentum, these economically powerful but socially marginalized communities could begin gaining influence in the state apparatus as well.

The liberal trade policies that the Nepalese state had adopted, in order to lead to a sustained development, depends on the global and regional capitalist conditions. Particularly, it could benefit from an upward cycle of global

capitalism i.e. a boom in the core capitalist countries and/or India.

Events during the 1990s are, however, quite different from the 60s and 70s when certain East Asian countries i.e., the NICs were able to take advantage the liberalized trade policies in United States and Europe and move up from the periphery to the semi-periphery status. The current decade, however, is marked by (1) a recession in Western Europe and the United States, (2) the existence of protective trade blocks (e.g. the European Economic Community and the North American trade block), (3) the emergence of capital hungry ex-Soviet Union republics, and (4) a more "liberal" (in an economic sense) India. Given these conditions, it is improbable that Nepal can escape from its underdevelopment in the immediate future though possibilities of "dependent development" in the long run cannot be discounted.

Table 1
World System Conditions, States, Class and Value Configurations in
Different Periods of Nepalese History

	World system Conditions	state	class	values
Tributary	- Penetration of capi-in - Indiarresistence against British mercantilism by the young Nepalese state	- expansion of the Gorkha kingdom - political balance maintained between imperial China and East India	- state machinery controlled by the shah monarch - later by different military families who became hereditary aristocracy	- "defensive Hinduism" as a religious ideology consolidated

Semi-Colony	- consolidation of Capitalism in India - no more resistance against British mercantilism	- Weakening of imperial china - alliance between Rana aristocracy and British imperialism	- state in the hands of hereditary aristocracy headed by the Ranas - emergence of a fuedal-dependent class	- ideological homogeneity among the upper caste/class
Periphery	- growth of the India national bourgeoisie - rivalry between the capitalist and the communist blocs	- growing role of bilateral and multilateral agencies in the state apparatus - hold of hereditary aristocracy on the state apparatus	- rise of the new professional middle class	- introduction of secular ideas and the declining hold of "defensive Hinduism"
The present	- end of the cold war - defeat of Communism in Eastern Europe - disintegration of the soviet Union - the entry of multi-nationals into India	- Weakened hold of hereditary aristocracy on the state - reduction in the role of the state and ascendance of the private sector	- growing clout of the middle class - ascendance of new entrepreneurial groups	- ideological heterogeneity - debate between Hinduism vs secularism

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२०४६ सालको जन आन्दोलनका घटनाहरूको विवरणः एक अध्ययन

राम कुमार धिमिरे

साधारण परिचयः

विश्वमा सानो तर स्वतन्त्र देश नेपालको आन्तरिक राजनीतिमा विभिन्न समयमा आएको उतारो चढावले यहाँ विभिन्न प्रकारका शासन व्यवस्थाहरू सञ्चालित भए। २००७ सालमा राणा शासन समाप्ति भएपछि पनि यस देशले एकै प्रकारको अविच्छिन्न शासन पद्धति कायम राख्न सकेन। राणा शासन समाप्ति पछि तत्काल शासन सञ्चालन गर्न भनि केही दिनको लागि बनाइएको अन्तरिम सम्बिधानले नै आठ वर्षसम्म काम गर्‍यो। आखिरमा सम्बिधान सभाको चुनाव पनि भएन। २०१५ सालमा संसदीय व्यवस्था अन्तर्गत चुनाव जितेर नेपाली कांग्रेस आयो। तर डेढ वर्ष पुग्दा नपुग्दै बल प्रयोग गरी त्यसको सरकारलाई पनि खतम गरियो। त्यसबेला देशमा जनचेतनाको कमी, राजनीतिक दलहरू बीचको फाटो, शक्तिशाली दलहरूको जनता माथिको पकडको अभावका साथै तत्कालीन अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय परिस्थिति जस्ता कुराहरू बाट फाइदा उठाई ल्याइएको पञ्चायती व्यवस्थाले तीन दशकसम्म शासन चलायो। पञ्चायती व्यवस्थालाई देशको हावापानी र माटो सुहाउँदो भनी खुब प्रचार गरियो यद्यपि त्यसको सुरुवात सँग सँगै विरोध पनि शुरू भएको थियो। राजनीतिक दलहरू प्रतिबन्धित गरी पञ्चायतको प्रारम्भ गरिएकोले राजनैतिक स्थायित्वको लागि चाहिने राजनैतिक परिचालन नभएकाले राजनैतिक सहभागिता बढ्न सकेन। फलस्वरूप पञ्चायतको वैधताको (Legitimacy) संकट उत्पन्न भयो। त्यस्तै राजनैतिक नेतृत्वको विकास, चाख संग्रह गर्ने (जनताको) र नीति बनाउने प्रक्रिया पनि त्रुटिपूर्ण रहयो। मानवीय मूल्यको अभावमा पञ्चायतले केही शक्ति सञ्चय गरे तापनि वैधानिकता पाउन सकेन। जनमत संग्रह पछि शुरू भएको राजनैतिक प्रक्रिया निश्चयनै पहिले भन्दा उदारवादी थियो। त्यसैले त्यसपछिको निर्वाचनमा जन-सहभागिता बढ्यो तर त्यसलाई व्यवस्थित रूपबाट अगाडि बढाउने संस्थाहरू भएनन्। अतः जनमत संग्रह पछि पनि पञ्चायतले वैधानिक (राष्ट्रिय पञ्चायतबाट गरिएको विरोध) र व्यवहारिक विरोधको सामना गर्नु पर्‍यो। जसले आन्तरिक वैधानिक संरचनालाई कमजोर तुल्यायो। समाजमा रहेका माँग र पूर्तिका बीचको असन्तुलनले पञ्चायतको कार्यक्षमतामा शिथिलता आयो। 'विकासको निम्ति राजनीति', 'एशियाली मापदण्ड' जस्ता नाराहरूले तुलनात्मक रूपमा जनताको चेतना र आकांक्षाहरूमा बृद्धि गर्‍यो तर देशमा आर्थिक उन्नति हुन सकेन, बरू

अर्थतन्त्र अधोगतितिर लाग्यो। प्रजातन्त्र भन्नाले व्यवस्थाप्रति सकृय समर्थन मात्र नभएर विरोधको राजनीति पनि हो भन्ने तथ्यलाई पञ्चायतमा बलजफित दबाएर राखियो। त्यस व्यवस्थामा जति जति शक्तिको केन्द्रीकरण हुँदै गयो त्यति त्यति राज्यको स्वरूप प्रशासनिक हुँदै गयो। अन्ततः पञ्चायत व्यवस्थालाई चलाउने एक मात्र आधार जबरजस्त शक्ति (Coercion) रहनगयो। राजनीतिको केन्द्रीकरण गरिएको भए तापनि भारतमाथिको बढ्दो निर्भरताले आधारभूत रूपमा नै राजनैतिक प्रणालीको रूपमा पञ्चायतको प्रयोजन र स्थायित्व माथि प्रश्न चिन्ह लाग्दै गयो। व्यापार, सञ्चार, प्रविधि, विचारधारा, मानव अधिकार र वैदेशिक सहायताले आन्तरिक राजनीतिलाई अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय मूल्यसंग जोड्दा आधारभूत रूपमा आन्तरिक राजनीति र आर्थिक मूल्यको खियावटलाई पञ्चायतका शासकहरूले बुझ्न सकेनन्। वैदेशिक सहायता लिई राज्य स्तरमा यथास्थितिलाई सघाउनु र जनस्तरमा राहत (अल्पकालको लागि) दिनुमात्र पञ्चायतको लक्ष रह्यो। देशमा घूसखोरी, कमिशन र अन्य अनियमितताहरू बढेपछि पञ्चायत भित्र यस्तो वर्गको जन्म भयो जस्लाई जनताका आकांक्षाहरू प्रति खास कुनै चासो रहेन। देशमा ऋणको भार बढ्दै गयो। त्यसैले आन्तरिक श्रोत परिचालनबाट उठेको रकमका साथ वैदेशिक सहायताबाट प्राप्त ठूलो रकम समेत सो ऋणको व्याज तिर्नमा नै सीमित रह्यो।

उक्त विभिन्न कारणहरूले गर्दा पञ्चायत व्यवस्थाले राम्रो शासन सञ्चालन गर्न सकेन। फलस्वरूप २०४६ साल फाल्गुण ७ गते पञ्चायती व्यवस्था विरूद्धमा घोषित आन्दोलन शुरू भयो। एक महिना बीस दिन सम्म विभिन्न कार्यक्रम सहित चलेको उक्त आन्दोलनले पञ्चायतको नै अन्त्य गरायो। त्यसैले त्यो आन्दोलनमा के कस्ता महत्त्वपूर्ण घटनाहरू घटे ती सबैको क्रमिक विवरण यस लेखमा प्रस्तुत गर्ने प्रयास गरिएको छ।

२०४६ सालको जन आन्दोलनको पूर्वाभास फागुन ७ गते अगावै भएको थियो। आन्दोलनको उद्घोषणा गर्ने राजनीतिक शक्तिहरूले कार्यक्रमलाई तीन चरणमा बाँडेका थिए, जस अनुसार विधिवत कार्यक्रम माघ २७, २०४६ मा नेपाली कांग्रेसका कार्यबाहक अध्यक्ष कृष्ण प्रसाद भट्टराई र बाम मोर्चा अध्यक्ष सहाना प्रधानले संयुक्त रूपमा हस्ताक्षर गरी एउटा चरणवद्ध कार्यक्रम जन समक्ष ल्याए। जो यस प्रकार थियो:

- (१) फागुन ७ गते दुबै समूह (नेपाली कांग्रेस र बाममोर्चा) ले आ-आफ्ना झण्डाका साथ जुलुस प्रदर्शन र आमसभा गरी पार्टीहरू उपर विगत २९ वर्ष देखि लागेको प्रतिबन्धलाई तोड्ने,
- (२) फागुन ८ गते नेपाल बन्दको कार्यक्रम अनुरूप देशभरि यातायात, शिक्षण संस्था, उद्योगधन्दा, कलकारखाना र व्यापार बन्द गर्ने,
- (३) फागुन १४ गते संपूर्ण देशभरी पञ्चायती व्यवस्थाको विरोधमा कालो दिवस मनाउने। कालो झण्डाका साथ कालो पट्टि बाँधी आमसभा र प्रदर्शन गर्ने,
- (४) फागुन १९ गते राष्ट्रव्यापी रूपमा नेपाल बन्द गर्नुका साथै स्थानिय परिस्थिति अनुरूप विभिन्न अन्य कार्यक्रमहरू बीचमा पनि स्थानिय रूपमा सञ्चालन गरी रहने।

आन्दोलनको विधिवत थालनी:

पहिलो चरणको कार्यक्रम अनुसार फागुन ७ गते आन्दोलनको पहिलो दिन थियो। उक्त दिन 'श्री ५ त्रिभुवन जयन्ती तथा प्रजातन्त्र दिवस' मनाउने प्रचलन भएको हुनाले सो उपलक्ष्य मा श्री ५ बाट देशवासीका नाममा बक्सेको सन्देशमा "पञ्चायती व्यवस्था राष्ट्रिय जनइच्छा अनुकूल भएको" कुरा हुकुम भयो।^१ तर त्यसैदिन प्रतिबन्धित राजनीतिक दलहरूले आ-आफ्ना झण्डा सहित पञ्चायती व्यवस्थाको विरोध प्रदर्शन गर्ने तय गरे। जस अनुरूप फागुन ७ गते जुलुश निस्कियो। "पञ्चायती व्यवस्था मुर्दाबाद", "हामी प्रजातन्त्र चाहन्छौं" (We want Democracy) जस्ता नाराहरू साथ निस्केको यस जुलुशको तत्कालीन पञ्चायती प्रधानमन्त्री सहित पुतली सडक आदि ठाउँमा आन्दोलनकारी र प्रहरीहरू बीच मुठभेड भयो।^२ सुन्धाराबाट निस्केको आन्दोलनकारी जुलुश करीव ३० हजार जतिको थियो। त्यस जुलुशबाट बामपन्थी नेता मनमोहन अधिकारी र तुलसीलाल अमात्य गिरफ्तार भए। यसैगरी काठमाण्डौ बाहिर हेटौँडामा भएको प्रदर्शनमा प्रहरी र प्रदर्शनकारी बीच मुठभेड हुँदा एक प्रहरी र चार प्रदर्शनकारी मरेको र चितवनमा तत्कालीन रा.पं.स. भीमप्रसाद श्रेष्ठ र जाग्रतप्रसाद भेटवाललाई गिरफ्तार गरियो। त्यसै दिन विराटनगरमा बामनेता कमल कोइराला र नेपाली कांग्रेसका अशोक कोइराला पनि पार्टीका झण्डा सहित गिरफ्तार भए।^३ यसैगरी धरान, जनकपुरधाम, बुटवल आदि स्थानमा पनि दंगा-प्रहरी र आन्दोलनकारी बीच बिभिन्न मुठभेड भए। यी मुठभेडहरूमा देशभरका करीव १९ जनाको मृत्यु र २०० जना जति घाइते भएका थिए।^४ आन्दोलनको थालनी हुने दिन आन्दोलनकारी बीच जनताको राम्रो सहभागिता नहोस् भनि त्यस्को अधिल्लै दिन ठूलो संख्यामा विद्यार्थीहरूको घरपकड गर्नु र आन्दोलन थालिएको प्रथम दिनमा आन्दोलनलाई दवाउन प्रहरी द्वारा अत्यन्त क्रूर ढंगले यातना दिई दमन गरिनुले त्यसदिनको आन्दोलन शान्तिपूर्ण नभएर निकै उत्तेजित हुनपुग्यो, तर सरकारी समाचार माध्यमले प्रजातन्त्र दिवस मनाईरहेको जुलुशमा आन्दोलनकारीले दुइ मुढा बसाई अशान्ति फैलाएको हुनाले केहीलाई गिरफ्तार गरिएको छ भन्ने खबर दियो।^५

आन्दोलनको दोश्रो दिन फागुन ८ गते "नेपाल बन्द"को कार्यक्रम थियो। यसदिन देशका प्रमुख शहरहरूमा यातायात, कलकारखाना, शिक्षणसंस्था र पसलहरू बन्द गरिएका थिए। कीर्तिपुरमा पुरुष छात्रावास अगाडि तीनकुनेनिर नेपाल र एशियाली अनुसन्धान केन्द्रको भिनीबसमा आगो लगाइयो र त्यसको केही समय पश्चात कीर्तिपुर खासी बजारको प्रहरी थानामा पनि आगो लाग्यो, जसबाट थानाका केही कागजपत्रहरू डढे। त्यसैगरी भक्तपुरमा पसल बन्द गराउन निस्किएका प्रदर्शनकारी र प्रहरी बीचको मुठभेडमा गोली चलाइएकोले केही प्रदर्शनकारीहरू मरे। मृतकको संख्यालाई कसैले ४६ कसैले ५७ र कसैले ८८ बताए। सरकारी सञ्चार माध्यमले त्यो संख्यालाई भरतपुरमा ३ जना, हेटौँडामा १ जना (प्रहरी) र भक्तपुरमा ३ जना गरी जम्मा ७ जना मरेको समाचार दिएको थियो।^६ आन्दोलनकारीले सो संख्या नस्वीकारी त्यो भन्दा बढ्ता भनेको पाइन्छ। यसरी आन्दोलन भएको दोश्रो दिनमा नै त्यत्रो संख्यामा (सरकारी संचार माध्यमहरूका अनुसार ७ जना) मृत्यु हुनुले आन्दोलन

शान्तिपूर्ण रहन सकेन यस प्रकार आन्दोलनको प्रारम्भदेखि नै हत्या हुन थालेकाले आगामी दिनमा आन्दोलन भन बढी जोखिमपूर्ण हुनसक्ने संकेत देखा परे।

आन्दोलनको कार्यक्रम अनुसार फागुन ९ गते कुनै घोषित योजना नभए तापनि सो दिन काठमाण्डौका वकिलहरूले अदालत बहिष्कार गरे। सोही दिन जनकपुर जदुकुबामा पुलिसको गोलीबाट ५ जनाले ज्यान गुमाए। सरकारी समाचार माध्यमले तीन जनाको हत्या भएको भनी स्विकार गरे तापनि संख्यामा विवाद देखायो।^{१०} त्यसै दिन काठमाण्डौ बीर अस्पताल अगाडि एउटा शोक जुलुश प्रदर्शन भयो। तर त्यो जुलुश पनि प्रहरीको दमनबाट उम्कन सकेन।

यसरी देशभित्र जुलुश प्रदर्शन, लाठीचार्ज, पक्राउ र यातना भइराखेको बेला भारतसँग सम्बन्ध सुधार्ने प्रयास अनुरूप फागुन ९ गते भारतको नयाँ दिल्लीमा नेपाल र भारत दुबै देशका अधिकारीहरू बीच वार्ता भयो।

फागुन ७ र ८ गतेका कार्यक्रममा भएका दमन, यातना र गोली-काण्डको विरुद्धमा बाम-कांग्रेस दुवैले फागुन ११ गते बीर अस्पताल अगाडि शोक जुलुश निकाल्नुका साथै आमसभा गर्ने, फागुन १२ गते उपत्यका भरी प्रचार सभा गर्ने भनी उपत्यकाका लागि कार्यक्रम बनाइएको थियो। त्यसै अनुरूप कतै कतै श्रद्धान्जलि सभाहरू गरिए तर १२ गतेको कार्यक्रम चाहिँ प्रहरीको कडा निगरानीले गर्दा त्यति सफल हुन सकेन। सो दिन महाराजगञ्ज र बीर अस्पतालका स्वास्थ्य कर्मीहरूले २ घण्टाको टोकन हडताल गरे। यसपछि आन्दोलनलाई राजनैतिक दलका कार्यकर्ताहरूबाट सरकारी कर्मचारीहरूसम्म लैजाने कार्यको थालनी भयो।

फागुन १३ गते शिवरात्री मेलाको अवसरमा पशुपतिमा ब्राम विद्यार्थी संगठनले जुलुश प्रदर्शन गरेका थिए। यसै दिन कमलाक्षी र असनबाट पनि जुलुशहरू निकालिए। तर सरकारले पत्रिपत्रिकामा (आन्दोलनको खबर छाप्न) सेन्सरसीप कायम गरेको र कतिपय पत्रिकाहरूलाई जफत गरेकाले बजारमा आन्दोलनको प्रगति सम्बन्धी खबर दिने अखबारको अभाव भयो। सो काम पूरागर्न प्र.रा. मञ्चले "संघर्ष बुलेटीन" निकाली आन्दोलनको खबर जनतालाई दिन थाल्यो।

फागुन १४ गते विरोध जुलुश र कालो दिवस मनाउने कार्यक्रम सफल हुन नदिन शहर भरि र त्यस्मा पनि ७ गतेको आन्दोलनको केन्द्रविन्दु रहेको धरहरा क्षेत्रमा साह्रै धेरै प्रहरीहरू तैनाथ थिए। त्यस दिन त्यो बाटो हिँड्ने यात्रीलाई समेत प्रहरीले गिरफ्तार गरे। तैपनि डिल्लीवजार, प्यूछा, बाङ्गेमुडा, बालाजु आदि स्थानबाट छड्के जुलुश निस्किए। त्यसैगरी पाटनको च्यासल, भक्तपुरको हरीशिव, इलाम, विराटनगर, धरान, वीरगञ्ज, नारायणघाट, हेटौँडा, पोखरा, पाल्पा, बुटवल, नवलपरासी, हुम्ला, आदि स्थानमा पनि जुलुश निकालिए।^{११} काठमाण्डौको जुलुशबाट हरीबोल भट्टराई, पद्मरत्न तुलाधर, सिन्धुनाथ प्याकुरेल आदिका साथै अन्य केही व्यक्तिहरूलाई प्रहरीले पक्रियो। सरकारी दमनको विरोधमा त्यस दिन पनि बीर अस्पतालका कर्मचारीहरूले बिहान ६ बजे देखि १० बजे सम्म हातमा कालो पट्टि बाँधी विरोध जनाए तर पनि ७ र ८ गतेको तुलनामा फागुन १४

गतेको कार्यक्रम त्यति सफल हुन सकेन।^{१२} त्यस दिनको घोषित कार्यक्रम (कालो दिवस) सफल हुन नसकेको समाचार सरकारी सञ्चार माध्यमले पनि दिएको थियो।

फागुन १५ गते "स्ववियू काउन्सील" (खासगरी माले समूहसँग सम्बद्ध रहेका उपत्यकाका स्ववियूहरूको मञ्च) ले एक पर्चा प्रकाशित गरी क्याम्पसको शुल्क तत्काल नतिर्न विद्यार्थीहरूलाई आह्वान गर्‍यो। केही स्कूल र क्याम्पसका शिक्षक-प्राध्यापकहरूले पनि त्यसै दिन सरकारी दमनको विरोध गर्दै हडताल गरेका थिए।

फागुन १६ गते प्राथमिक र माध्यमिक शिक्षक संघले सरकारी दमन विरुद्ध क्षोभ व्यक्त गरे। यसै दिन उपत्यकाका क्याम्पस र यूनिभर्सिटीका प्राध्यापकहरूले पनि सरकारी दमनको विरुद्धमा कलम बन्द गरी त्रि-चन्द्र क्याम्पसमा एक सभाको आयोजना गरेका थिए। त्यसै गरी उपत्यका बाहिर सिद्धार्थनगर, बुटवल, म्याग्दी आदि ठाउँहरूमा जुलुश निस्कँदा केही व्यक्तिहरू पक्राउ परे। त्यसबेला सम्म पनि सरकारले पत्र-पत्रिकाहरू माथिको सेन्सरसिप कायमै राखेकोले पत्रकार जगतले सरकारको कडा आलोचना गर्‍यो। त्यसै दिन २ वटा मिनी बसहरूबाट करीब एकसय पचास 'मण्डले' भनिने जवानहरू आन्दोलन दबाउन बुटवलबाट काठमाण्डौ तर्फ लागेका थिए। त्यसरी सरकारले आन्दोलन दबाउन बलको बढी प्रयोग गर्नु र देशमा रहेका बौद्धिक बर्गले सरकारी कार्यको विरोधमा खुलेर लाग्नुले आन्दोलनलाई बढी जोड मिल्यो।

फागुन १७ गते ७ वटा विद्यार्थी संगठनको आयोजनामा काठमाण्डौको टुँडिखेलमा र अन्य विभिन्न स्थानहरूमा आमसभा गर्ने कार्यक्रम थियो। तर प्रहरीको कडा निगरानीको कारण सो दिन यस्ता कुनै कार्यक्रमहरू हुन सकेनन्। त्यसैले त्यस दिन विद्यार्थीहरूले पाटनका विभिन्न गल्लीहरूमा छड्के जुलुश निकाले र चण्डीमा पञ्चायतको पुत्ला जलाए।^{१३}

यसबेला आएर सरकारले बाम-कांग्रेसबीच फूट भएको हल्ला चलाउन थाल्यो। तर प्र.ने.क. पार्टीका पोलिटव्यूरो सदस्य बलराम उपाध्यायले टिप्पणी गर्दै त्यो हल्लालाई पूर्ण रूपले तथ्यहीन बताए।^{१४} त्यसपछि सरकारले आन्दोलनलाई दबाउनकालागि विभिन्न स्थानमा 'प्रतिकार समिति' गठन गर्न थाल्यो। जस अन्तर्गत धरान नगर पञ्चायतका प्रधानपञ्च बम देवानको अध्यक्षतामा एक बृहद नगर स्तरीय 'प्रतिकार समिति' गठन भयो। यसैगरी भापा जिल्ला पञ्चायतका सदस्यहरूको क्षेत्रीय भेलाले बहुदलवादीहरूको कार्यको निन्दा गर्दै निन्दा प्रस्ताव पारित गर्‍यो।

यसैबीच केही पञ्चहरू र तत्कालीन मन्त्रीहरूले आन्दोलनको बारेमा टिप्पणी गर्दै प्रधान मन्त्रीको दोष औल्याए। त्यसरी पञ्चहरू र मन्त्रीपरिषद भित्रै आन्दोलनको विषयलाई लिएर मतभेद भएको थाहा पाएपछि आन्दोलनकारीहरूको मनोबल बढ्दै जानु स्वभाविकै थियो। यसबेला नेपालमा भइरहेको आन्दोलनको बारेमा नेपाल बाहिर पनि निकै चर्चा चल्यो। 'एमनेष्टी इन्टर नेशनल', 'एसीयावाच' जस्ता संस्थाले नेपालमा गिरफ्तार भएका व्यक्तिहरूलाई अविलम्ब रिहाई गर्न नेपाल सरकारलाई आह्वान गरे।^{१५} यसैगरी अमेरिकी हाउस अफ रिप्रेजेण्टेटिभ र अमेरिकी सिनेटका सदस्यहरूले संयुक्त रूपमा नेपालका राजालाई एक पत्र पठाई 'नेपालमा शान्तिपूर्ण प्रदर्शन हुन दिनु पर्दछ,

पत्रकारिताको जगतमा प्रतिबन्ध लगाइनु हुँदैन' भन्दै पक्राउ परेकाहरूलाई दुःख दिए विरुद्ध चिन्ता व्यक्त गरे।^{१६} फागुन १९ गतेलाई पहिलो चरणको अन्तिम कार्यक्रम 'नेपाल बन्द' राखिएको थियो। यो कार्यक्रम सफल हुन नदिन सरकारले ठूलो प्रयास गर्‍यो। उपत्यकाका मिनीबस, ट्याक्सी, ट्याम्पो आदिका साथै सरकारी यातायातका साधनहरूलाई अघिल्लै दिनदेखि बगिखानामा थुपार्न लगाइएको थियो। यी साधनहरू त्यसदिन चलाउँदा आवश्यक पर्ने इन्धन सरकारले व्यहोरी दिने^{१७} भनेतापनि धेरैले आफ्ना साधन चलाएनन्। त्यसदिन चलाएका केही सबारी साधनहरूमा सरकारकै आफ्ना मान्छे र काठमाण्डौ उपत्यका बाहिरबाट ल्याएका खेलकूद परिषदसंग सम्बन्धित केही मण्डले चरित्रका व्यक्तिहरू मात्र थिए। उपत्यका बाहिर सुनसरी, मोरङ्ग, चितवन, धनुषा, पर्सा, मकवानपुर, पाल्पा आदि स्थानमा पनि १९ गतेको नेपाल बन्द कार्यक्रम सामान्यतया सफल रह्यो। नेपालबन्दको समाचारलाई अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय समाचार माध्यम (बि.बि.सी., अल इण्डिया रेडियो आदि)ले त्यसै साँझ प्रकाशित गरे।^{१८} यसरी पहिलो चरणको कार्यक्रम फाल्गुण १९ गते समाप्त भएको थियो। पहिलो चरणको कार्यक्रममा विशेषतः पार्टी कार्यकर्ता, युवाहरू र विद्यार्थीहरूले नै प्रमुख रूपमा भाग लिएकाले यो चरण विशेषतः पार्टीसंग सम्बन्धित कार्यक्रमको रूपमा रह्यो।

आन्दोलनको दोस्रो चरण:

आन्दोलनको दोस्रो चरणलाई फागुनको तेस्रो सातादेखि चैत्रको दोस्रो सातासम्म चलाउने भनी निर्धारण गरिएको थियो। आन्दोलनको दोस्रो चरण प्रारम्भ हुनु अगावै आन्दोलनको पकड कम्युनिष्टहरूमा गएको प्रचार गर्दै सरकारले कांग्रेस र कम्युनिष्टहरूलाई फुटाउने प्रयास गर्‍यो। जुनकुराको टिप्पणी गर्दै राधाकृष्ण मैनाली (तत्कालीन मालेका नेता) ले "सरकारको कुत्सित फूट पार्ने चाल हो" भनी सरकारको हत्या र आतंक फैलाउने चेष्टा देखि सावधान गरे।^{१९} यसै बीच नेपाली कांग्रेसका नेता गणेशमान सिंहले एक अपील प्रकाशित गरी सरकारी यस्तो आरोपको खण्डन गरे। बाममोर्चाकी अध्यक्ष साहाना प्रधानले पनि सरकारी आरोपको खण्डन गरी एकतालाई फुटाउने दुष्प्रयास भनिन्।^{२०} यसरी सरकारले आन्दोलनकारी पक्षलाई फुटाउन बल गर्नु र आन्दोलनकारी पक्षले पनि त्यसबेला गर्ने भनि तोकिएका कार्यक्रमहरूलाई राम्ररी चालुगर्न नसक्नु (२१ गते भक्तपुरमा गर्ने भनेको शोक सभा सफल भएन) ले सरकार पक्षको मनोबल बृद्धि भएको आभाष तत्कालीन गृहमन्त्रीको भाषणबाट मिल्छ।^{२१} यद्यपि त्यसबेला आएर पञ्चायत भित्रै पनि आन्दोलनको बारेमा विभिन्न धारणाहरू जन्मिए। भू.पू. प्रधानमन्त्री लोकेन्द्र बहादुर चन्द, रामहरि शर्मा, राजेश्वर देवकोटा सहित चालीस जना तत्कालीन रा.पं.स.हरू भू.पू.रा.पं.स. रणबहादुर शाहको घर (लाजिम्पाट)मा बसी छलफल गरी सरकारले हिंसाको बाटो त्यागी राजनैतिक समाधानको बाटो खोज्नु पर्ने कुरा व्यक्त गरे।^{२२} यसै गरी भू.पू. प्रधानमन्त्रीहरूमा सूर्यबहादुर थापा र कीर्तिनीधि बिष्टले पनि समस्याको समाधान दमनको सट्टा छलफलद्वारा गरिनुपर्ने विचार व्यक्त गरे।^{२३} तर सरकारले त्यसपछि पनि आफ्नो दमनकारी नीतिलाई त्यागेन।

जसले गर्दा दमनको विरोध गर्दै विभिन्न पेशासंग सम्बन्धित पेशेवार व्यक्तिहरू त्यसपछिको आन्दोलनमा शामिल भए। यसबाट आन्दोलनकारीको केही खस्केको मनोबल पुनः माथि उठेर गयो।

फागुन २२ गतेका दिन काठमाण्डौका ३५० भन्दा बढी वकिलहरूले सर्वोच्च अदालत अगाडि कालो पट्टि बाँधी विरोध प्रदर्शन गर्दै मानव अधिकारको बहालीको माँग राखे र त्यो प्राप्त नभएसम्म आन्दोलनको कार्यक्रम जारी राख्ने दृढता व्यक्त गरे।^{२४} अर्कोतिर तत्कालीन प्रधान मन्त्री र अरू मन्त्रीहरू बीचमा खटपट पर्न थालेको हल्ला बजारमा आयो। जसको फलस्वरूप तत्कालीन जलस्रोत सहायक मन्त्री केशवकुमार बुढाथोकीलाई मन्त्रीपदबाट फागुन २५ गते हटाइयो पनि। मन्त्रीपदबाट निष्काशित भएपछि उनले एक पत्रकार सम्मेलन गरे र श्री ५ बाट बहुदल बक्सभएमा आफु पञ्चायतको सती नजाने कुरा व्यक्त गरे भने जनमत संग्रहको बेला पनि आफु बहुदलको पक्षमा रहेको कुरा बताए।^{२५} त्यसैबेला मनोनित रा.पं.स. डी.पि. अधिकारीले पनि राजिनामा दिए। यी २ वटा घटनाले आन्दोलनकारीहरूको हौसला झन बढेर गयो।

यसैबेला भारतीय कम्युनिष्ट पार्टी (मार्क्सवादी) का एक जना पोलिटब्यूरो सदस्यले एक वक्तव्य प्रकाशित गरी नेपाली आन्दोलनकारी प्रति समर्थन जनाए। बेलायतमा रहेका करिब ५० जना नेपालीहरूले बेलायत स्थित नेपाली राजदुतावासमा गई एक विरोध पत्र दिए। जसमा 'नेपालमा प्रजातन्त्र र मानव अधिकार स्थापना' र 'सरकारले जनतालाई यातना दिनु हुँदैन' भन्ने कुराको माँग गरिएको थियो भन्ने कुरा २४ गते नेपाल भित्र प्रचारमा आयो।^{२६}

फागुन २५ गते 'अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय नारी वर्ष' को दिन थियो। त्यस दिन अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय नारी वर्ष मनाउन पद्मकन्या क्याम्पसमा उपस्थित भएका महिलाहरूले प्रजातन्त्रको समर्थनमा वक्तव्य दिई जुलुस गर्न लाग्दा जुलुस माथि पुलिसले हस्तक्षेप गरेका थिए।^{२७}

फागुन महिनाको तेस्रो हप्ताको अन्त्यमा आएर नेपाली कांग्रेस र संयुक्त बाम-मोचाले दोस्रो चरणको कार्यक्रम प्रकाशित गरे, जुन यस प्रकार थियो:

१. फागुन २६ गते देशका विभिन्न स्थानमा पञ्चायतको पुत्ला जलाउने,
२. फागुन २७, २८ र २९ गते आन्दोलन सम्बन्धमा विभिन्न खाले प्रचारात्मक कार्यक्रमहरू गर्दै राजनीतिक दलका झण्डाहरू प्रदर्शन गर्ने,
३. फागुन ३० गते प्रचार सभा तथा जुलुस प्रदर्शन गर्ने,
४. चैत्र १ गते नेपाल बन्द गर्ने (शिक्षण संस्था, यातायात, कलकारखाना सहित अन्य सबै स्थान),
५. चैत्र १० गते "जन एकता दिवस" मनाउने।^{२८}

उपर्युक्त कार्यक्रम बाहेक "संयुक्त राष्ट्रिय जन आन्दोलन" ले छुट्टै कार्यक्रम दिई चैत्र ५ गते विरोध दिवस मनाउँदै (देश भित्र र विदेशमा समेत) जुलुस प्रदर्शन र आमसभा गर्ने र चैत्र २४ गते नेपालबन्द गर्ने कार्यक्रम राखेको थियो।^{२९}

फागुन २६ गते बाम-कांग्रेसको संयुक्त कार्यक्रम अनुरूप काठमाण्डौका हात्ती गौडा, महाराजगञ्ज, पुरानो बानेश्वर, सतुङ्गल, कालीमाटी, कीर्तिपुर, सामाखुसी, गौशालापुल, क्षेत्रपाटी, त्यौड, ठंहीटी, बाँसबारी आदि स्थान, पाटनका त्यागल, बालकुमारी, पाटन सिनेमाहल अगाडि, भक्तपुरका दधिकोट, बोडे र भक्तपुर नगरमा पञ्चायतको पुत्ला जलाइयो। उपत्यका बाहिर मोरङ्गमा महेन्द्र मोरङ्ग क्याम्पस हाताभिन्न, सरस्वती हाइस्कूल मा तथा रञ्जनी, दर्बेसा, लक्ष्मीचौकमा र जनकपुरको जनकपुरधाममा तथा चितवनका ३८ वटा गाउँ पञ्चायत र नगर पञ्चायत क्षेत्रभिन्न, पोखरामा चिप्ले दुङ्गामा र सिनेमाहल अगाडिका साथै म्याग्दी, काभ्रे इत्यादि स्थानहरूमा पनि पञ्चायतको पुत्ला जलाइयो। तत्कालीन समाचार माध्यमले यी कार्यक्रमहरूको उल्लेख गरेन। तर वि.वि.सी. नेपाली सेवा, अल इण्डिया रेडियो नेपाली सेवा (मार्च ९), भ्वाइस अफ अमेरिका, वि.वि.सी. हिन्दी सेवा (मार्च १०) ले प्रसार गरेका थिए।

दोस्रो चरणको आन्दोलनको क्रममा पनि आन्दोलनकारीहरू सरकारको यातनाबाट मुक्त हुन सकेनन्। दाडमा प्रहरी हिरासतमा रहेका घनश्याम रेग्मी, महेश लामिछाने, बासुदेव पन्त, भोलानाथ अधिकारी र किरण रेग्मीलाई निर्मम यातना दिई पञ्चायतको पक्षमा लेखन र टेलिभिजनबाट आन्दोलन विरुद्ध बोल्न बाध्य गराइयो।^{३०} तर पनि आन्दोलनकारीहरूको मनोबल घटेन, बरु निश्चित कार्यक्रम अनुसार पञ्चायतको पुत्ला बनाई, त्यसलाई पोली पञ्चायतको विधिवत अन्त्य भएको कुरा व्यक्त गर्दै पञ्चायतको अस्तित्व अन्त्य नभएसम्म आन्दोलन जारी राखिरहने दृढता व्यक्त गरे।

आन्दोलनको दोस्रो चरणको शुरूकै दिन फागुन २६ गते भारतको मधुबनी जिल्लाको जयनगरमा अञ्चलस्तरीय भारतीय पार्टीहरू (भा.क.पा., भा.क.पा. (माक्सवादी), जनता दल र कांग्रेस (आई) का प्रतिनिधिहरूले "नेपाल लोकतान्त्रिक आन्दोलन सहयोग समिति" गठन गरे।^{३१} त्यसको भोलिपल्ट फागुन २७ गते भारतीय सि.पि.एम. सि.पि.आई पार्टीहरू का साथै जनतादलका स्थानीय नेताहरूको आवाहन र नेपालबाट भागेर गएका प्र.ने.का. का करिब दुई-तीन सय मानिसहरूले तत्काल भारतले दिईरहेका दुईवटा नाकाहरू पनि छ घण्टा सम्म रोके। यसबारे नेपाल सरकारले प्रतिक्रिया व्यक्त गर्दै "चन्द्रशेखरको इशारामा प्राप्त २ वटा नाकाहरू पनि रोकिनुले नेपाली जनता र नेपाललाई अप्ठ्यारोमा पार्न खोजेको" भन्यो।^{३२}

फागुन २९ गते कीर्तिपुरमा छात्रावास अगाडि तीनकुनेमा राजनीतिक पार्टीहरूका झण्डाहरू फहराइएका थिए। त्यसै बखत केही प्रहरी र मण्डलेहरू आई विद्यार्थी छात्रावासमा समेत प्रवेश गरी छात्रहरूलाई समाउन थालेपछि विद्यार्थी र तिनीहरूबीच मुठभेड भयो। तर तत्काल थप प्रहरी आएकाले विद्यार्थीहरू भागे यद्यपि केहीलाई प्रहरीले पक्राउ गर्‍यो। उपत्यका बाहिर भापामा पनि कार्यक्रम थियो, जहाँ पनि प्रहरीसंग आन्दोलनकारीको साधारण झडप र भागाभागको स्थिति रह्यो। त्यो दिन नारायणघाट बजार बन्द थियो तर त्यसै दिन तत्कालीन रा.पं.स.हरू जागृत प्रसाद भेटवाल र भीमबहादुर श्रेष्ठलाई प्रहरी भ्यानमा नारायणघाट बजार ल्याएको कुरा त्यहाँ स्थानीय बासिन्दाहरूले

थाहा पाएपछि धेरैको संख्यामा जनताहरू प्रहरी भ्यान अगाडि भेला हुन थाले। उपस्थित जनसमुदायलाई प्रहरीले शक्ति प्रयोगबाट तितर वितर पार्‍यो र नगर पञ्चायतको भ्यानमा प्रहरीले ल्याएका केही व्यक्तिबाट एकलौटी रूपमा त्यहाँको घटनाबारे सरजमिन गरायो।^{३३} त्यसदिन बामपन्थी नेता राधाकृष्ण मैनालीको अन्तरवार्ता वि.वि.सी. ले प्रसारित गर्‍यो। मैनालीले आन्दोलनकारीको माँग (पञ्चायतको अन्त्य र बहुदलको स्थापना) पूरा गर्न डाक्टर, वकिल, प्राध्यापक आदिबाट बल पुगेको बताउँदै नेपालीका नाताले निहत्था नेपालीलाई केही पनि नगर्न प्रहरीलाई आह्वान गरे। यसै गरी पुराना राजनीतिक कार्यकर्ताहरू र नेपाल बार एसोसिएसनले पनि सरकारको आलोचना गरे। उता त्यसै दिन तत्कालीन प्रधानमन्त्रीले बाणिज्य संघ र चेम्बर अफ कमर्शका सभापति सँग भेट गरी ३० गते काठमाण्डौमा पसल खुलाउनका लागि दबाव दिए। तर त्यसदिन पूर्ण सुरक्षा नहुने र पूर्ण सुरक्षाको ग्यारेण्टी नभएसम्म पसल खोल्न नसकिने भनि उनीहरूले उत्तर दिए।^{३४} यसकुराबाट तत्कालीन सरकारले शान्ति स्थापना गर्न नसक्ने स्थिति र जनताको ठूलो हिस्साले सरकारी कार्यवाहीलाई असहयोग गर्ने मनस्थिति रहेको तथ्य स्पष्ट हुन्छ।

फागुन ३० गते काठमाण्डौमा भेडासी, लाजिम्पाट, शंकरदेव क्याम्पस, नयाँबजार, भोसिका टोल आदि स्थानका साथै पाटन, भक्तपुर र उपत्यका बाहिर पोखरा, चितवन, काभ्रे, पाल्पा आदि स्थानमा मसाल जुलुश निस्किए।^{३५} कीर्तिपुर तीनकुनेमा विरोध सभा भयो। जहाँ आन्दोलनकारीले बाम मोर्चा र काँग्रेसका झण्डा गाडे। यस स्थानबाट पुलिसले धेरै विद्यार्थीहरू पनि पक्राउँ गर्‍यो। सरकारले त्यसबेला जेलमा रहेका राजबन्दीहरू मध्ये केहीलाई उपत्यकाका केन्द्रीय कारागार, भद्रगोल जेल र नख्खु जेलबाट गरी करीब २० जनालाई चौतारा जेल तर्फ चलान गर्‍यो। त्यसरी जेल सारिनेहरूमा नेपाली काँग्रेसका हरीबोल भट्टराई र बामपन्थी नेता पद्मरत्न तुलाधर पनि थिए।^{३६}

आन्दोलनको कार्यक्रम अनुसार चैत्र १ गते “नेपाल बन्द” थियो, जुन दिनको कार्यक्रमबाट काठमाण्डौका तीनै शहर, भापा, मोरङ्ग, सुनसरी, धनुषा, चितवन, पर्सा, कास्की, पाल्पा आदि ठाउँमा निकै प्रभाव पर्‍यो। त्यस दिन कृषि विकास कार्यालयका कर्मचारीहरूले एक घण्टा सम्म काम नगरी टोकन हडताल गरे।^{३७} तर त्यस पटकको नेपाल बन्दको कार्यक्रम त्यसभन्दा अगाडिका नेपाल बन्दका कार्यक्रमहरू जत्तिको सफल भने देखिएन।

चैत्र २ गते जलेश्वर जेलमा सुधारको माँग राखी अनशन शुरू भयो। जेलभित्र भएको अव्यवस्था र बढी भन्दा बढी व्यक्तिलाई जेलमा ल्याउने कामबाट जेलको व्यवस्था ज्यादै नराम्रो हुँदै गएको थियो। यसदिन इञ्जिनियरिङ क्याम्पस पुल्चोकमा ‘मण्डले’ भनिने तत्कालीन सरकार-समर्थक गुण्डाहरूद्वारा धेरै विद्यार्थीहरू माथि गरिएको आक्रमण प्रति विरोध जनाउँदै चैत्र ३ गते सो क्याम्पसका प्राध्यापकहरूले मुखमा कालो पट्टि बाँधी कक्षा बहिष्कार गरे।^{३८} ज्ञानिय नेपाल एकेडेमीले ठाउँ नदिएकोले त्यसै दिन दिउँसो २ वजे त्रि-चन्द्र क्याम्पसमा भेला भएका करिब ३०० जति लेखक कलाकारहरूले पनि सरकारी दमनको विरोध गर्दै मुखमा कालो पट्टि बाँधी विरोध जनाए। यस ठाउँबाट कवि युद्धप्रसाद

मिश्र र कलाकारहरू हरिवंश आचार्य र मदन कृष्ण श्रेष्ठ सहित अन्य १३ जना जतिलाई गिरफ्तार गरियो। त्यसदिन महाराजगञ्ज क्याम्पसमा 'क्याम्पस-स्थापना दिवस' मनाउने कार्यक्रम थियो। विभिन्न वक्ताहरूले आन्दोलनलाई क्रमबद्ध रूपमा लैजानु पर्ने कुरा बताए। उता सरकारको कार्य शैलिमा भने त्यसबेला सम्म पनि कुनै परिवर्तन आएको थिएन। धरपकड, यातना, जेल चलान, जेल सार्ने काम, आन्दोलनको विरुद्धमा बक्तव्य भाषण, पञ्चे जुलुश आदि एक पछि अर्को गरी आईरहेका थिए। यसका बावजूद पनि क्रान्तिकारीहरूको जोशमा मन्दता आएको थिएन। बरु त्यसबेला देखि आन्दोलनले गाउँ गाउँलाई पनि समेटे सकेको थियो।^{३९}

चैत्र ५ गते "संयुक्त राष्ट्रिय जन आन्दोलन"को आवाहन अनुरूप विरोध दिवसको दिन थियो। कार्यक्रम अनुसार कीर्तिपुर र पाँगा सहित उपत्यकाका विभिन्न स्थानहरू (पाटन, भक्तपुर, त्यौड आदि) र उपत्यका बाहिरका केही स्थानहरूमा पनि विरोध जुलुश निस्किए। त्यस दिनको जुलुशबाट नन्द कुमार प्रसाई लगायत अन्य ३० जना जति पक्राउ परे। सरकारी दमनको विरोधमा अमृत साइन्स क्याम्पसका प्राध्यापक र कर्मचारीहरूले त्यस दिन काम बहिस्कार गरे।^{४०}

काठमाण्डौ बाहिर जनकपुर र चितवनमा पनि आन्दोलन बढ्दै गएको थियो। त्यहाँका सामान्य जनता पनि तीब्र रूपमा आन्दोलित भै सकेका थिए। त्यसैले प्र.ने.का. का नेता महेन्द्र नारायण निधिलाई जनकपुर अस्पतालबाट जलेश्वर जेल चलान गरियो।^{४१}

चैत्र ६ गते उपत्यकाका सरस्वती, त्रि-चन्द्र, रत्नराज्य, शंकरदेव, नेपाल ल आदि विभिन्न क्याम्पसहरूका विद्यार्थीहरूले पञ्चायतको पुत्ला जलाए। यस्तै जनकपुर र भक्तपुरमा मसाल जुलुश निस्किए।^{४२}

चैत्र ७ गते आन्दोलन शुरू भएको एक महिना भैसकेको थियो, तर पनि सरकारको व्यवहारमा भने कुनै पनि फरक आएको थिएन। दमन, यातना, धरपकड लगातार जारी थियो। बढ्दो दमनका कारण आन्दोलनमा सक्रिय युवावर्गले बिना हात-हतियार लड्न सकिन्न कि भन्ने सोच्न थाले। त्यसले गर्दा आन्दोलनलाई अन्य वर्ग र व्यवसायीहरूमा लैजानु पर्ने आवश्यकता महशुस भयो। चैत्र ७ गतेको बुद्धिजीवी भेला यसै दिशातर्फ प्रथम प्रयास थियो। त्यस दिन त्रि.वि.कीर्तिपुरको अडिटोरीयमहलमा विभिन्न पेशामा संलग्न करिब ७०० जति बुद्धिजीवी र विद्यार्थीहरू भेला भएर तत्कालीन परिस्थितिमा बुद्धिजीवीहरूका भूमिका बारे प्रवचन कार्यक्रम गरी रहेको अवस्थामा प्रहरीको ठूलो जत्थाले त्यो स्थानलाई घेरा हाली सबैलाई गिरफ्तार गर्‍यो।^{४३}

यसकामले आन्दोलनकारीहरूलाई ठूलो समर्थन मिल्यो। विभिन्न पेशासंग सम्बन्धित त्यति धेरै बुद्धिजीवीहरूको एकै स्थानबाट भएको गिरफ्तारीले ठूलो सनसनी फैलियो। तत्कालीन त्रि.वि. पदाधिकारीहरूबाट संचालन गर्न स्विकृति प्राप्त कार्यक्रमबाटै अचानक गिरफ्तारी दिनुपर्दा गिरफ्तार हुनेहरूको मनोभावनामा ठूलो चोट लाग्नु स्वाभाविकै थियो। त्यसका अतिरिक्त गिरफ्तार गरी बगिघखाना पुर्‍याइएका केही व्यक्तिहरू माथि प्रहरीले अभद्र व्यवहार समेत गरेबाट तत्कालीन सरकारी नीतिको कमजोरी प्रष्टै हुन्थ्यो। त्यसैले

बुद्धिजीवीहरूको गिरफ्तारलाई आन्दोलनकारीका साथै अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सञ्चार माध्यमले समेत खूब प्रचार गरे। यसपछि आन्दोलनको स्वरूपमानै परिवर्तन आई त्यसको खास केन्द्रविन्दु शिक्षा क्षेत्र हुन थाल्यो। स्कूलका शिक्षक विद्यार्थीहरू पनि आन्दोलनमा सक्रिय हुन थाले।

चैत्र ८ गते “नेपाल राष्ट्रिय शिक्षक संगठन” को आह्वानमा शिक्षकहरूको सांकेतिक हडतालको दिन थियो। त्यस दिन उपत्यकाका सारा विद्यालयहरूमा कलम बन्द भयो। चैत्र ७ गते कीर्तिपुरबाट भएको बुद्धिजीवीहरूको गिरफ्तारी र ८ गतेको शिक्षक संगठनको कलम बन्दको आह्वानको समर्थन गर्दै त्यस दिन शिद्दार्थ बनस्थली, महेन्द्ररत्न, पब्लिकयुथ र नर्सिङ्ग क्याम्पसका विद्यार्थीहरूले क्याम्पस-क्याम्पसमा जुलुश निकाले।^{४४} त्यसका अतिरिक्त पाटन, चितवन, पाल्पा, भद्रा आदि स्थानमा पनि कार्यक्रम आशातीत रूपमा सफल भए।^{४५} विद्यालयका शिक्षकहरू मात्र नभएर स-साना विद्यार्थीहरू पनि आन्दोलनमा सक्रिय हुन थाले पछि आन्दोलन फुन भयावह हुन थाल्यो। सरकारको दमनकारी नीति र विद्यार्थीहरूको छिटै उत्तेजित हुने स्वभावले गर्दा धेरै अभिभावकहरू चिन्तित हुन थाले। यसै बीच काठमाण्डौका पत्रिका पसलेहरूले ‘गोरखापत्र’ र ‘राइजीङ्ग नेपाल’ बिक्रि नगर्ने निधो गरेपछि सरकारी समाचार माध्यम समाजमा तिरस्कृत भयो।^{४६} उता भारतको नयाँ दिल्लीमा चैत्र ४ गते देखि ८ गते सम्म भएको “एशियाली सूचना केन्द्र”को तेस्रो अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय सम्मेलनले (३० देशका विद्यार्थीहरू सहभागी भएको) नेपालमा प्रजातन्त्रकोलागि भैराखेको आन्दोलनलाई समर्थन जनायो।^{४७}

चैत्र ९ गते पनि आन्दोलन कायमै रहयो। त्यस दिन पनि उपत्यकाका विभिन्न विद्यालयहरूका विद्यार्थी एवं शिक्षकहरूले सरकारको दमन प्रति घृणा र रोष देखाए भने आन्दोलनकारी र प्रहरी बीच साना-तिना झडप पनि भए।

चैत्र १० गते विरोध-जुलुशको कार्यक्रम थियो। त्यस दिन उपत्यका भरी प्रहरीको अत्यधिक तैनाथी भएतापनि कीर्तिपुरमा प्राध्यापकहरूको मौन जुलुश निस्कियो। त्यसै गरी वकिलहरूले पनि हातमा कालोपट्टि बाँधी विरोध जनाउन सफल भए। त्यसै दिन उपत्यकाका विभिन्न सडक र गल्लीका साथै क्याम्पसहरूमा पनि “जन एकता दिवस” मनाइयो।^{४८}

“जन एकता दिवस” धेरै ठाउँमा मनाइए तापनि त्यसभन्दा अगाडिका कार्यक्रम जस्तिको सफल हुन सकेन। यसबाट आन्दोलनकर्ताहरूमा केही निराशा बढ्छ कि जस्तो देखियो। तर त्यसबेलासम्ममा असंख्या शिक्षण संस्थाहरू आन्दोलनमा लागिसकेका र विद्यार्थी-शिक्षकहरूमा आन्दोलनप्रति निराशाको सट्टा फुनफुन हौशला बढ्नु थालेको हुनाले आन्दोलन सेलाएर जाने सम्भावना भने थिएन। बरु त्यसपछि आन्दोलनमा निजामति कर्मचारीको समेत सहभागिता थपियो। ठीक त्यसैबेला दूर सञ्चारका कर्मचारीहरूको सुविधा सरकारी दमन कोषमा जाँदैछ भन्ने एउटा हल्ला निकै बढेर गयो। जसले कर्मचारी जगतमा ठूलो सनसनी फैलियो र उनीहरू पनि सरकारी कार्यको विरोध गर्न थाले।^{४९}

यसै बीच स्विटजरलैण्डले नेपालमा मानव अधिकार उल्लंघन भएको प्रश्न उठायो। चैत्र ११ गते स्विटजरलैण्डबाट निस्कने समाचार पत्र “Tages Anzeiger” मा उल्लेख भए

अनुसार नेपालमा मानव अधिकार हनन भैरहेको र सो नरोकिंदा सम्म स्विटजरलैण्डले नेपाललाई दिंदै गरेको सहायता रोक्ने भयो।^{५०}

चैत्र ११ र १२ गते पनि विभिन्न क्याम्पस र स्कूलका विद्यार्थीहरू सक्रिय भए। चैत्र १२ गते उपत्यकामा ल क्याम्पस, रत्नराज्य लक्ष्मी क्याम्पस, इञ्जिनियरिङ्ग क्याम्पस र शान्ति विद्यागृह, लैनचौरका विद्यार्थी र प्रहरीहरू बीच मुठभेड भयो।^{५१} क्याम्पसमा जवरजस्ती प्रहरी पस्ने, विद्यार्थीलाई घर पकड गर्ने र यातना दिने काम हुन थाले। यसपछि क्याम्पसका प्राध्यापकहरू, त्रि.वि.पदाधिकारी, सामान्य कर्मचारी र विद्यार्थीहरू सरकारसंग रूष्ट भए। यसको प्रतिक्रिया स्वरूप सरस्वती क्याम्पस समितिले प्रहरी हस्तक्षेप गराएको विरुद्धमा उपकुलपतिलाई स्मृति पत्र दियो। त्यसैगरी तत्कालीन प्राध्यापक संघ केन्द्रिय संघर्ष समितिले पनि त्रि.वि. पदाधिकारीको राजीनामाको माँग गर्‍यो।^{५२} यसैबीच कीर्तिपुरको महिला छात्रावासमा केही बलिया र देख्दै डरलाग्दा व्यक्तिहरू गई छात्राहरूलाई धम्क्याएको हुनाले त्यसको विरोधमा पनि उपकुलपतिलाई विरोध पत्र दिइयो।^{५३} ठीक त्यसै बेला विद्यालयका शिक्षकहरूले "नेपाल राष्ट्रिय शिक्षक संघर्ष समितिको गठनगरी सरकार समक्ष १३ सूत्रीय माँगहरू प्रस्तुत गरे।^{५४}

चैत्र १३ गते पनि शिद्वार्थ बनस्थली, रत्नराज्य लक्ष्मी क्याम्पस र ल क्याम्पसका विद्यार्थीहरू र प्रहरीहरू बीच मुठभेड भयो। विभिन्न विद्यार्थीयूनियनहरूले क्याम्पस हाताभित्र हुनेगरेको प्रहरी हस्तक्षेपको विरोध गरे। यसबेला काठमाण्डौं उपत्यका बाहिर पनि संघर्ष निकै चर्किदै जान थाल्यो। बुटवलमा आन्दोलनका क्रममा पक्रिएका विद्यार्थीहरूको रिहाईकोलागि माँग गर्नु, बिराटनगरका बौद्धिक समुदायले तत्कालीन राजनीतिक बातावरणलाई फराकिलो पार्न र राजनैतिक पद्धतिमा बहुपक्षीय विचारधाराको प्रतिनिधित्व हुनु सक्ने तुल्याउन राजा समक्ष विन्तिपत्र चढाउनु^{५५} आदि जस्ता कामले आन्दोलनको आगोमा घिउ थप्ने काम गर्‍यो।

चैत्र १४ गतेदेखि आन्दोलन निकै बढेर गयो। उपत्यकाका विभिन्न स्कूलहरूमा त्यस दिन पनि छात्र र प्रहरी बीच मुठभेड भयो। यसबाट धेरै विद्यार्थीहरू घाइते भए भने केही पक्राउ पनि परे। त्यसरी पक्राउ पर्नेहरूमा स्कूलका स-साना केटाकेटीहरू समेत भएको र तिन्लाई पनि प्रहरीले यातना दिएको हुनाले त्यसको विरोधमा नेपाल विद्युत प्राधिकरणका केही कामदारहरूले त्यस दिनको कार्यालयको काम बहिष्कार गरे। त्यस्तै सरकारी दमनको विरोध गर्दै खाद्य संस्थानमा २ घण्टा कलम बन्द भयो। अस्पतालमा चिकित्साकर्मीहरू र राष्ट्रबैकका कर्मचारीहरूले पनि सरकारको काममा आफ्नो असहमति व्यक्त गरे। त्यसै दिन मेची क्याम्पसका विद्यार्थीहरूले कालो झण्डा बोकी नारा जुलुस सहित पञ्चायतको पुतला जलाउँदै गरेको ठाउँमा मण्डलेहरूले गरेको सांघातिक हमलाबाट रामथापा भन्ने विद्यार्थीको मृत्यु भयो।^{५६} रामथापाको राजनैतिक झुकावका बारेमा आन्दोलन पछि निकै विवाद पनि भयो। ने.वि. संघका विद्यार्थीले उनलाई आफ्नो समर्थक बताए^{५७} भने रामथापाकी आफ्नै भाउजुले रामथापा शुरु देखिनै अनेरास्ववियूको पक्षमा रहेको बताइन्।^{५८} रामथापाको मृत्युले विद्यार्थी जगतमा तीव्र आक्रोश पैदा भयो। यसबाट विभिन्न क्याम्पसमा

जुलुश प्रदर्शनका साथै पञ्चायतको पुतला जलाउने काम भयो।

चैत्र १५ गते आन्दोलनको कुनै घोषित कार्यक्रम नभए तापनि विद्यार्थी र प्रहरी बीच धेरै स्थानमा मुठभेड भयो। त्यस दिन राती पाटनमा मसाल जुलुश निस्कियो र १६ गतेको बत्ती निभाउने कार्यक्रमलाई सफल पार्ने आह्वान गर्दै केही युवकहरू विभिन्न स्थानका बाटामा दगुरे। त्यसैगरी त्यस दिन त्रि.वि. उपकुलप्रति कार्यालय अगाडिको प्राङ्गणमा भेला भएका देश भरका प्राध्यापकहरूले आन्दोलनको क्रममा निस्काशित पृथ्वीनारायण क्याम्पस, पोखराका प्राध्यापकहरूको विनाशर्त बहाली गर्न र काठमाण्डौंको कीर्तिपुर स्थित अडिटोरीयमबाट चैत्र ७ गते पक्राऊ परेका संपूर्ण प्राध्यापकहरूलाई प्रहरी कब्जाबाट रिहाई गराउनु पर्ने कुराको माँग गर्दै सो माँग पूरा गर्न नसके त्रि.वि. का केन्द्रीय पदाधिकारीलाई कुर्सी छाड्न भन्दै ती माँग पूरा नभए प्राध्यापकहरू आन्दोलनमा उत्रन बाध्य हुने कुरा बताए।^{५९} त्यसबेला (दोस्रो चरणको कार्यक्रमको अन्तिम दिन) सम्ममा आन्दोलन काठमाण्डौं, पूर्वमा इलाम, भुपा, मोरङ्ग, सुनसरी, जनकपुर आदि स्थानका साथै पश्चिममा पाल्पा, बाग्लुङ्ग, अर्घाखाँची, दैलेख, जुम्ला, नेपालगञ्ज आदि स्थानका साथै मध्य नेपालमा पनि फैलीसकेको थियो।^{६०}

आन्दोलनको तेश्रो चरण:

नेपाली कांग्रेस र संयुक्त बाम-मेर्चाबाट चैत्र ६ गते नै तेश्रो चरणको आन्दोलनको कार्यक्रम प्रकाशित भयो। यो यस प्रकार थियो:

१. चैत्र १६ गते बेलुका ७ बजे देखि ७.१० बजेसम्म सबैले बत्ती निभाउने।
२. चैत्र २२ गते आन्दोलनमा मारिएका शहीदहरूको स्मृतिमा विभिन्न धार्मिक स्थलहरूमा शोक सभा गर्ने।
३. चैत्र २७ गते नेपालको सम्बिधान जलाउने र नयाँ सम्बिधानको माँग गर्ने।

चैत्र १६ गते उपत्यकाका नेपाल ल, रत्नराज्य, विश्वभाषा, अमृत साइन्स, महाराजगञ्ज, महेन्द्ररत्न, शंकरदेव आदि क्याम्पसहरूमा प्रहरी र विद्यार्थीहरू बीच भिडन्त भयो। विद्यालयहरूमा शान्ति विद्यागृह, शिद्दार्थ बनस्थली, परोपकार, भानु मेमोरियल, शिवपुरी, विश्व निकेतन, जन प्रभात, कन्या आदिमा पञ्चायत बिरोधी प्रदर्शन भए। अधिकांश स्थानमा प्रहरीले हस्तक्षेप र लाठीचार्ज गर्दा गर्दै पनि विद्यार्थीहरू घाइते भएतापनि कन्या मा.वि. का विद्यार्थीहरूले पञ्चायतको पुतला जलाई छाडे भने भानु मेमोरियलका विद्यार्थीहरूले सरकारी मोटरमा क्षति पुऱ्याए।^{६१} कीर्तिपुर तीनकुनेमा विद्यार्थीहरूले आमसभा गरे र पञ्चायतको पुतला बनाई त्यहीँ छेउको एक विजुलीको खम्बामा फाँसीमा झुण्ड्याए।^{६२} सो पुतला क्रान्ति अवधि भरि नै त्यहीँ झुण्डिरहेको देखिन्थ्यो।

यसरी स्कूल क्याम्पसमा आन्दोलन तीव्र रूपमा बढ्दै जानु र शिक्षक विद्यार्थी, सरकारी कर्मचारी पनि आन्दोलनप्रति उत्साहित हुनुले सरकारलाई धेरै अपठ्यारो पर्दै गयो। सरकारले एकपछि अर्को शिक्षण संस्था बन्द गर्न दबाव दिन थाल्यो। प्रकाशित कार्यक्रम अनुसार

चैत्र १६ गते साँझको बत्ती निभाउने काम सबैतिर राम्ररी सफल भयो। पाटनमा बत्ती निभाएका बेलामा प्रहरीहरूले घरघरमा गई बत्ती बाल्न दबाव दिए र उनीहरूको भनाइ नमान्ने माथि बल प्रयोग समेत गर्न थाले। यस कार्यले जन आक्रोस भन बढ्यो।

चैत्र १७ गते बिहानदेखि नै पाटनका जनताले ज्यादै ठूलो जुलुश निकाले। सो जुलुशमा पनि प्रहरीले हस्तक्षेप गर्न खोज्यो। तर जनता र प्रहरी बीच दुझामुढा हानाहान भयो। जनताले प्रहरीलाई लखेटे र पाटनको मंगल बजार थाना सहित नगर पञ्चायत भवनमा आगो लगाइदिए। त्यसै दिन १२ बजे दिउँसो प्रहरीहरू संगठित भई जनतामाथि गोली चलाउन लागे, जसबाट के कति व्यक्तिहरू मारिए तत्काल यकिकन हुनसकेन। यद्यपि एक पत्रिकाले २ जना मारिएका, २० जना भन्दा बढी घाइते भएका र सयौं पक्राउ भएका भनि समाचार छाप्यो।^{६३} त्यस पछि त्यस दिन भरी नै पाटनका जनताले जुलुश निकाले। यो जुलुशलाई दबाउन सरकारले सेनाको समेत प्रयोग गर्‍यो।^{६४} आन्दोलनमा भाग लिने आफ्ना दाजु-भाई र छिमेकीहरूको रगत आफ्नो अगाडि पोखिएको देखेपछि पाटनका सारा जनता (आइमाइ, केटाकेटी सहित) आफु सँग उपलब्ध घरायसी हतियार सहित घर बाहिर निस्केर पहरा दिनुका साथै पाटनमा मोटर आउने बाटो बन्द गर्न थाले। पाटनको यो स्थिति सरकारकोलागि पनि धेरै सम्बेदनशील बन्यो।

यसै दिन भारतमा चन्द्रशेखरको नेतृत्वमा २०७ जना सांसदहरूले नेपालको आन्दोलनप्रति समर्थन जनाउँदै बक्तव्य दिए। त्यस दिनको भारतीय दूरदर्शनले यस संबन्धी समाचार प्रकाशित गरेको थियो। यस्तै भ्वाइस अफ अमेरिका र वि.वि.सी.ले पनि नेपालको जन आन्दोलनबारे खबर दिँदै नेपालका परराष्ट्र मन्त्रीले राजीनामा दिएको कुरा बताए।

चैत्र १८ गते पनि पाटन बजार पूर्णरूपमा आन्दोलित थियो। पाटन बजारमा नयाँ मान्छे र प्रहरी पस्न त्यहाँका जनताले पूर्ण रोक लगाए। पाटनको यस कार्यले पाटन मात्र हैन, सारा उपत्यका आन्दोलित भयो। पाटन कब्जा गर्ने जनता माथि प्रहरीको केही जोर नचलेको देखेपछि काठमाण्डौं उपत्यकाका अन्य भागका जनताको पनि मनोबल बढ्यो।

चैत्र १९ गते देशव्यापी रूपमा डाक्टरहरूले हडताल गरे। आकस्मिक सेवा बाहेक क्लिनिक समेत बन्द गरे। त्यो दिन उपत्यकाका विभिन्न क्याम्पस र स्कूलहरूमा विरोध प्रदर्शन भई रहयो। यसै दिन देखि स्थानिय जनताले पाटनलाई पञ्चायती शासनबाट मुक्त क्षेत्र घोषित गरे। पाटनमा भएको विशाल आमसभालाई सम्बोधन गर्दै शिद्धिलाल सिंह र अन्य नेताहरूले आन्दोलनलाई अझै अगाडि बढाउने आह्वान गरे।^{६५} पाटनका ७६ जना पञ्चहरूले गोली काण्डको बिरोध गरे र सरकारले अब पनि दमन नीति लिएमा राजिनामा दिने धम्की दिए।^{६६} यसै गरी नेपालका धेरै चार्टर एकाउण्टेण्टहरूले सरकारी कार्य चिन्ताजनक भएको बताए भने नेपाल बार एसोसिएसनले एक जाँच आयोग गठन गर्नु पर्ने माँग गर्‍यो।^{६७} यसबेला सम्ममा आन्दोलनले विभिन्न पक्ष र स्थानलाई समेटे सकेको र पाटनले अझ उग्ररूपलिई आन्दोलनलाई दबाउनै नसकिने स्थिति बनेकाले पञ्चहरू पनि धेरै आत्तिन थालेका थिए। यस जनआन्दोलनबारे विचार गर्न १७ गते पञ्चायत नीति तथा जाँचबुझ समितिमा जम्मा भएका भूतपूर्व प्रधानमन्त्रीहरू कुनै निष्कर्षमा पुग्न नसक्नु,

तत्कालीन मन्त्रीपदमा बसेका मन्त्रीहरूले राजिनामा दिनु, बहालवाला राष्ट्रिय पंचायतका सदस्यहरूका साथ अरू धेरै पञ्चहरूले आन्दोलनलाई शक्तिको भरमा कुल्चने कुरामा सहमति नजनाउनुले पनि पञ्चायत भित्रको कमजोरी र दिशा विहीन अवस्था थाहा पाउन कुनै गाह्रो पर्दैनथियो। यसरी एकातिर पञ्चहरू बीच विवाद चर्केको र अर्कोतिर आन्दोलन भन बढ्न लागेको अवस्थामा आन्दोलनकारीसँग वार्ता गर्नु बाहेक अर्को विकल्प हुन सक्तैनथ्यो। तर चैत्र १९ गते श्री ५ बाट श्रेष्ठ मन्त्रीपरिषदको तेश्रो पुनर्गठन गरिवक्स्यो, जसले आन्दोलनलाई शान्त पार्न सकेन बरु यस कार्यबाट आन्दोलनकारीहरूले आफूलाई उपेक्षित गरिएको महशुस गर्न थाले। अतः आन्दोलन भन चर्केर जान लाग्यो, जस्तै रोक्न नवगठित (पञ्चहरूको) मन्त्री परिषद पनि असक्षम भयो।

आन्दोलनकारीहरूले सरकारी हत्या र दमनको विरोध स्वरूप चैत्र २० गते उपत्यका बन्दको आह्वान गरे। यसबेला पाटनको स्थिति ज्यादै भयावह भयो। यस दिन पनि आन्दोलनकारीहरूले पाटनलाई चारै तर्फबाट घेरी कांग्रेस र बामका भण्डा सहित जुलुश र आमसभा गरे। यस दिन पाटनको सुन्धारामा भएको आमसभालाई विभिन्न भूमिगत नेताहरूले सम्बोधन गर्दै जनताको विजय निश्चित भएको कुरा बताएछन् छोटो समयमा बनाइएको कार्यक्रम भए तापनि त्यस दिनको 'नेपाल बन्द' पूर्ण रूपमा सफल रहेको थियो। यस दिन बिहान कीर्तिपुरको पांगामा एक जुलुश निस्कियो र अपरान्ह करीव ३ बजेतिर कीर्तिपुरका केही युवाहरू मिली पञ्चायतको पुत्ला जलाउनुका साथै जुलुश पनि निकाले। त्यो जुलुश कीर्तिपुर थाना छेउ पुगेपछि जुलुशमा सहभागी विभिन्न व्यक्तिहरूलाई प्रहरीले पक्राउ गर्न थाल्यो। त्यसरी पक्राउपर्नेहरूमा एकजना बालक थिए। ती बालकलाई छुटाउन एकजना व्यक्ति गए तर प्रहरीले उनलाई र अरूहरूलाई समेत अन्धाधुन्ध गोली प्रहार गर्‍यो। त्यसरी गोली चलेपछि स्थानिय जनताले गोली लागेका व्यक्तिहरूलाई अस्पताल लाने प्रयास गर्न थाले। गोलीलाग्ने व्यक्तिहरू मध्ये राजमान मालीको घटनास्थलमा नै मृत्यु भयो। मृतकको शरीरलाई स्थानिय जनताले आफ्नो कब्जामा लिए र कीर्तिपुरलाई किल्ला बन्दी गरी प्रहरीलाई प्रवेश गर्न दिएनन्। कीर्तिपुरलाई सुरक्षित राख्न उनीहरूले रातको समयमा पनि पहरा दिए। त्यस दिन साँझमा बत्ती निभाउने कार्यक्रम उपत्यकाभरि नै राम्ररी सफल भयो।

चैत्र २१ गते बिहान ठूलो संख्यामा कीर्तिपुरका जनताहरू भेला भई मृतकको शव लिएर कीर्तिपुर बजार परिक्रमा गरे। करिब ५० हजार जतिको उक्त जुलुशले पञ्चायतको बिरोधमा नारा घन्काउँदै शवको दाह संस्कार गर्‍यो। कीर्तिपुरको शव जुलुशमा मिसिन आईरहेका नैकापका जनतालाई प्रहरीले रोक्न खोजेपछि जनता र प्रहरी बीच झडप भयो। प्रहरीको संख्या सानो भएको र नैकापका जनताहरू अग्लो ठाउँमा भएकाले जनताले प्रहरीलाई लखेटे। यसैबीच प्रहरीले गोली चलाउन थालेका र तत्काल अरू प्रहरी पनि त्यहाँ आई पुगेका हुनाले जनताहरू तितर बितर भई भागे। त्यस दिन नैकापमा कोही पनि मारिएन। यस घटना पछि प्रहरीहरू कीर्तिपुर आउन सकेनन्। कीर्तिपुरका जनताले कीर्तिपुरलाई मुक्त क्षेत्र घोषित गरे। त्यही दिन कीर्तिपुर क्षेत्रका ३ जना प्रधानपञ्चहरूले

आफ्नो पदबाट राजिनामा गरे।^{६९} त्यसदिन पनि उपत्यका भरि नै बत्ती निभाउने काम भयो।^{७०}

चैत्र २२ गते काठमाण्डौका विभिन्न धार्मिक स्थलहरूमा श्रद्धाञ्जली सभाको कार्यक्रम थियो। यस अनुरूप पशुपतिनाथका साथै अन्य विभिन्न धार्मिकस्थलहरूमा यस्ता सभाहरू भए। त्यसबेला सम्ममा पाटन, कीर्तिपुरका साथै सम्पूर्ण काठमाण्डौ उपत्यका आन्दोलनको आगोमा लपेटिई सकेको हुँदा त्यस दिनको कार्यक्रममा सदा जस्तो प्रहरी हस्तक्षेप हुन सकेन, जसले गर्दा आन्दोलनकारीहरूको मनोबल पुरै बढेर गयो। काठमाडौं उपत्यका बाहिर पनि पोखरा, चितवन, मकवानपुर, पाल्पा आदि स्थानमा समेत आन्दोलन तीव्र रूपमा बढ्न थाल्यो। यसले गर्दा तत्कालीन सरकारले केही गर्न सकेन। यस्तो हुनु स्वाभाविकै थियो। तर पनि सरकारले अझै पनि आन्दोलनलाई केही गरी शान्त गर्न सकिन्छ कि भनी कास्कीका तत्कालीन रा.पं.स. सोमनाथ अधिकारी प्यासीलाई मुस्ताङ जेलबाट पोखरा जेलमा सान्यो। तर यसबेला सम्ममा आन्दोलन निकै अगाडि बढी सकेकाले एक जना व्यक्तिलाई जेल सार्ने कामले कुनै असर पारेन। चैत्र २२ गते आन्दोलनको ज्वाला काठमाडौं उपत्यका सहित देशका विभिन्न स्थानमा चर्किदै गयो र आन्दोलन प्रति विभिन्न पक्षको प्रत्यक्ष समर्थन बढ्न थाल्यो। विभिन्न कायलियका कर्मचारीहरूले सरकारी काम छाडी आन्दोलनकारीहरूलाई पूर्णरूपमा सहयोग दिन थाले। यसबेला सरकारले आन्दोलनलाई दबाउन त के, आन्दोलनकारीसम्म पुग्न पनि कठिन हुन गएको थियो, जसले गर्दा त्यसपछिका प्रयासहरू राजाबाट नै हुनुपर्ने अनिवार्यता बन्यो।

'संयुक्त राष्ट्रिय जन आन्दोलन' ले आह्वान गरे अनुरूप चैत्र २४ गते 'नेपाल बन्द'को कार्यक्रम थियो। यसबेलासम्म आन्दोलन चरम चुलीमा पुगिसकेकाले त्यसभन्दा अगाडिका कार्यक्रमलाई रोक्ने उद्देश्यले चैत्र २४ गते बिहान श्री ५ बाट देशबासीका नाममा सम्बोधन गरी बक्सदै तत्कालीन मन्त्री परिषदले (मरीचमान श्रेष्ठको) जनताको जन-धनको सुरक्षा गर्न नसकेकाले त्यो मन्त्रीपरिषदलाई विघटन गरी लोकेन्द्र बहादुर चन्दको अध्यक्षतामा मन्त्रीपरिषद गठन गर्न लगाई बक्सियो। उक्त सम्बोधनमा जनताको क्षति सम्बन्धमा जाँचआयोग गठन गर्ने र तत्काल राष्ट्रिय पञ्चायतको अधिवेशन समेत बोलाउने कुरा उल्लेख गरिएको थियो। यसैगरी त्यसमा विभिन्न बिचारधारा राख्ने व्यक्तिहरूसँग वार्ताचलाउने कुराको पनि उल्लेख थियो।^{७१}

तर त्यसपछि आन्दोलन घट्नुको सट्टा झन् उग्र भयो। राजाको घोषणालाई आन्दोलनकारीले कमजोरीको रूपमा लिए। अतः नेपाली कांग्रेस र बाम-मोर्चाले बहुदलीय व्यवस्था स्थापना नभएसम्म आन्दोलन जारी राख्ने कुरा बताए।^{७२} फलस्वरूप आन्दोलनकारीहरूले तत्कालीन प्रधानमन्त्री लोकेन्द्र बहादुर चन्दको चार सदस्यीय मन्त्री मण्डलसँग वार्तागर्न अस्विकार गरे।^{७३} राजबन्दीहरूलाई सरकारले रिहा गर्‍यो। तर आन्दोलनकारीहरूले शाही घोषणालाई स्विकारेनन्, बरु त्यको सट्टा "शाही घोषणा धोका हो" भनि नारा लगाए।^{७४} नारामा अब राजाको नाम पनि उल्लेख गरीएको थियो।^{७५} त्यस दिन, दिनभरि नै शहरमा जताततै जुलुश भइरह्यो। बिहान १० बजेतिर पाटनबाट ज्यादै ठूलो

जुलुश काठमाण्डौतर्फ आयो। प्रहरीले त्यो जुलुशलाई कुपण्डोल र थापाथलीमा रोक्न खोज्यो तर त्यो सम्भव भएन। पाटनबाट आएको जुलुश र काठमाण्डौमा जताततै निस्केको जुलुशले पनि राजपरिवार विरोधी नाराहरू लगाएका थिए भने बागबजारका केही स्थानमा राजपरिवारका फोटोहरू पनि जलाइए।^{१६} त्यस दिनको कुनै पनि जुलुशलाई प्रहरीले रोक्न सकेन। तीन बजे तिर कीर्तिपुरबाट एउटा जुलुश काठमाण्डौ आयो र काठमाण्डौको जुलुशमा मिसिएर रानी पोखरी, विश्वज्योति सिनेमा हल हुँदै दरबारमार्गबाट अगाडि बढ्न चाह्यो तर ठूलो संख्यामा त्यहाँ रहेका प्रहरीले त्यो जुलुशलाई रोक्न खोजे। आन्दोलनकारीले प्रहरीलाई वास्ता नगरी अगाडि बढ्न प्रयास गरेपछि प्रहरीले लाठी चार्ज गर्दै टियर ग्याँस छाड्यो तर पछाडिबाट जुलुश सहित उत्तेजित ठूलो भीड लगातार आइरहेको हुनाले जनताले प्रहरी माथि प्रत्याक्रमण गरे। एक जना आन्दोलनकारीले दरबारमार्गमा रहेको महेन्द्रको शालिकमा चढेर शालिकको राजदण्ड आफ्नो हातमा मात्र के लिएको थियो प्रहरीले त्यस व्यक्तिमाथि गोली चलायो। त्यसपछि चारैतिरबाट गोलीको वर्षा शुरू भयो। गोली चलाउन प्रहरीलाई सेनालेपनि साथ दियो। जनताहरू चारैतर्फ दगुर्न थाले।^{१७} जनताको भीड शहरमा जहाँ तहीं भएको र गोली पनि जहाँ तहीं चलेकाले कहाँ के कति घाइते भए वा मारिए भन्ने थाहा हुन तत्काल गाह्रो भयो। त्यसैले त्यस दिन मर्नेहरूको संख्यामा विविधता पाइयो। त्यसै दिन साँझको वि.वि.सी.ले मारिने व्यक्तिहरूको संख्या १०, अल इण्डिया रेडियोले २२ र भ्वाइस अफ अमेरिकाले ५० बताए। तर त्यसबारेमा रेडियो नेपालले कुनै समाचार नै दिएन। बरू साँझदेखि उपत्यकाका दुईवटा शहर काठमाण्डौ र पाटनका चक्रपथ भित्र पर्ने स्थानमा २४ घण्टाकोलागि कर्फ्यू जारी भएको समाचार दियो। काठमाण्डौमा कर्फ्यू लागेको बेला भक्तपुरमा जुलुश निस्कियो। त्यसैले चैत्र २५ गतेदेखि भक्तपुरमा समेत कर्फ्यू लागू गरी काठमाण्डौको कर्फ्यू समयलाई पुनः २४ घण्टाको लगि थप गरियो।

यसरी सारा उपत्यकामा कर्फ्यू लागेको भए तापनि उपत्यका बाहिर बुटवल र जनकपुरमा २४ र २५ गते पनि आन्दोलन भइरह्यो। देशका विभिन्न स्थानमा प्रहरीको गोलीबाट धेरै जनाले ज्यान गुमाए।^{१८} उपत्यकामा कर्फ्यू बाहिरको इलाकामा विभिन्न हल्लाहरू जस्तो कि “दरबार भित्र आन्तरिक कलह छ”, “सेनाले राजनीतिमा चाख बढाए”, “विभिन्न राजदूतावासले आन्दोलनकारी र दरबार बीच सम्बन्ध गराउन भूमिका खेल्दैछन्” इत्यादि। कर्फ्यू लागेकै बेलामा तत्कालिन मन्त्री परिषदका नेताहरूले विपक्षी राजनीतिज्ञहरू संग सम्पर्क गर्न थाले। यसले गर्दा नेपाली कांग्रेस र बाममोर्चाका बीच वार्ताहुनु आवश्यक भयो, जस अनुरूप नेपाली कांग्रेसका अध्यक्ष कृष्णप्रसाद भट्टराईसंग बाममोर्चाकी अध्यक्ष सहाना प्रधानले भेट गरिन्। त्यसपछि नेपाली कांग्रेस र बाममोर्चा दरबार जाने भए।^{१९} नेपाली कांग्रेसबाट कृष्णप्रसाद भट्टराई र गिरिजाप्रसाद कोइराला र बाममोर्चाबाट सहाना प्रधान र राधाकृष्ण मैनाली चैत्र २६ गते राजासँग वार्ता गर्न दरबार गए। वार्ता सकिएपछि त्यसै राती ११:२० बजे रेडियो नेपाल तथा नेपाल टेलिभिजनले दरबारको सम्वाद सचिवालयको एक विज्ञप्ति प्रसारित गर्‍यो। विज्ञप्तिमा तत्कालीन

सन्विधानबाट "निर्दलियता शब्द भिकी दलमाथिको प्रतिबन्ध हटाइएको कुराको उल्लेख थियो।^{८०}

राजासंगको वार्ता सकिएपछि नेपाल टेलिभिजनले वार्ताकारहरूसंगको अन्तरवार्ता प्रसारण गर्‍यो। आफ्नो अन्तरवार्तामा कृष्णप्रसाद भट्टराईले राजाले उदार भइ, जनता प्रति प्रेम राखी बहुदल दिन मानेको हुनाले आन्दोलन स्थगित गरिएको कुरा उल्लेख गरे भने गिरीजाप्रसाद कोइरालाले आन्दोलन स्थगनगर्ने र अब पछि अराजकता फैलाउन खोज्ने तत्वलाई संपूर्ण जनता र पार्टी मिलेर एकलो पार्नु पर्ने बिचार व्यक्त गरे। यसैगरी सहाना प्रधानले अब स्वतन्त्रताको उपभोग गर्ने, बोल्ने आदि जस्ता मानव अधिकारहरू प्राप्तहुने सम्भावना रहेकाले आन्दोलन स्थगनगर्ने कुरा बताइन् भने राधाकृष्ण मैनालीले बहुदल प्राप्तिको माँगलाई उचित रूपले प्रयोग गर्ने र हाललाई आन्दोलन एकहदसम्म रोकिएको कुरा व्यक्त गरे।^{८१}

त्यस राती नेताहरूको अन्तर्वार्ता हेर्ने र रेडियोबाट खबर सुन्ने उपत्यकाका धेरै जनताहरू तत्काल खुशियाली मनाउन घरबाट बाहिर निस्केका थिए। तर त्यसबेलासम्म पनि कफर्यू कायमै भएको हुनाले सैनिकले गोली चलाए। त्यस्तो गोली लागेर त्यस रात पनि केही व्यक्तिले आफ्नो ज्यान गुमाए।^{८२} काठमाण्डौ बाहिर घरानमा पनि बहुदल आएको खुशियालीमा जुलुस लगाउनु पर्दछ भन्दै त्यही रात घरबाट निस्केका एक युवक शुशिल कट्टेललाई प्रहरीले गोलीहानी मान्यो।^{८३}

आन्दोलनकारीले राजासंग वार्ता गरी आन्दोलन रोक्ने कुरा गरे पछि वार्ता (राजा र आन्दोलनकारी बीच भएको) को बारेमा विभिन्न स्थान र व्यक्तिहरू बीच खूब टीका टिप्पणी हुन थाल्यो। पञ्चायत ढल्नै लागेको बेलामा नेताले वार्ता गरेको र वार्ता पछि आन्दोलन रोक्न आह्वान गरेको कुरा प्रति कडा टिप्पणी गर्दै ने.क.पा. मसालले नेपाली जनताले पञ्चायतलाई मन नपराउने र पञ्चायत ढल्नै लागेको बेला त्रिपक्षीय सम्झौता भएकाले त्यसलाई "लाटाको पापा" भन्यो।^{८४} यस बाहेक व्यक्ति व्यक्तिकाबीच पनि प्रशस्त टिप्पणी भए। कसैले यसलाई राम्रो ठान्दाँ उदै आवश्यक सम्झौता भने भने कसैले हतारको सम्झौता भने।

त्यसरी सम्झौताको बारेमा विभिन्न टीका-टिप्पणी भए तापनि चैत्र २७ गतेको बिहानै देखि उपत्यकामा लगाइएको कफर्यू हटाइयो। उपत्यकाका विभिन्न शहरमा विभिन्न पार्टीका झण्डा बोकेका हजारौं व्यक्तिहरूले नारा लगाउँदै घुमे।^{८५} सबै तिरबाट निस्केको जुलुसको लक्ष खुल्ला मञ्च गई नेताहरूको भाषण सुन्नु थियो। करीब २ बजे टुँडिखेलमा ने.का.का मार्सल जुलुस शाक्यको सभापतित्वमा अभिसमा भयो। सो आमसभालाई संबोधन गर्ने नेताहरूमा ने.का.का गणेशमान सिंह, हरिबोल भट्टराई, ओमकार श्रेष्ठ, जगन्नाथ आचार्य, बालकृष्ण खाँड (ने.वि.संघ) का साथै बाममोर्चाका मनमोहन अधिकारी, सहाना प्रधान, तुलसीलाल अमात्य, निर्मल लामा, विष्णुबहादुर मानन्धर, कृष्णराज बर्मा, फलनाथ खनाल, पद्मरत्न तुलाधर, श्यामकृष्ण कसजु आदि थिए। प्रायः सबै नेताहरूले दलमाथिको प्रतिबन्ध हटेपछि प्राप्त जनअधिकारलाई राम्ररी सदुपयोग गर्ने, नेपाली जनताले पत्याएका नेपाली

कांग्रेसका र कम्युनिष्टक राजनैतिक व्यक्तित्वहरूलाई समावेश गराई यथाशिघ्र अन्तरिम सरकारको गठन गर्नुपर्ने र पञ्चायतका सम्पूर्ण अङ्ग खारेजगर्नुपर्ने, आन्दोलनको शिलशिलामा शहिदहुने र घाइतेहुनेहरूको सही तथ्याङ्क पत्ता लगाई मृतकका परिवार र घाइतेहरूलाई उचित क्षतिपूर्ति दिनुपर्ने माँग गरे। यसै आमसभामा नेपाली कांग्रेसका गणेशमान सिंहले सबै प्रकारका भ्रमबाट मुक्त रहन आग्रह गर्दै पहिले पहिले पञ्चायतले जनतालाई भ्रमहरू दिने गरेको र त्यसबाट गलतव्यक्तिले फाइदाउठाएको चर्चागर्दै भने कि संसारमा धेरै ठूलाठूला र निरंकुश तानाशाहीले जनतालाई दिने गरेको यातना र दुःख भन्दा पञ्चायतले धेरै दुःख दिइ सकेकाले तत्काल थोरै मात्र अधिकार पाए पनि त्यसलाई स्विकार्नु परेको हो भन्ने कुरा व्यक्त गरे। कृष्णप्रसाद भट्टराईले पञ्चायतको विघटन गरी आम चुनाव यथाशिघ्र हुनुपर्ने कुरामा जोड दिए। गिरीजा प्रसाद कोइरालाले आफू कमजोर भएमा मात्र अरूले धोका दिन सक्ने, जनताको बलिदान खेर नजाने, र प्रजातन्त्रमा सबैको जीत हुने, आन्दोलन त्यत्तिकैमा नटुङ्गिने र समाजलाई पूर्ण प्रजातान्त्रिक ढंगबाट अगाडि बढाउनुपर्ने कार्य अभै बाँकि रहेको बताए।

ने.क.पा. मार्क्सवादीका नेता मनमोहन अधिकारीले बहुदलप्राप्ति पछि आन्दोलन दोश्रो चरणमा प्रवेशगरेकोले तत्कालै अन्तरिम सरकार बनाउनुपर्ने र सम्विधान निर्माणगर्नुपर्ने कुरा बताए। सहाना प्रधानले तत्कालीन मन्त्रीपरिषदमा केही व्यक्ति थपी बनाएको सरकार जनतालाई मान्य नहुने, जनताको हितहुने सम्विधान जनताले नै बनाउन पाउनुपर्छ भनिन्। यस्तै अन्य नेता मध्ये तुलसीलाल अमात्यले 'कांग्रेस, कम्युनिष्ट, अभै बाँस्नु नहुने', पद्मरत्नले भ्रष्टाचारीलाई कार्यवाही गर्नु पर्ने, निर्मललामाले 'आन्दोलनबाट जनताका ५% माँग मात्र प्राप्त भएकाले अरू बढि अधिकार प्राप्त गर्न पार्टीगत एकता त्याग्नु नहुने', विष्णुबहादुर मानन्धरले आन्दोलनबाट प्राप्त अधिकारबाट नयाँ नेपाल निर्माण गर्न अगाडि बढ्न सकिने, फलनाथ खनालले आन्दोलन नयाँ चरणमा प्रवेश गर्नलागेको कुरा बताए।^{१६}

देशका विभिन्न स्थानहरूमा पनि यस दिन यस्तै आमसभाहरू गरिए। सबै ठाउँका आमसभामाबोल्ने वक्ताले अन्तरिम सरकारको गठन गर्ने र फटाहमाथि कार्यवाही गर्ने माँग राखे। यस दिन देशका विभिन्न जिल्लाका जेलमा रहेका राजनैतिक व्यक्तिहरूको पनि रिहाइ गरियो।

उता तत्कालीन प्रधानमन्त्री लोकेन्द्रबहादुर चन्दले आफ्नो सरकारलाई अन्तरिम सरकार भन्दै अनुचितकार्य गर्नेहरूलाई कार्यवाही गर्ने, श्री ५ को सरकारले कसैमाथि बदलाको भावना नराख्ने, धनजनको क्षति बारेमा जाँच आयोगले दिएको प्रतिवेदन अनुसार आवश्यक कारवाही गर्ने, जाँच आयोगबाट सबैलाई न्याय मिल्ने, आन्दोलनका क्रममा मरेका व्यक्तिका परिवारलाई क्षतिपूर्ति दिनेतर्फ बिचार गर्ने, आन्दोलनका क्रममा पक्राउ परेका व्यक्तिहरूलाई मुक्त गर्ने र बहुल राजनीतिक प्रजातन्त्र नै सम्विधानको स्वरूप हो भने।^{१७} यस्तै त्यसबेलाको विदेश सम्बन्ध हेर्ने पशुपति संसेरले भारतसँगको मित्रताको आधार नयाँ परिवेश अनुसार तय गरिने कुरा व्यक्त गरे। उता अमेरिका र बेलायतले जस्तै भारतले पनि नेपालको चैत्र २६ गतेको कदमलाई स्वागत योग्य कदम भन्यो।^{१८}

चैत्र २८ गते तत्कालीन प्र.मं. लोकेन्द्रबहादुरचन्दले रेडियोनेपाल र नेपाल टेलिभिजनलाई अन्तरवार्तादिदै राष्ट्रिय समझदारी र सहमति कायम गर्न दोश्रो चरणकोवार्ताहुने र मृतकका परिवारलाई केही राहत दिइने कुरा व्यक्त गरे। साथै त्यस पछि आन्दोलनकारीहरू माथि लागेका मुद्दाहरू खारेजहुने भए।^{९१}

चैत्र २९ गते पञ्चायत अन्तर्गत बहुदलप्रति निष्ठावान रहेकाले निलम्बित कार्यकर्ताको निलम्बन फुकुवा गरिएको र पत्रपत्रिकामाथि लगाइएको सेन्सरशिप हटाइयो।^{९२}

चैत्र ३० गते पाटन मंगल बजारमा एक आमसभा भयो। आमसभामा बोल्दै ने.का.का कृष्णप्रसाद भट्टराईले हाललाई पार्टी प्रतिबन्ध हटेको र सम्बिधानबाट 'दलविहीन' शब्द हटाइएकाले सम्झौता गरिएको तर अझै धेरैमाँग पूराहुन बाँकि रहेका र तीमाँग पूरानभएसम्म आन्दोलन क्रमिक चरणमा अगाडि बढ्ने कुरा बताए। बाममोर्चाकी सहानुप्रधानले तत्कालिन राजनैतिक व्यवस्था पञ्चायतमा आधारित भएकाले त्यो मान्यनहुने, तत्कालिन पञ्चायती मंत्रीपरिषदमा आन्दोलनकारीहरू भिसिन नसक्ने कुरा व्यक्तगर्दै ती कुराहरू श्री ५ संगपनि राखिसकेको र ती माँग पूरा नभएमा आन्दोलन पुनः शुरू हुने कुरा बताइन्।^{९३}

चैत्र ३१ गते कांग्रेसका र बाम नेताहरूबाट शहीदहरू प्रति श्रद्धाञ्जलि अर्पण गर्दै शहीदहरूको त्याग र बलिदानलाई सँधै स्मरण गरीरहने कुरा व्यक्तगरिए।^{९४}

नववर्ष २०४७ सालको पहिलो दिन गणेशमान सिंह र राजा बीच वार्ता भयो। राजासँग दर्शनभेट पछि अन्तरवार्ता दिँदै सिंहले शाही कदमबाट देशमा समझदारीको अवस्था आएको कुरा बताए। त्यसै दिन जनआन्दोलनका मृतक र घाइतेलाई आर्थिक सहायता (मृतकका परिवारलाई १५,०००/-, अंगमभङ्ग हुनेलाई ५,०००/- र घाइतेलाई २०००/- रूपिया) दिने र सरकारी मुद्दा सम्बन्धि ऐन २०१७ को दफा ९ (क) अनुसारका सम्पूर्ण मुद्दाहरू फिर्ता लिने निर्णय भयो। नेपाली कांग्रेसले त्यसै दिन एक प्रेस वक्तव्य प्रकाशित गरी बहुदलीय नेताहरूबाट मन्त्री मण्डल बनाउने कुरामा श्री ५ सहमत होई बक्सेको कुरा बतायो।^{९५}

बैशाख २ गते नेपाल राजकीयप्रज्ञाप्रतिष्ठान भवनमा श्री ५ को सरकार (पशुपति समशेर, अच्युतराज रेग्मी, श्रीभद्रशर्मा, केशरबहादुर विष्ट, पद्म सुन्दर लावती) र विपक्षीहरू (योग प्रसाद उपाध्याय, दमन ढुङ्गाना, निलाम्बर आचार्य, कृष्णराज बर्मा) बीच वार्ता शुरू भयो। वार्तामा विपक्षीहरूले पञ्चायत तुरुन्त भङ्ग गरिनु पर्ने, र राजाबाट अन्तरिम सरकारको तुरुन्त घोषणा हुनुपर्ने माँग राखेकाले वार्ता ठोस निर्णयमा पुग्न नसकेपछि श्री ५ को सरकारका प्रतिनिधिहरू वार्तास्थलबाट हिँड्न खोजे तर वार्ता स्थल बाहिर रहेको जनताको विशाल भीडले उनीहरूलाई भाग्न दिएन। श्री ५ को सरकार प्रतिनिधिहरू बिना निर्णय वार्ता छाड्दैछन् भन्ने थाहा पाएपछि जनताले पञ्चायतका सबै अङ्ग खारेज गर्ने, अन्तरिम सरकार तुरुन्त बनाउने माँगहरू राख्दै तीब्र रूपले रातभर प्रज्ञा भवनलाई घेरी नाराबाजी र जुलुश प्रदर्शन गरीरहे।

त्यसको भोलिपल्ट बिहान श्री५बाट शाहीघोषणा भयो जसमा राष्ट्रिय पञ्चायत र यस अन्तर्गतका वर्गीय संगठनहरू एवं पञ्चायतनीति तथा जाँचबुझ समिति भङ्ग गरी लोकेन्द्र

बहादुर चन्दले प्र.मं.बाट राजिनामा दिएको कुरा उल्लेख थियो।^{९४}

बैशाख ४ गते राजाबाट गणेशमान सिंहलाई दर्शनभेट बक्सी अन्तरिम सरकारको नेतृत्वगर्न हुकुम भयो। तर गणेशमान सिंहले स्वास्थ्यको कारण देखाई आफु प्रधानमन्त्री हुननसक्ने कुरा दर्शाउँदै नेपाली कांग्रेसका कार्यवाहक अध्यक्ष कृष्णप्रसाद भट्टराईको नाम पेश गर्नु भयो। उहाँले भट्टराई माथि बाममोर्चाको पनि सदाशयतारहने कुरा राजासँग जाहेर गर्नुभयो।^{९५}

बैशाख ६ गते नेपाली कांग्रेसबाट ४ जना, बाममोर्चाबाट ३ जना, स्वतन्त्र २ जना र राजाबाट २ जना गरी जम्मा ११ सदस्यीय मन्त्रीमण्डल गठन भएको र लोकेन्द्रबहादुर चन्दको राजिनामा स्वीकृत गरिएको कुरा राजदरवारको प्रमुख संवाद सचिवालयको विज्ञप्तिमा उल्लेख भयो।^{९६}

सो विज्ञप्ति अनुसार मन्त्री परिषदमा निम्न व्यक्तिहरू सम्मिलित थिए:-

१. श्री कृष्णप्रसाद भट्टराई - प्रधानमन्त्री, राजदरवार, रक्षा र परराष्ट्र।
२. श्रीमती सहाना प्रधान - मन्त्री, उद्योग र वाणिज्य
३. श्री केशरजङ्ग रायमाझी - मन्त्री, शिक्षा तथा संस्कृति र सामान्य प्रशासन।
४. श्री अच्युतराज रेग्मी - मन्त्री, आवास तथा भौतिक योजना।
५. श्री महेन्द्रनारायण निधि - मन्त्री, जलश्रोत तथा स्थानीय विकास।
६. श्री योगप्रसाद उपाध्याय - मन्त्री, गृह र सञ्चार।
७. श्री निलाम्वर आचार्य - मन्त्री, कानून तथा न्याय श्रम तथा सामाजिक कल्याण र पर्यटन।
८. श्री मार्सल जुलुम शाक्य - मन्त्री, आपूर्ति, निर्माण तथा यातायात।
९. श्री भलनाथ खनाल - मन्त्री, कृषि भूमिसुधार तथा व्यवस्था र वन तथा भू-संरक्षण।
१०. श्री देवेन्द्रराज पाण्डे - मन्त्री, अर्थ।
११. श्री मथुराप्रसाद श्रेष्ठ - मन्त्री, स्वास्थ्य।^{९७}

निष्कर्ष:

२०४६ सालको जन आन्दोलनको घटना-विवरण दिएर त्यसबाट पनि केही मात्रामा आन्दोलनका कारण र प्रभावलाई पत्ता लगाउन सहयोगपुग्ने छ भन्ने आशा राखिएको छ। देशको राजनीतिक व्यवस्थाको संरचना र कार्यमा आउने शिथिलता, विकृति र असक्षमतालाई हटाई जनताको बढ्दो चाहनासँग आफुलाई सामञ्जस्य गर्न नसक्दा त्यसप्रति नकारात्मक प्रवृत्ति देखापर्ने गर्दछ। सामाजिक मूल्यहरू (जो शक्तिको प्रयोगबाट असन्तुष्ट हुन्छन्) र राजनीतिक मूल्यहरू बीच असन्तुलन हुन जान्छ र स्थायित्वलाई प्रभाव पार्दछ। हाम्रो जस्तो बहुजातीय सांस्कृतिक संरचना भएको देशमा शक्तिको पृथक्करणहुनुको साटो त्यसको केन्द्रीकरण (शक्ति प्राप्ति, हस्तान्तरण र प्रयोग) भएमा राज्यशक्तिको आधार बलियो हुन सक्तैन। व्यवस्थाले बैधानिकताको आधारका रूपमा केही

जनसहभागिता प्राप्त गरे तापनि त्यसलाई राजनीतिक संरचनाले सम्पूर्ण रूपमा स्विकार्न नसकेमा राष्ट्रिय सहमतिको वातावरण तयारहुन सक्तैन भन्ने कुरा पञ्चायती प्रयोगले स्पष्ट गर्‍यो। पञ्चायती शासनमा समाजमा विभिन्न प्रकारका असंतुष्टिहरू बढ्दै गए। त्यस्तो परिस्थितिमा देशभित्र जनआन्दोलन शुरू भयो र अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय वातावरणले पनि आन्दोलनलाई नै सहयोग पुऱ्याएकाले आन्दोलनले आन्तरिक र अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय बैधानिकता प्राप्त गर्न सजिलो पऱ्‍यो। पञ्चायतको विरोधमा आन्दोलन ५० दिनसम्म चल्यो र देशभित्र विभिन्न घटनाहरू घटे। पञ्चायतले यो आन्दोलन दबाउन सकेन बरू पञ्चायतको लागि यो जन आन्दोलन यस्तो रोग भयो जस्तो अन्त्य शरीरको अन्त्य संगै भएर गयो।

टिप्पणी

१. गोरखापत्र, फागुन ८, २०४६, पृष्ठ ७।
२. ऋषिकेश शाह, "मोभमेण्ट १९९०" मेडीयानेपाल (अग्रेजी मासिक) अगस्त १९९० पृ १४।
३. न्यूजलेटर (अग्रेजी बुलेटिन) नेपाल फोन्युम फर प्रोटेक्सन अफ ह्यूम्यान राईट, फेब्रुअरी १९, १९९० पृ २।
४. समाज दैनिक फागुन ९, २०४९ पृ
५. ऐजन
६. पूर्ववत पृ १५
७. विद्यार्थी समाचार (अनेरास्ववियू पाँचौ) प्रकाशन विभाग आन्दोलन बुलेटिन फागुन २२, २०५६
८. 'प्रजातन्त्रका लागि जनताको आन्दोलन जारी छ,' भित्तेपात्रो ने.क.पा.माले २०४७।
९. गोरखापत्र, फागुन ९, २०४६,
१०. ऐजन, फागुन १०, २०५६,
११. संघर्ष, जनसंघर्ष प्रचार कमिटी, प्ररामञ्च अड्क २ फागुन १५, २०४६
१२. नेपाली आवाज, फागुन १९, २०४६
१३. विद्यार्थी समाचार, पूर्ववत
१४. समाज दैनिक, फागुन २१, २०४६
१५. संघर्ष बुलेटीन, फागुन १९, २०४६
१६. साप्ताहिक विमर्श, फागुन २०, २०४६
१७. समाज दैनिक, फागुन २१, २०४६
१८. संघर्ष बुलेटीन, फागुन २०, २०४६
१९. नेपाली आवाज, फागुन २६, २०४६
२०. संघर्ष बुलेटीन, पूर्ववत

२१. गोरखापत्र, फागुन २३, २०४६, पृ. ३
२२. समाज दैनिक, फागुन २१, २०४६
२३. नेपाली आवाज, फागुन २६, २०४६
२४. समाज दैनिक, फागुन २३, २०४६
२५. साप्ताहिक विमर्श, चैत्र १०, २०४६
२६. संघर्ष बुलेटिन, फागुन २४, २०४६
२७. देशान्तर साप्ताहिक, फागुन १८, २०४६
२८. नेपाली कांग्रेस तथा संयुक्त वाममोर्चाको आह्वानमा गरिने जन आन्दोलन सम्बन्धी कार्यक्रम भन्ने नेपाली कांग्रेसको पर्चा र "चैत्र १ गते नेपाल बन्द पारौ" भन्ने अनेरास्ववियूको पर्चा।
२९. साप्ताहिक विमर्श, फागुन २६, २०४६
३०. ऐजन
३१. संघर्ष बुलेटिन, फागुन २८, २०४६
३२. समाज दैनिक, फागुन २८, २०४६
३३. ऐजन
३४. ऐजन
३५. संघर्ष बुलेटिन, चैत्र १, २०४६
३६. समाजदैनिक, चैत्र १, २०४६
३७. डायरी साप्ताहिक, चैत्र ४, २०४६
३८. समाज दैनिक, चैत्र ४, २०४६.
३९. देशान्तर साप्ताहिक, चैत्र ५, २०४६।
४०. संघर्ष बुलेटिन, चैत्र ६, २०४६
४१. समाज दैनिक, चैत्र ८, २०४६.
४२. ऐजन
४३. त्यो बेलाको प्रत्यक्ष दर्शीको रूपमा यो विवरणकार आफै रहेको।
४४. संघर्ष बुलेटिन, चैत्र ९, २०४६
४५. साप्ताहिक विमर्श, चैत्र १०, २०४६.
४६. समाज दैनिक, चैत्र १०, २०४६.
४७. डायरी साप्ताहिक, चैत्र १२, २०४६.
४८. देशान्तर साप्ताहिक, चैत्र १२, २०४६
४९. संघर्ष बुलेटिन, चैत्र ९, २०४६,
५०. साप्ताहिक नेपाली आवाज, चैत्र १७, २०४६.
५१. संघर्ष बुलेटिन, चैत्र १३, २०४६.

५२. डायरी साप्ताहिक, चैत्र १३, २०४६.
५३. समाज दैनिक, चैत्र १४, २०४६.
५४. समिक्षा साप्ताहिक, चैत्र, २०४६.
५५. समाज दैनिक, चैत्र १५, २०४६.
५६. संघर्ष बुलेटिन, चैत्र १६, २०४६.
५७. नेपाली आवाज, चैत्र ३१, २०४६
५८. दृष्टि साप्ताहिक, चैत्र २६, २०४६.
५९. साप्ताहिक विमर्श, चैत्र १७, २०४६.
६०. समीक्षा साप्ताहिक, चैत्र १७, २०४६.
६१. साप्ताहिक विमर्श, चैत्र १६, २०४६.
६२. संघर्ष बुलेटिन, चैत्र १६, २०४६.
६३. समाज दैनिक, चैत्र १९, २०४६.
६४. संघर्ष बुलेटिन, चैत्र १८, २०४६
६५. समाज दैनिक चैत्र २०, २०४६.
६६. ऐजन
६७. युगसम्वाद साप्ताहिक, चैत्र २३, २०४६.
६८. संघर्ष बुलेटिन, चैत्र २०, २०४६.
६९. समाज दैनिक, चैत्र २३, २०४७.
७०. युग सम्वाद साप्ताहिक, चैत्र २३, २०४६.
७१. गोरखापत्र, चैत्र २५, २०४६.
७२. द वासीङ्गटन पोष्ट, (अंग्रेजी दैनिक) अप्रिल ७, (चैत्र १५) १९९०.
७३. गोरखापत्र, चैत्र २५, २०४६.
७४. प्रजातन्त्रको उदय, फ्योरूम फर प्रोटेक्सन अफ राइट, नेपालमा जनक्रान्ती पृ ५७.
७५. इण्डीया छडे, (हिन्दी दैनिक) अप्रिल ३०, १९९०
७६. प्रजातन्त्रको उदय, पूर्ववत पृ ५९
७७. समाज दैनिक, चैत्र २७, २०४६.
७८. ऐजन.
७९. चन्द्र प्रकाश मैनालीसंगको अन्तवार्ता, साप्ताहिक विमर्श, बैशाख १४, २०४७.
८०. शाहा, पूर्ववत पृ. ५९
८१. गोरखापत्र, चैत्र २७, २०४६
८२. प्रजातन्त्रको उदय, पूर्ववत पे. ८४.
८३. समाजदैनिक, चैत्र ३०, २०४६
८४. युग सम्वाद, चैत्र ३०, २०४६.

८५. प्रजातन्त्रको उदय, पूर्ववत पृ ९६। सचित्र.
८६. गोरखापत्र, चैत्र २८, २०४६
८७. ऐजन.
८८. समीक्षा, चैत्र ३१, २०४६
८९. गोरखापत्र, चैत्र २९, २०४६
९०. ऐजन
९१. नेपाली आवाज, चैत्र ३१, २०४६
९२. गोरखापत्र, चैत्र २९, २०४६
९३. ऐजन
९४. ऐजन
९५. साप्ताहिक विमर्श, वैशाख ७, २०४७
९६. गोरखापत्र, वैशाख, ७, २०४७
९७. ऐजन

REVIEW ARTICLE

Three Decades and Two Kings (1960 - 1990): Eclipse of Nepal's Partyless Monarchic Rule. 1990. Rishikesh Shaha. Sterling Publishers, New Delhi. Pages v + 128. Price IRs. 150.

Politics in Nepal 1980 - 1991: Referendum, Stalemate and Triumph of People Power. Third revised edition, 1993. Rishikesh Shaha. Manohar Publishers, Delhi. Pages xiv + 344. Price IRs. 320.

Pratyoush R. Onta

Panchayat's Three Decades

The first book under review here is a collection of Shaha's various essays organized in four chapters. In the first chapter, which runs for 46 pages (thus constituting half of the main text excluding the appendix), he provides a broad historical overview of the three decades (1960 - 1990) of Panchayat rule in Nepal. Those readers who are familiar with the pathology of Panchayat's thirty years will find very little that is new here. Prefaced by a brief discussion of the various political experiments of the 1950s, Shaha says that after the Royal takeover of 1960 (when Nepal's first experiment with democracy met an unceremonious end), King Mahendra devised the panchayat system "in an attempt to create a simulation of democratic administration" (p. 5). But what was often described as a 'tiered democracy' was actually a system in which the "actual number of votes that could theoretically send a candidate up through the system to a seat in the Rastriya Panchayat was ludicrously small by the standards of representative democracy as understood elsewhere" (p. 5). Political parties were not allowed to function because they were thought to be inherently divisive, faction-oriented and incapable of playing "an integrative role in the Nepali context" (p. 6). Various measures adopted by King Mahendra to promote national unity and integration and to expand Nepal's foreign relations are mentioned briefly.

In 1972, King Birendra succeeded his father who died of a heart attack and the first four years of his rule were "characterised by a perceptible rise in acts of both governmental and popular violence accompanied by waves of unrest among students and peasants" (p. 10). These incidents are mentioned but

briefly. Nevertheless he writes that they provided the "immediate background to the 1975 second amendment to the constitution of Nepal" (p. 10), which in its main body, incorporated the role and functions of the Back-to-the-Village National Campaign (BVNC). Shaha writes that the machinery and operational procedures of BVNC "resembled those of a political party" (p. 17), in this case, the King's Party. The BVNC contained a "scheme for evaluation of the worth of social workers as a means of making the people realise that the criterion of acting as popular representatives in future would be their actual contribution to the success of development programmes for their region of locality" (p. 16-17). As another official organ aimed at promoting popular participation, Shaha writes that the BVNC was "foredoomed to failure" because that task "could be secured only with the help of non-official and purely people-oriented agencies" (p. 17). The second amendment to the constitution also made provision for a Commission for the Prevention of the Abuse of Power (CPAP) which although "it looked like the institution of the ombudsman in some democratic states" was in reality a watchdog committee for the King "to check whether the people in various elective and appointive positions were acting in a manner prejudicial to the accepted practice and tradition of the monarch's rule by peremptory command" (p. 18).

The BVNC became one of the first victims of the 1979 popular agitation led by the students. As the situation worsened, King Birendra announced (on 24 May 1979) a referendum in which he said "all eligible citizens will be asked to vote on one of two choices: whether we should retain the present panchayat system with suitable reforms or whether we should set up a multiparty system of government" (quoted in p. 19). But Shaha states that the elaboration contained in King Birendra's message of 16 December 1979 substantially modified the choice offered originally. Irrespective of the results, the King specified that the members to the legislature would be elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, the legislature would recommend the appointment of the Prime Minister, and the cabinet would be responsible to the legislature.

As is well known, the results of the referendum which was held on 2 May 1980 were in favour of the "reformed" panchayat system (with about 55% of valid votes for it as opposed to 45% for the multiparty system). The small "victory" margin looks even less impressive when you consider, as Shaha does, the fact that the voting age was not reduced to 18 from 21 as was popularly demanded. Thus many of this age group (18-20) who had played a role in the student movement that brought about the referendum "were debarred by the electoral law from being enrolled as voters" (p. 22). In its effort to ensure that victory, the Panchayat government of Surya Bahadur

Thapa forgot about the "serious economic crisis facing the nation" (p. 23). Shaha identifies the following as the consequences of this neglect: the undeclared planned holiday for the fiscal year 1980-81, unbridled inflation, the worsening unfavourable balance of trade, and loss of self-sufficiency in food production. On the other hand, corruption was placed "on the high pedestal of a 'new value' of national life and culture" (p. 23).

The third amendment to the constitution of Nepal which was announced later that year maintained the King's "authority to rule by peremptory command," made room for a parliamentary form as mere "window-dressing," continued the ban on political parties, and denied, as before, the people of Nepal "the right to freedom of association" (p. 26-30). Even the independence of organisations with a non-political agenda was severely circumscribed by the requirement that they operate under the wings of the Social Services National Coordination Council (SSNCC) headed by Queen Aishwarya. While ostensibly the SSNCC aimed to coordinate the welfare activities of various social organizations, its "rigid control mechanisms" squashed the "promotion of broad-based, effective assistance programmes for the needy" (p. 32).¹

Shaha then makes brief comments on the 1981 and 1986 elections (readers will find separate chapter-length discussions on these elections in Shaha's other book under review here) and looks at the "reformed panchayat legislature at work" (p. 34 - 38). In a brief section on economic development, he writes that "[a] basic needs strategy is inherently revolutionary" and argues that "freedom of association or organisation is a *sine qua non* of development" where "[g]enuine involvement by the people in decision-making through organisations of their own choice" can happen. He concludes this chapter with a short description of the 1985 bombings in Nepal and a note on the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) which, despite its shortcomings at present, is "but a necessary means to the ultimate realisation of the ideal of regional cooperation in the real sense" (p. 45).

The second chapter is a brief evaluation of Nepal's economy over the three decades of Panchayat rule. It begins by stating what is generally known: "the partyless panchayat system has failed to use efficiently the human and material resources available for Nepal's economic development" (p. 47). Shah then goes on to retell, based on various published reports, the many dismal records of the regime with respect to the economy Nepal is the only South Asian country with an average negative growth between 1960 and 1982. It has a per capita income of mere U.S. \$150 in 1986, a highly skewed pattern of income distribution in favour of the rich, a Kathmandu-centric growth of public utilities and services, decline in foodgrain production per

capita, and more generally, the negative results of investment in agricultural development. The failure of land-reform measures, burgeoning trade and budget deficits and foreign debt, and "unproductive expenditure on the overblown army and police force" all contribute to a future scenario that is truly dismal even in the South Asian context. The 34-page appendix found in this book – the "White Paper on the State of the Economy in Nepal" – brought out on 25 May 1990 by the Finance Minister of the Interim Government, Mr. Devendra Raj Pandey provides further details.

The third chapter contains reprints of five of Shaha's short essays published previously in various Indian newspapers during the 1980s on different aspects of Nepal-India relations. The first two were written during the trade imbroglio of 1989-1990 when in the absence of any valid trade and transit treaties between India and Nepal, the former closed most of the transit routes into the latter, thereby causing inordinate hardships to the common people of Nepal. In the first piece reprinted here from *The Statesman* of 30 August 1989, Shaha berates Panchayati rulers for putting all the blame for the trade impasse, including for their own failures, on India, and for using it "as a shield against the internal pressure which has been slowly and steadily building up for greater democracy and human rights in Nepal" (p. 61). In the second essay (reprinted from *The Indian Express* of 24 June 1989), he states that as a landlocked country Nepal is "quite justified in asking for two separate treaties of trade and transit" (p. 62). He writes that the delay in signing the concerned treaties shows that "there is a lack of basic political understanding and credibility between the two Governments" (p. 63) and blames the Nepali authorities for trying to bring international pressure on India when quiet diplomacy was the need of the hour.

The third essay is reprinted from *The Times of India* of 3 September 1986. Shaha writes that concrete terms of understanding between the two countries can only be worked out in bilateral treaties. However, King Birendra's proposal that Nepal be declared a zone of peace had received enough international support for it to become such a prestige issue for Nepal that it was in the interest of India to make "some sort of brief declaration supporting Nepal's peace zone proposal in principal without prejudice to the existing understanding and treaty on cooperation in respect of mutual security and development" (p. 67). He also argues that "in view of nascent Nepali nationalism and the pattern of international economic cooperation brought about by the worldwide technological revolution" and much else that has happened since its signing, the two governments should review the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and do what is required "to ensure everlasting peace and friendship" (p. 67-70). In the remaining two essays, written in 1984 and 1981 respectively, Shaha argues, among other things, for the

lessening of mutual fear and suspicion, a frank appraisal of "the entire gamut of bilateral relations" (p. 77), and greater cooperation between the two countries in the economic sphere.

The fourth and last chapter is about monarchy in Nepal. Brief sections devoted to "King Mahendra's political innovations" and "kingship in vedic and sanskrit literature" are followed by a discussion of the movement that put an end to the "tradition of rule by peremptory command" and restored "democracy and human rights" in Nepal (readers should again note that this subject is covered in more detail in the second book). Talking about the future of the monarchy in Nepal, Shaha writes that it is in its permanent interest to recognize that in democracy sovereignty resides in the people. Shaha adds that if King Birendra "endorses his grandfather's solemn commitment to the people in some form or the other and endeavours sincerely to fulfill it, Nepal may have stable and ordered progress as a nation" (p. 92).

Overall, it must be noted that what Shaha has to say in chapters one and four are repeated at greater length in his second book under review here. Therefore, the only reason one might want to read this book is to learn Shaha's views on Panchayat's economic performance (an analysis which is derivative) and on matters related to Nepal-India relations (a chapter of reprints). While those new to Nepal studies might benefit from this book, old hands will find it difficult to justify buying it.

The Transition to Multiparty Democracy

The first edition of the second book under review here was published as *Essays in the Practice of Government in Nepal* in 1982. The then Panchayat government headed by Surya Bahadur Thapa arbitrarily confiscated about 200 copies of it after some copies had been sold in the book market of Kathmandu. In that incarnation, this book contained a total of nine essays. Two of these essays that dealt with pre-Rana politics and Jung Bahadur were omitted in the second revised edition published in 1990 as *Politics in Nepal 1980-1990* with the same subtitle as the third edition under review here. In addition, the opening essay, entitled "Elitism in Nepali Politics" was shortened, deleting Shaha's discussion of elitism in modern political and social theory, and appeared as "Monarchy in Nepal" in the second edition. This and the following essay "Patrimonial Elites of Nepal" provided a historical background to the subsequent nine essays, four of which were new, of the second edition. In the main, these essays charted the decade of Panchayat politics between the Referendum of 1980 and its demise in 1990.

The third revised edition contains all of the eleven essays of the second and three new ones. It also contains a brief epilogue, and as appendices, the texts

of the three separate Treaty of Transit, Treaty of Trade, and Agreement of Co-operation between HMG of Nepal and the Government of India to control unauthorized trade signed between the two countries on December 6, 1991.

I will not review the essays reprinted from the second edition for two reasons. First because they are well-known. Second, because their main thrust has already been covered in chapter one – which I have summarized above at some length – of the first book. They recount, in somewhat greater detail, the events leading up to the 1980 referendum and its aftermath, the third amendment to the Panchayat Constitution, the 1981 and the 1986 elections to the Rastriya Panchayat, and Panchayati politics during the second half of the 1980s. They also describe King Birendra's efforts to declare Nepal as a Zone of Peace, the human rights situation in Nepal during the old regime and the movement that led to the restoration of multi-party democracy in the country. I will return to this last essay in the concluding section of this review.

The first of the three new essays of the third edition charts out the political life of the Interim Coalition Government (April 1990-May 1991) consisting of representatives of the Nepali Congress and United Left Front and headed by Mr. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai. Shaha credits this government for having successfully carried out the three fundamental tasks assigned to it: "(1) the restoration of the status quo ante to 1 April 1987 with regard to trade and transit facilities through negotiations with India, (2) the promulgation of a constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights of freedom and the rule of law, parliamentary form of government, constitutional monarchy and independence of the judiciary, and (3) the holding of elections by the end of mid-May 1991 at the latest" (p. 228).

As far as the first task is concerned, Shaha credits Mr. Bhattarai's visit to India at the invitation of the then Indian Prime Minister Mr. V. P. Singh in June 1990 for having immediately set the relationship that had gone sour over trade and transit issues back on the proper track he says that the joint communique issued at the end of this visit was "more than a routine formality for several reasons" (p. 229). For one thing, in terms of trade and transit facilities, it became the basis to restore the status quo ante to 1 April 1987. The subsequent visit of Mr. Chandra Shekhar to Nepal in February 1991 in his capacity as the Prime Minister of India and the high-level task force set up to explore "comprehensive economic relationship on a mutually advantageous basis" (p. 231) have, according to Shaha, set up the relationship in terms more favourable to Nepal than before.

Shaha then narrates the various *tamashas* leading up to the promulgation of the new constitution on 9 November 1990 and then proceeds to analyse the document. Using as his examples the ambiguity involved in issues such

as the King's power to revoke the constitution and declare a state of emergency, Shaha declares that the document is "a good constitution that could be better." Further examples given include what appear as restrictions to rights to equality, freedom and press, religion and right against preventive detention. As the position of the Hindu King is safeguarded elsewhere in the constitution, Shaha says that there was no reason for calling Nepal a Hindu state in part one. This, he says, not only has "the effect of rubbing religious minorities the wrong way," but also "militates against the principle and practice of separation of Religion and the State" (p. 242).

Shaha also has a short section on what he calls "discrimination against sex." Here he only raises the citizenship issue whereby children of male citizens of Nepal are Nepali citizens by descent whereas children of female citizens can only claim this status after 15 years of residence in Nepal. Shaha makes no comment on the fact that the Constitution Recommendations Commission consisting of nine members did not include a single woman. Nor does he mention how even as the Constitution states that "the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on the grounds of sex" (p. 240), it paid *no* attention to concerns regarding equal inheritance to family property for men and women, raised from various quarters while the document was being prepared. Moreover, Shaha does not mention the fact that during public deliberations prior to the writing of this important document, certain sections of the Nepali political spectrum has questioned the process itself and called for the election of a constitution assembly that would be responsible for framing the constitution.

In the final section of this essay, Shaha gives a brief account of the parliamentary election of 12 May 1991 and tabulates the performance of the various parties. In talking about the deficiencies in the conduct of the elections, he praises the work of the Human Rights Organisation of Nepal (with which he is associated) for having properly raised issues regarding voters lists and code of conduct of political parties. Commenting on the elections, Shaha says they were fought on "vague notions attributed to the two mainstream parties by their adversaries." While the Congress represented the Communists as "the party of atheists and godless persons drawing their inspiration from foreign countries," the Communists reciprocated by projecting the Congress "as the party favoured by the Indians and the Americans and likely to surrender the country's independence and sovereignty to them" (p. 248). Shaha does not say a word about how *both* parties made unreal development promises to their voters, and certainly there is no reason to excuse such practice as "natural" – as some other analysts tend to do – to the rhetorical exigencies of electoral politics in a democracy. Finally, he says that the trend towards the evolution of the two party system as evidenced in

the 1991 elections "must be regarded as healthy and satisfactory...from the point of view of the growth and stability of the democratic system" (p.248). Why this is necessarily the case is not spelt out.

In the second new essay entitled "Formation of the Post-election Government" the author tells his readers that it is too early "to assess objectively the performance of the post-election government and parliament" and thus he has just reproduced some "skeletal information about them and their activities, as furnished by Mr. Mahesh Chandra Regmi's Weekly Nepal Digest" (p. 249). True to his word, the whole chapter is a boring list of names of cabinet ministers and national assembly members, a long quote from King Birendra's July 1 1991 address to the joint session of the House of Representatives and the National Assembly, and extracts from editorial comments on the speech by various Nepali newspapers. The issue of the language problem raised when some members of the Assembly and the House chose to speak in Hindi is mentioned without much analysis or commentary from Shaha. Some of the highlights of the budget presented to the Parliament on July 11, 1991, are given with a comment that the budget for 1991-92 shows a "remarkable increase in expenditure on the army and the police" (p. 260) as compared with the budget of the previous fiscal year presented by the Bhattarai-led government.

In the last chapter Shaha briefly describes the outcome of Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala's trip to India in early December, 1991. Signing of the memorandum of understanding between the governments of Nepal and India for setting up the B. P. Koirala India-Nepal Foundation is taken by Shaha to be a "fitting recognition of the valuable services rendered by him [B. P.] to the cause of democracy in both the countries" (p. 261). In terms of other achievements of the visit, it is mentioned that separate treaties for trade (for five years) and transit (for seven years) were signed. Assurances given by Koirala to those interested in private investment and joint ventures in Nepal, and his willingness to engage in "major multipurpose water-resource development projects on the basis of bilateral cooperation" (p. 263) are mentioned. Reference is also made to the criticism by Koirala's adversaries regarding the statement that "there would be no arms purchase from China in the future" (p. 263). The texts of the joint press statement, the memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of agriculture, and the memorandum regarding the B. P. Foundation are given.² A brief note on the 1991 SAARC Summit held in Colombo and another one on major cabinet reshuffles in Nepal are also included.

Open differences between Koirala and the Congress Supreme Leader Ganesh Man Singh regarding ambassadorial and other appointments and the subsequent peacemaking role played by Nepali Congress President Bhattarai

are also mentioned. Shaha does not tell us his own opinion on this issue. He could have asked for instance, if Mr. Singh was justified in raising the "favouritism and nepotism" (p. 276) issue with respect to the appointments. Or more generally, what are the criteria by which such appointments are supposed to be made? To this reviewer's knowledge, Mr. Singh never openly discussed such criteria himself and engaged in Koirala-bashing from a platform which simply proclaimed "my men were not selected by Girija"! In the absence of publicly declared criteria, the process of appointments under multi-party democracy did not look one bit different than those of the much maligned Panchayat era.

As these three new essays were written before the Congress session in Jhapa in early 1992 and before Tanakpur became a hot issue, I cannot blame Shaha for not analysing these as significant political events in Nepal during 1992 (see p. 277-8 for some of his speculation regarding the Jhapa congress). Written immediately after the major events of 1990-91, his new essays seem to meet the publisher's desire to have an updated "blow by blow" account of the transition to democracy in Nepal, rather than present us with a sustained analysis of the process. While some important questions are raised in the first new essay regarding the constitution, the other two leave a lot to be desired. As they stand now, these essays are generally disappointing, and those who own the second edition of the book will not find much reason to buy this third edition.

Now some comments on Shaha's earlier essay on the "Movement for the Restoration of Democracy" reprinted from the second edition. Shaha writes that on 6 April 1990 – "the climatic day of the protest movement" – "The Kathmandu valley people were on the move, the inhabitants of Kirtipur amongst the most militant, *seeking to avenge the amputation of noses 225 years ago by the King's forefather* (p. 207-8; emphasis added). It is unclear to me on what basis Shaha imputes such intentionality to the protesters from Kirtipur. Interviews with these protesters might provide us with clues to make such a claim but such a method of inquiry is not Shaha's forte. It is worth asking if and how Prithvinarayan Shaha's atrocities are preserved in the public memory of the inhabitants of Kirtipur, and if it had any influence on the positive agenda of protest participants from Kirtipur on that day of April 1990.

The second point is related to the time when Patan was under siege (the last days of March 1990). Shaha writes, "men of Patan sent to men of Kathmandu a quantity of women's bangles and of tassels for the ends of women's braided hair with the insulting implication that Kathmandu men had lost their manhood" (p. 203). No further comments on this act are forthcoming from the author. To this reviewer it seems that even in the

climatic moments of political protest, gender oppression remained *outside* the agenda of protest. The above act, supposedly perpetrated to insult the inactivity of Kathmandu's men protesters, is insulting to *all* women of Nepal. If some three years after the end of the old regime we wonder why the culture of elite politics has not made much difference to many forms of oppression in our country, it might be worth our while to ponder further on how supposed revolutions leave old forms of skewed power relationships intact or remold them in new patterns.

The third point is related to the violence reported from various parts of the country during the last days of April, 1990, immediately after the installation of Bhattarai's interim government. Shaha writes how in Kathmandu "some vigilante groups rounded up and held captive people whom they considered to be acting suspiciously, and next morning 'excited mobs' attacked these 'people's prisoners'" (p.220). At least five persons were beaten to death and some of their bodies were taken around the city on a push cart in what this reviewer can only interpret as a macabre celebration of "people's power." In addition, Shaha mentions (relying on RSS reports) that six bodies of "policemen" were found in Teku, apparently victims of a mob that thought that they were "thugs disguised as police" (p. 221). Other incidences of public lynching are also mentioned by Shaha, but he does not suggest how we might interpret such crowd behaviour.

The fact of the matter is that several individuals suspected of being "thugs" were taken around the city of Kathmandu for many hours and lynched in daylight. While many watched, nobody intervened to save their lives. To me it is significant that no analyst thus far has examined these lynchings for their significance both for the political culture of democracy in Nepal, and more generally, for a social theory of violence in Nepal. What is it that allows people to be murdered in such a way? Why is it that such violence was tolerated by the same people who had only recently brought an end to a supposedly ruthless system? How is it that no one has been held accountable for these killings, just as no one has been punished for the murders perpetrated under the old regime? What is the relationship between such violence and the "criminalization of politics" that one hears a lot about for the case of South Asia? Do these killings constitute an aberration or are they evidence of deeply embedded violent tendencies in our society? Three years after these lynchings, when more than half a dozen separate incidences of security forces firing on public protest gatherings (resulting in the death of several dozen people) have been recorded, it might not be out of place to ask if the memory of these lynchings informs how our police forces react to mob situations today. Could it be that they consider being encircled by a mob as the end of their lives and therefore resort to firing? I think these questions

deserve more attention than they have thus far received.³

Also we might want to ask if democracy has "come" to the families of those lynched in the streets of the capital of the country? In a related context, Amrit Srinivasan has written: "It was in the production of a new kind of evidence, whose documentation would compensate for the unexplained 'residues' of rational history-writing, that the survivor proved crucial. As an ordinary member of society speaking from private memory and experience, the survivor furthermore provided a corrective to the understanding of history as an exclusively specialist activity." (1990: 307) Thus, talking to the families – the survivors of public lynching – might teach us a thing or two about our intellectual unwillingness and inability to understand violence. Moreover, as Srinivasan has written, it "is from the epistemological space that the survivor occupies that we can perhaps interrogate the exact nature of the relation between society and state" (1990:320).⁴

Finally I want to raise an issue regarding the field of analysis that political science writings in Nepal encompass using Shaha's above books as examples. It would be fair to say that Shaha, while writing within the traditional turf of political science or history (see Shaha 1990), has always chosen to write about elite politics as the only legitimate subject of his inquiry. For him, political and historical writing means talking about the politics of those in power or those knocking in the doors of power (either legitimate or banned oppositions depending on which era of Nepali history he is talking about) at Kathmandu. In all of his works, Shaha equates the politics of this elite level unproblematically to the *politics of Nepal*. It is this perspective that, is the weakest aspect of *all* of Shaha's works. Politics not centered in Kathmandu and the linkages between politics at the centre and "local" levels remain uncomfortably outside his purview and therefore outside his *Politics of Nepal*.⁵

Lest I be accused of having raised this issue only from the position of an armchair academic, I give the following extract from an interview I conducted over the course of two days in Galyang (Shangja district) in July, 1992. At the end of an interview whose main focus was a different topic somewhat, I asked my interviewee (name withheld), a man in his fifties, what he thought about the transition from Panchayat to a multiparty democracy in Nepal. He told me (my translation from Nepali):

I have not been able to see this [transition thing] very clearly. It seems like the [new] leaders are searching for their shares of the spoils. They know their problems, and we know ours....Money comes for certain projects. They put up a show and the rest... [gestures to indicate that they "eat" the rest]. National/local elections – we do not have to get excited. Those who occupy seats eat. For us

at the bottom life is like this.

The remoteness of Kathmandu and all the talk about multiparty democracy in that town that I had heard since returning from abroad in January, 1992, struck me in a way that my writing cannot adequately represent here (cf. Pandey 1991). The tasks for political analysts like Shaha is to be able to write about politics in such a way so that sentiments such as those expressed above are included in the "Politics of Nepal" centrally. This means that analysts abandon their obsession with politics at the centre and re-create their field of analysis (for political science as well as historical writings) in new, inclusive, and imaginative ways. Then perhaps scholars like Shaha can legitimately call their intellectual exercises "Politics of Nepal." Otherwise, equating politics centered in Kathmandu with the politics of Nepal would have dangerous long-term implications and scholars like Shaha will have made themselves complicit in a discourse of exclusion.⁶

Notes

1. This reviewer has some experience of dealing with the Youth Activities Coordination Committee (YACC), one of the six committees formed under SSNCC. As a member of the executive committee of a social organization based in Kathmandu between 1981 and 1984, I was required to meet with officials of the YACC on numerous occasions. On one such occasion in early 1984, immediately after my organization had published a year-book of its activities for the previous calendar year, I was chastised by the then President of YACC for thanking YACC in the year-book only in small print. Moreover, he asked me why, in my capacity as the editor, I had not requested a "message" from him for the same, and he proceeded to remind me that a previous editor had done so. So much for coordination! Volumes are waiting to be written on the saga of these six committees and more generally on "social work" in the Panchayat years.
2. For another view on India-Nepal relations after the Koirala government came to power, see Baral (1992).
3. A conversation with Kanak Mani Dixit convinced me that these questions were important.
4. For attempts to redress the shortcomings of what Srinivasan has called "rational history-writing" or what is more generally called social theory with respect to violence in South Asia, see Das (1990), Baxi (1991) and Pandey (1991) among others.
5. This weakness also pervades the "classics" of political science writing on Nepal. See, for example, Gupta (1964) and Joshi and Rose (1966). For a review of Shaha (1990) that does not question his focus on elite history

as the history of Nepal, see Thapa (1992/93). Khatri et al. (1992) have begun an effort to redress this situation, however partially, regarding political science writings on the "transition phase."

6. I wish to emphasize that my effort here has not been to denigrate Shaha (or other scholars), but to initiate a discussion in which specialists and others writing on Nepal can reconceptualize the field of knowledge that we have come to know as "political science."

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BOOK REVIEW

Development through Non-Governmental organizations in Nepal. 1991. Diwaker Chand. Institute for National Development Research and Social Services, Kathmandu. Pages 128. Price: US \$ 20/-.

In December of 1992, the Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI) issued a report entitled *The Potentials of Nepal NGOs*¹. This study sought to examine the present state of the nongovernment (NGO) sector in Nepal and assessed prospects for its future evolution as a major player in Nepal's socioeconomic development. It identified several important issues facing NGOs and pinpointed existing and potential problems. The growing responsibilities of Nepal's NGOs clearly call for prompt attention to these matters.

CECI's study found Nepal's NGO sector in a complex state. Since democracy, literally thousands of new NGOs have been established, and the governmental mechanism for regulating NGOs has been redefined. The overall credibility of the sector was found to be in jeopardy, since many of the new NGOs which are emerging are "opportunistic", with "self-interested motives"². Such organizations threaten to absorb development funds without delivering genuine efforts. Furthermore, the study identified weaknesses within the sector which need immediate attention if NGOs in Nepal are to capably assume the vast responsibilities expected of them in Nepal's future.

The NGO sector in Nepal is at a crucial point in its history. A Nepal's people, new democratic government, and the international aid community look to it as the key to sustainable and successful development, the sector itself is in the midst of drastic growth and changes. NGOs are challenged to assert a self-definition, to improve their ability to rise to heightened expectations, and, provided their new-found freedoms are sustained, to carve a productive niche in the development efforts of Nepal's democratic future.

Diwaker Chand's recent book, *Development Through Non-Governmental Organizations in Nepal* is a timely contribution to the present dialogue which examines the changing identity and role of NGOs in Nepal. Chand offers an overview of the growth and transformation of the NGO sector by combining a historical survey of social service organizations in Nepal with

his personal theoretical assertions. A former member of HMG's Social Service National Coordination Council (SSNCC), and the author of several books on Nepal's socioeconomic development³, Chand writes with both an insider's insight and an insider's bias.

The study is divided into six parts, covering a wealth of information in only 98 pages of text. Consequently, the work is more useful as a factual reference than as a source of conclusions or synthetic observations. This is not so much a comprehensive analysis as it is a plethora of facts. For those reading Chand's work in its English version, there is the significant obstacle of poor editing; at times, the reader is left to ponder rather unintelligible sentences.

Development Through Non-Governmental Organizations in Nepal begins with an effort to define the term "NGO", which, although it may seem a basic step, is a significant and controversial issue within Nepal's NGO community today. As a clear and accepted single definition does not yet exist, just about any organization can assume the title "NGO" and faces little challenge. Chand sees true development as a collective endeavour in which people's organizations-NGOs play an integral part. Unfortunately, however, he does not offer a very innovative approach to identifying them; he uses broad, trite phrases like "non-profit", "non -Governmental", and "committed to solidarity and justice". The inauthentic NGOs invading the sector can easily make their way around such terms.

Chand creates four possible categories in order to organize and classify a sector whose members perform many, very different, tasks. For the author an NGO in Nepal can be considered under one of these headings: "social service" NGO; professional research-oriented NGO; government-affiliated NGO; NGO directly attached to a government agency. A precious little elaboration and commentary are offered regarding the latter two categories, but Chand asserts that the "social service" NGO is far more useful for Nepal's needs than the professional, research groups. He argues that professional groups fail to establish crucial grassroots links and are ultimately not sustainable.⁴

A historical overview of social service organizations is offered in Parts Three and Four of the book. Perhaps the most interesting portion of this section is Chand's portrayal of SSNCC.

Most post-democracy writings on SSNCC are sharply critical of this former NGO and social service group regulating committee. Accusations ranging from improper appropriation of funds to politicized management of development funding abound. Many claim that the Council's main function was to protect the interests of the Panchayat Government and to monitor political threats. SSNCC is also said to have cultivated a serious dependency

upon development planning from the central authority and to have discouraged unity among different social service groups.⁵

Such observations are notably missing from Chand's assessment of history. His picture of the Council is rather favourable, and at times defensive. The Queen, as the head of the organization, is often accused of having grossly mismanaged it. Chand, however, praises her leadership and suggests that if there were problems with the Council, they were caused by its association with other bureaucratic offices within HMG. Since SSNCC was not an autonomous body, it had obligations to consult several other ministries before finally making decisions.

Chand views SSNCC as the primary instrument of institutionalization of the NGO sector, a step which he sees as crucial to the full evolution of nongovernmental assistance. In the democratic era, he writes, a council similar to the former SSNCC would be crucial to a smooth future. The only real reform he suggests is autonomous decision-making power.⁶

The author goes on to look at the People's Movement, and concludes by suggesting improvements upon current development practices. He calls for the maintenance of political neutrality among NGOs, but asserts that they must also be constantly politically aware. In general, he supports more freedom for the NGOs which populate the sector, but, as discussed, continues to support a governmental regulating body similar to SSNCC. While Chand's ideal picture requires reform, it nevertheless, retains some potentially damaging characteristics.

Like much of the contemporary literature on the subject, *Development Though Non-Governmental Organizations in Nepal* stresses the evolving importance of the NGO community as a catalyst for change—both socioeconomic and political. Chand's book emerges at a crucial time; hence his observations are well worth discussion and debate.

Notes

1. CECI. *The Potentials of Nepali NGOs*. Vol 1. Kathmandu: Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation, Dec. 1999.
2. CECI. 3.6.3.
3. Other works by Diwaker Chand include: *New Dimensions of Economic Development in Nepal* (1975); *Critical Appraisal of the Rural Economy of Nepal* (1976); *The Foreign Trade of Nepal* (1977); *Recent Trends of Economic Development in Nepal* (1978).
4. See also Chand, p. 83 for comments on SEARCH, a professional NGO in Kathmandu.

- 5 For two elaborations, see Maskey, Bishwa Keshar "Nongovernmental Organizations for Development: Search for a New Vision" 27-29 NGO Seminar, Kathmandu, p10. OR CECI report, endnote 1.
6. The newly-established NGO regulatory council, the Social Welfare Council, was established after the publication of Chand's recent book. The new council resembles SSNCC in function and composition.

- Anne M. Rademacher

BOOK REVIEW

People Power. 1992. Gopal Chitrakar. Kathmandu: Sita Chitrakar. Pages 197. Price Rupees 2000/US \$ 100.

Two hundred and twenty two years after Nepal came into existence as a nation state, there have been two bitter struggles for democracy and the restoration of human rights. The first popularly known as the Revolution of 1950-overthrew successfully the yoke of the 194 year-old autocratic Rana regime and the second, greatly inspired by people's movements in Eastern Europe helped bring down in April 1990, the much despised thirty year-old partyless Panchayat rule like the proverbial house of cards. For the first time in the nation's political history, hardline Communist parties of Nepal and the liberals of the Nepali Congress joined hands. For a common cause they came together for the first time. Democracy was restored after three decades.

The fight for democracy the second time round- better known as the Mass Movement - was a fierce, bloody and determined one. In just fifty days, the movement rocked the edifice of the Panchayat system right down to its very foundations. The people emerged victorious. Freedom dawned. Democracy arrived. The nation and its people, however, paid a heavy price in terms of the loss of human lives and destruction of property. The streets of Kathmandu, Patan and Bhaktapur turned into bloody battlefields; tear gas, gun smoke, bullets, shouts and screams of agony and pain rent the air. Pungent smell of burning tyres, streets and pavements littered with bricks and stones along with the bodies of the dead and dying were a common sight. A sight not easily forgotten. But liable to be forgotten all the same.

Gopal Chitrakar, the trained photo journalist, in his book *People Power* makes sure that the historic struggle is not forgotten. The photographs compiled in the publication record how tenacious the movement was and give a wide coverage of the most significant and dramatic moments of the mass uprising. By just flipping through the volume with its two hundred photographs on varied themes-and enlarged for effect-the mass movement suddenly comes alive. The sequentially arranged photographs read like a photo essay and is far more effective than what could be expressed in words. The photo documentation amply covers the historic movement, the struggle,

transfer of power during the interim period and the subsequent challenge to the elected government posed by the civil servants agitation. The photographs are also backed by a first person account of the movement by the author himself and gives a vivid insight into the risk a photo journalist encounters when actually in the field. The incident in Patan, especially, has a chilling, blood curdling effect.

It is evident that the photographs in the volume have been carefully and meticulously edited. Though they do not photographically document the event in its entirety, as to what happened in other parts of the country, it still provides a fairly comprehensive account of Nepal's fight for democracy and freedom. Though the volume in its preface gives the impression of being carefully edited, and proof read, glaring grammatical, typographical factual and structural errors both in the text and in the photo captions state otherwise. If the publication intends to go into second edition, the numerous errors will have to be seriously looked into.

Some sampling is given below:

may for my (p. iv) chates for chats (p.5) continous for continuous (p.12) sefety for safety (p.12) pusurge for upsurge (p.36) countrary for contrary (p.38) thier for their (p.77) clebrate for celebrate (p.70) Sing for Singh (p.71) yothful for youthful (p.93) overly for overtly (p.143) disbandes for disbanded (p.148) urgs for urges (p.149) consitution for constitution (p.155) democrati for democratic (p.170) left for right (p.176) Koriala for Koirala (p.178) use for us (p. 187) Suprime for Supreme (p. 187), 1942 for 1985 (p. 188) world for word (p. 190) choose for chose (p.192) befor for before (p.195) burn for burnt (p.63) vctims for victims (p.65) commmission for commission (p.162) counducted for conducted, television for television, earthquak for earthquake (In the back flap of the publication.)

Errors of punctuation are too numerous to list.

It is common knowledge that the fight for freedom and its ultimate success was due to the coming together of the Nepali Congress and the hardline Communist parties of Nepal. But the photographs clearly show the Congress trio hogging the limelight, not to speak of the photos of the controversial and much talked about presence of the Indian leader Chandra Shekhar addressing the historic Nepali Congress Conference of January 18-20, 1990, occupying the strategic front pages of the volume. Even the three UML leaders' views, with photographs alongside that of the Congress trio at the end, fail to erase the impression that they only played second fiddle to their Congress counterparts in providing leadership to the movement. The success of the struggle, the way it was planned, executed and finally accomplished

was the result of the timing, coordination and orchestration of plans of action on both sides. Both deserve equal credit. Neither did the Nepali Congress occupy centre stage, nor did the UML and other parties simply cheer from the sidelines.

Above all, the power of the people to make or break governments also vividly comes to the fore. The publication is a gruesome reminder of how the Nepali people, when taken for granted, can with the strength of a thousand storms uproot with astonishing ease even a thirty-year regime in just a matter of fifty days: The publication at the same time very subtly warns the present democratic government and political leaders to fulfil, at least to some extent, the pledges and promises they made to the people in the name of democracy and freedom. The bloody struggle is certainly not over yet. The fight was after all, basically against tyranny, oppression, corruption, nepotism and the abuse of human rights, and the people will continue to crush such forces of evil whether it be under the outocratic partyless Panchayat rule or under the present democratic Multi Party system.

The photographs as mentioned earlier, no doubt, speak volumes, but the poor, washed out print quality certainly does not compliment the coffee table publication. Whether in colour or black and white, most of the photos quality wise, are a total disappointment coming as they do from a self trained photographer of twenty years and Photo/Art Editor of Gorkhapatra Cooperation. Despite the shortcomings, however, the final product is still fairly remarkable, and good enough to set the heart racing, the blood boiling and the head spinning. But it is only the price tag of the volume that takes the breath away. A whopping two thousand rupees/ a hundred US dollars! A real heavy weight!

– Ananda P. Shrestha